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Editors’ Note

T

he debate over climate change has evolved over the past
several years; while it began as one about the need for
action, it is now one of degrees. This debate has progressed from discussions regarding climate change to concrete
actions by every industrialized country to reduce their CO2 emissions, except the United States. However, at the state level, the
United States has taken steps to reduce its carbon emissions and
it appears that whoever Americans elect as their next president
will commit the country to any post-Kyoto framework.
We are seeing the canaries in the coal mine with regard to
climate change, including the dying of coral reefs, the melting of
glaciers, and the increase in severe weather events. Every degree
we allow Earth to warm we open Pandora’s box wider. Many
have already conceded a one-degree Celsius rise in global temperatures, at which we will increase the spread of severe droughts
across the globe. A one-degree rise will force many species to
migrate over 100 kilometers towards the poles or face extinction. A one-degree rise will raise sea levels, potentially placing
many large coastal cities below sea level. A one-degree rise in
global temperatures will cause many foreseeable and unknown
consequences; however, this is not to discount the effects of a
two- or even three-degree rise in global temperatures. As global
temperatures increase the consequences increase exponentially.
The economic, ecological, and human costs, devastation, and
consequences are what makes the future fight over climate
change one of degrees.
It is time for all countries, regardless of industrial status,
economic, or population size, or even economic efficiency, to
start addressing the carbon emission issue seriously and commit
to binding reductions. The United States once led this effort with
SO2 reductions to prevent acid rain, and showed that phasing out
emissions under a cap-and-trade scheme does not have to result
in economic downturn, and may even boost an economy. It is
time for the United States to start participating at the international level and show its leadership once more.
This is SDLP’s fourth installment on climate law. From the
beginning we have seen the issues evolve from whether to act
transform to an issue of how to act. This issue includes a wide
range of topics such as how state and federal climate change
actions impact litigation, trade, and taxes; the developing domestic law in the United States and Australia; and encompasses the
Clean Development Mechanism as well as successful efforts to
combat climate change through the international ozone regime.
We are proud to be one of the venues in the climate debate and
1
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An Overview of This Issue:
Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Agreement1
by Mohamed T. El-Ashry*

C

Introduction

limate change is one of humanity’s most pressing and difficult challenges. Without urgent and concerted action,
climate change will seriously affect the way of life in all
countries, damage fragile ecosystems and threaten global security through migratory pressures and resource conflicts. Since
climate change is a long-term problem, it cannot be addressed
successfully through short-term, country-based actions alone.
Resolving the climate crisis will require international cooperation at all levels—from bilateral to regional to global.
Climate change, its causes, and its adverse impacts are
closely linked to economic development, the alleviation of
poverty, and energy security. While solutions will require harmonization of economic growth and poverty alleviation with
Sustainable Development Law & Policy (“SDLP”) is a publication of
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ambitious emissions reductions, they also present tremendous
opportunities for innovation and technological development,
especially in the energy field.
A future global agreement, negotiated under the auspices of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) must have a long-term target to stabilize the
“greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system.”2
Parties must agree on four pathways for negotiation that address
mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance. Any agreement
must be comprehensive, including all countries, all sectors, all
sources and sinks, and mitigation as well as adaptation. The cost
of taking action now is small—about one percent of global gross
domestic product, according to the Stern Review—and the benefits are large compared with the much heavier penalties of postponing action.3 The costs of both mitigation and adaptation will
rise substantially with delay. A new agreement, however, will be
successful only if it is perceived by all participating countries to
be equitable.

Mitigation
Mitigating emissions sufficiently to protect the Earth’s climate will require vast international cooperation. A post-2012
agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC should recognize
the differentiated responsibilities underpinning the UNFCCC,
specifically that “developed countries should take the lead in
combating climate change.” 4 However, “dangerous anthropogenic interference” cannot be avoided by developed countries
acting alone. Even an eighty percent reduction of greenhouse
gas (“GHG”) emissions in all developed countries by 2050
would not achieve this objective without emissions reductions
by rapidly industrializing and developing countries. All countries should commit to reduce collectively global emissions by
at least sixty percent below the 1990 level by 2050 to avoid the
most serious impacts of climate change.
As a first step, developed countries should reduce their collective emissions by thirty percent by 2020. Rapidly industrializing countries on the other hand should commit to reduce their
energy intensity by thirty percent by 2020, an average of four
percent per year, and agree to emissions reduction targets afterwards. Other developing countries should commit to an energy

* Mohamed T. El-Ashry is Senior Fellow with the UN Foundation and serves
as Facilitator of the Global Leadership for Climate Action. Prior to that he was
CEO and Chairman of the Global Environmental Facility. He also served as director for the Environment Department and as Senior Vice President of the World
Resources Institute.
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intensity target differentiated by their responsibilities and capabilities. The international community should develop a monitoring and review system and clear criteria for determining when
and how various categories of countries should assume stronger
climate commitments.
A comprehensive emissions-based agreement sends a clear
signal to the market and offers countries flexibility to implement
emissions reduction strategies that are most appropriate to their
national circumstances. Smaller, targeted agreements, on the
other hand, offer the potential of early action by countries that are
not ready to accept emissions limits and could be incorporated
into a comprehensive climate change agreement. The objective
should be to make the comprehensive agreement and smaller
targeted agreements mutually supportive and complementary.
Country-based agreements among the top-emitting countries in the world, or alternatively between smaller geographic
groups, may offer a simpler negotiating process and the potential
to address a large fraction of the
world’s emissions. Sector-based
targeted agreements should be
encouraged; such agreements
can avoid competitiveness concerns by setting emissions targets
for particular industries—e.g.,
power, transportation, aluminum,
steel, cement, appliances, buildings, and forestry—including
those located in developing countries. Policy-based agreements
could require harmonized carbon
taxes or reductions in emissions
intensity, for example, or support clean technology dissemination. Measures-based agreements could involve specific emission reduction strategies—e.g., energy efficiency, renewable
energy, and land-use regulation.
Energy security and climate security are intertwined and
should be addressed at the same time. Renewable energy and
energy efficiency can contribute to such a strategy. Renewable
energy is a win-win proposition for all countries as it (1) provides opportunities for poverty alleviation and for satisfying
the energy needs in rural and remote areas; (2) helps generate
employment and creates local economic opportunities; (3) helps
curb climate change and contributes to the protection of human
health caused by air pollution; and (4) enhances energy security through reliance on domestic energy sources. The technical
and economic potentials of improving energy efficiency, including building efficiency, are also enormous and should be pursued as aggressively as new supply. In addition, technological
innovations can cost-effectively reduce the risk of large-scale
impacts of energy supply disruptions, especially in the electricity sector.
To reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide cost-effectively,
a full range of interventions to create and maintain biological
sinks of carbon should be included in a post-2012 climate change
regime in order to capture the many co-benefits of sustainable

livelihoods, land management, forestry, and biodiversity conservation. Land-use changes, mainly deforestation, account for
more than twenty percent of global emissions, a share greater
than either the global transport or industrial sectors. With
increasing emphasis on growing biofuels for transport, there will
be increasing pressure to convert remaining forests to other uses.
Both Article 3.3 of the Framework Convention and the history
of Kyoto Protocol negotiations point to the need to include GHG
sinks in any agreement. Difficulties in monitoring and verifying
both above ground and below-ground stocks of carbon need to
be overcome. Because not all forests are alike in their capacity to
sequester carbon dioxide (“CO2”), additional research is needed
to account for their differences.
Because of the size of the forest resource, credits for avoided
deforestation must be coupled with sharply reduced emissions
targets or they could destabilize carbon markets. Reducing
deforestation presents an opportunity to sequester CO2 in the
atmosphere with additional
benefits—the conservation of
biodiversity, the provision of
ecosystem goods and services,
especially water resources, and
the improvement of livelihoods
for neighboring communities.
In this regard, the carbon market offers an opportunity to
change forest management and
improve livelihoods in rural
areas of developing countries.
Markets should be organized to have a reasonable
promise of achieving the policy goals of carbon reductions in
an efficient manner. Most economists agree that to achieve the
greatest climate benefits efficiently and effectively, a carbon
price should be set through carbon taxes or trading. Carbon
taxes are easier to implement than cap-and-trade schemes, are
economically efficient, and would generate significant financial resources. A system of harmonized, universal carbon taxes
should be agreed by the international community.
Recognizing that many in industry prefer a cap-and-trade
system, there is a need for well functioning and financially linked
carbon markets to be developed across the globe, incorporating
various national and regional cap-and-trade programs. In general, emissions allowances should be auctioned, thus raising
resources that can be allocated by national governments for other
purposes, such as clean energy development and adaptation.

Dangerous
anthropogenic interference
cannot be avoided by
developed countries
acting alone.
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Adaptation
Adaptation is a key component of an effective strategy to
address climate change. Adaptation is not simply a matter of
designing projects or putting together lists of measures to reduce
the impacts of climate change. A national policy response would
increase resilience to climate vulnerability and change and should
be anchored in a country’s framework for economic growth and
sustainable development and integrated in its poverty reducSustainable Development Law & Policy

tion strategies. Responses to climate change need to encompass
several levels including access to clean energy for vulnerable
populations, crop and farm-level adaptations, national level agricultural and supporting policies and investments.
Businesses and international financial institutions also need
to integrate climate change into their activities and make their
investments less susceptible to climate change. International
technical and financial assistance should be strengthened and
made more coherent in order to respond at the requisite scale to
the needs of least developed countries. The United Nations has
a pivotal role to play in building institutional, public policy, and
human capacity in support of effective programs of adaptation.
Because the costs of adaptation were thought to provide
largely local benefits, were difficult to distinguish from “regular” development, were suspected to be large, and smacked of
compensation awarded for damages, developed countries have
been reluctant to agree to substantial amounts of funds for
adaptation. Nevertheless, since
climate change will impede
development efforts, increase
risks to public health, frustrate
poverty alleviation programs,
and exacerbate migrations from
waterlogged, water-scarce or
food-scarce regions, there is an
important role for official development assistance in financing
adaptation measures, including
human and institutional capacity building, and in reducing vulnerability of agriculture, forests, and water resources. Effective
adaptation will require broader planning capacity in all relevant
departments and ministries in developing countries. Local scientists should be supported for monitoring and research on climate
impacts on various sectors in their own countries. In addition, all
countries should cooperate in identifying a package of reliable
funding to help countries build resilience to climate risks. Such
funding could include public and private finance and the carbon
market. Development agencies should integrate climate change
effects into their projects and programs.

gies more efficient and affordable. Unfortunately, investments
in both public- and private-sector energy research and development programs have been declining for the last two decades.
These declines need to be halted and reversed.
Market-based mechanisms are good at identifying the
cheapest mitigation opportunities amongst existing options, and
spurring innovations that have immediate cost reductions, but
are less helpful in encouraging the development of new lowemission technologies. Innovation targets to bring new, more
efficient, and less costly technologies to market could be very
helpful. Incentives could be provided to countries (and businesses) that beat these targets in the form of credits against their
future emission targets.
In addition, the formation of a Consultative Group on
Clean Energy Research, as suggested by the International Task
Force on Global Public Goods, could facilitate international collaboration on the development of low-cost, zero-carbon technologies and the exchange of
information about clean energy
technologies.
Sustainable development
is not possible without making
energy systems more sustainable. All developing countries,
especially rapidly industrializing countries, should have
access to clean energy technologies on preferential terms.
The barriers that hamper the dissemination of such technologies
in developing countries, such as intellectual property rights and
competitive rules, should be overcome.

Renewable energy is a
win-win proposition for
all countries.

Technology Development
and Cooperation
If the world continues on its current energy path, dominated
by fossil fuels, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2050 will be
two-and-a-half times their current levels.5 According to the International Energy Agency, these emissions can be returned to their
current levels by 2050 through a combination of the following
actions undertaken in all countries: (1) strong energy efficiency
gains in transport, industry and buildings sectors; (2) increasing
decarbonization of the electric power generation sector through
increased deployment of renewables, nuclear, natural gas, and
coal with CO2 capture and storage; and (3) increased use of biofuels for road transport. However, reducing global emissions by
at least sixty percent at acceptable costs will require a science
and technology revolution, at least as large as those in the space
and telecommunication sectors, to make clean energy technoloWinter 2008

Finance
Both public and private finance are essential for adaptation,
for technology transfer to developing countries, and to implement successfully any comprehensive and long-term strategy to
combat climate change. Climate-friendly investments need to be
multiplied through national and international frameworks, and
the current international carbon market needs to be enhanced in
order to scale up private flows. However, external funding must
be additional to national resources obtained through domestic
savings and taxation. Governments have an obligation to establish a supportive framework for private investment. Local capital markets should facilitate long-term investments in adaptation
measures. Carbon taxes or the auctioning of emissions allowances can also raise resources that can be used for this or other
purposes.
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) was created
under the Kyoto Protocol to support low-carbon investments
in developing countries. For the developed countries, the purpose of the CDM is to lower the cost of emission reductions and
provide an element of flexibility in carrying out their national
obligations. From the developing countries’ perspective, the
purpose of the CDM is to promote their sustainable development
and contribute to the stabilization of GHGs in the atmosphere.
The CDM has encountered administrative and technical hurdles.
4

Initial projects have been limited to a few countries and a few
gases and have been plagued by bureaucratic procedures, and
with little contribution to sustainable development.
The CDM should be reformed in order to deliver its full
potential during the 2008–2012 commitment period, and in the
post-2012 regime an additional
market mechanism should support sectoral approaches capable
of transforming whole sectors of
rapidly industrializing countries
at a speed commensurate with
the challenge of taking emissions
reductions to global scale. The
CDM’s weaknesses exist because
it was created as a project-based
instrument; however, the Executive Board recently approved
the inclusion of “programmes
of activities” in the CDM. In order to promote policy reform,
underwrite technology development, and stimulate investment
flows at a scale that is truly transformational, an additional market mechanism must take a sectoral approach. The fundamental
distinction between the sectoral approach and the project-based
or programmatic approach is that a developing country could set
sector-wide baselines for carbon-intensive sectors at levels that
coincide with its economic interest while meeting commitments
to reduce the energy intensity of its growth.
Public finance also has an important role, especially in demonstrating new approaches for building human and institutional
capacity and for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. However, the existing funding sources for these purposes
(for example, the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) and the
multilateral development banks (“MDBs”)) are too small for the
scale of assistance required. They should be strengthened and
their resources enhanced so that they can play a bigger role in
leveraging private finance for mitigation and adaptation and in
assisting developing countries to set appropriate framework conditions for private investment.
Finance is a critical element of any strategy to address climate change effectively. Funds will be required for increased
assistance to developing countries for the adoption of energy
efficiency and clean energy technologies, and for avoided deforestation. Funds will be required for greening power sectors, for
adaptation, and for increased R&D and deployment in all coun-

tries, focusing especially on technologies that are technically
viable but not yet financially competitive.
A climate fund of additional resources, starting at U.S.
$10 billion and growing to U.S. $50 billion per year, should be
established to support climate change activities in developing
countries (adaptation, avoided
deforestation, and clean energy
development and deployment)
and should include both public
and private resources. It should
have an innovative structure and
governance that is transparent
and inclusive. In addition, existing mechanisms, such as the
GEF and the MDBs, should be
strengthened and their resources
enhanced to continue their
important work in demonstrating new approaches, building human and institutional capacity,
and leveraging private finance.

Finance is a critical
element of any strategy to
address climate
change effectively.

Conclusion
With its limited time frame, participation, and inadequate
provisions for monitoring, the Kyoto Protocol was never seen as
a solution to the climate problem. It was meant to be a first step,
preparing for the broader engagement that will be necessary and
establishing the legal, technical and institutional groundwork for
future regimes. As we embark upon a more comprehensive and
inclusive agreement, we need to build on the experience gained
from Kyoto, particularly in international emissions trading.
We also need to build on the experience of cities, states,
communities, businesses, and individuals who have voluntarily
undertaken important steps to address climate change. As they
have shown, determined action presents substantial opportunities for economic growth and job creation, based on the development and deployment of clean energy technologies. In addition,
public advocacy and information programs can play an important role in enhancing awareness of the impacts of personal
behavior and lifestyle.
Above all, we need to build trust between North and South
and establish an equitable basis and new modalities for genuine international cooperation to address the linked challenges of
energy and climate security. For an issue this important to the
future of the planet, there must be no more broken promises.

Endnotes: Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Agreement
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Climate Change and the States:
Constitutional Issues Arising from State Climate Protection Leadership
by Robert K. Huffman & Jonathan M. Weisgall*

A

Introduction

s state, local, and federal legislators develop policies to
address global climate change, the United States may
soon face the difficult political and legal necessity of
reconciling multiple—and potentially conflicting—state, local,
regional, and federal climate change programs into a comprehensive national policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This
Article reviews some of these programs and explores several
constitutional issues that may arise from state programs designed
to combat climate change.
The causes of climate change
are not completely understood,
but there is now widespread
agreement that humans are having an impact on the climate, primarily from carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases (“GHG”)
that are emitted from burning
fossil fuels. As these gases accumulate in the atmosphere, they
trap heat close to the earth’s surface, causing myriad effects on
our delicate ecosystem.
Regulators and policymakers at the local, state, federal, and
international levels are taking various actions to understand climate change and reduce GHG emissions. The first major action
occurred in 1990, with the release of the first report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).1 This was the
first time that a detailed scientific endeavor was undertaken to
study the climate change phenomenon. The IPCC’s first report
led to international action, with the creation of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty, adopted in
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Brazil.2 It created a UN Secretariat to oversee
the Convention and substantively serves as a framework for further negotiations on detailed protocols aimed at reducing worldwide GHG emissions.

by the required number of parties that represent a specified minimum percentage of worldwide GHG emissions.3
The Kyoto Protocol is in effect only through 2012. Negotiations are currently underway to craft a successor agreement that
would operate through at least 2020. This was the focus of the
December 2007 Conference of the Parties 13 in Bali, Indonesia.
These meetings resulted in an agreement, now known as the Bali
Roadmap, to complete further negotiations over the coming two
years.4
The United States, however, has not adopted the Kyoto
Protocol, objecting to the inclusion of industrialized nations
(Annex I Parties) but not the
developing world. Seeing this as
a competitive disadvantage that
could cause significant harm to
the U.S. economy, the government has refused to adopt the
binding emissions limits called
for in the Kyoto Protocol. Aside
from the United States, every
industrialized nation, including the European Union, has
adopted the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol provides three “flexibility mechanisms”
that allow countries to reduce the costs of achieving their emissions reduction targets. These mechanisms are the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Joint Implementation (“JI”), and
emissions trading. The CDM allows Annex I Parties to implement projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, in
return for Certified Emission Reduction (“CER”) credits.5 JI
allows Annex I Parties to implement projects in other Annex
I Parties that either reduce emissions or enhance carbon sinks,
in return for Emission Reduction Units (“ERU”).6 CDM and JI
projects are subject to a verification and certification process, in
order to ensure the legitimacy of any CER or ERU credits that

Aside from the
United States, every
industrialized nation,
including the European
Union, has adopted the
Kyoto Protocol.

Kyoto Protocol
Five years after the UNFCCC was created, at the Third
Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, an agreement was
reached to create binding emission reduction targets for industrialized nations. This 1997 agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol, came into force on February 16, 2005, after being ratified
Winter 2008
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are generated by the projects. Emissions trading, the final mechanism, is a market-based strategy for reducing GHG emissions.

Emissions Trading Systems
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties may develop
internal emissions trading markets or link together with other
Annex I Parties to create larger trading markets. An emissions
trading market contains a system-wide cap on emissions that
decreases over time, thus ensuring that overall GHG emissions
within the system decrease as well. The system-wide cap and
market features give rise to the general term cap-and-trade to
describe these emissions markets.
The emissions credits that can be traded are of a standard
form, with each credit equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.7 This
is the basic unit of currency in
the emissions reduction world.8
In designing and operating carbon markets, the single most
important issue is consistency
and quality control in measuring emissions. If a tonne from
one facility is not equal to a
tonne from a neighboring facility, the market cannot operate
properly. Therefore, without adequate monitoring, verification,
and reporting procedures, emissions markets will fail to deliver
actual emissions reductions.9

the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS will continue to operate, at least
in a modified form. In January 2008, the European Commission
released proposed rules for the next phase of the EU-ETS, which
will run from 2013 to 2020.11 The proposals will change several
details in the operation of the market and include a provision
that would allow the EU-ETS to link with trading systems in
countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, something
that is not permitted in the current phase. This is interpreted as
a clear overture to the United States to link its future emissions
market(s) to the EU-ETS.

U.S. Federal GHG Policy
The federal government has yet to pass legislation or
issue regulations covering GHG emissions. In January 2007 a
group of major corporations and
prominent environmental groups
formed the United States Climate
Action Partnership (“US CAP”)
and released a report entitled A
Call for Action.12 Its goal is to
put pressure on Congress to adopt
legislation regulating GHG emissions, including a comprehensive
cap-and-trade program. While it
may seem odd for a group of the
largest corporations in America to advocate for potentially costly
regulation, they have come to realize that regulatory uncertainty
and its concomitant risks may exact a greater long-term economic cost than comprehensive—but definite—legislation.
As of this writing, no comprehensive federal climate change
legislation has been adopted. One major cap-and-trade bill,
sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner,13 is considered
the leading proposal on Capitol Hill, but there is only a small
likelihood of final passage in 2008.
The Energy Independence and Security Act,14 signed into
law in December 2007, contains several provisions that are
intended to reduce GHG emissions, but it falls short of the comprehensive legislation advocated by US CAP and others. The Act
includes the first increase in Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(“CAFE”) standards for automobiles since they were enacted in
1975, requiring average fuel economy of thirty-five miles per
gallon in 2020.15 It also includes provisions to improve energy
efficiency in homes and buildings,16 a renewable fuel standard
(mandating the production of at least thirty-six billion gallons
of biofuels by 2020),17 and other provisions to meet President
Bush’s “20 in 10” challenge for reducing gasoline usage by
twenty percent in ten years.
A recent House Committee on Energy and Commerce white
paper looked at the proper role of federal, state, and local governments in any comprehensive carbon regulation scheme. 18
Working under the assumption that the federal government
would eventually enact a cap-and-trade program like the Lieberman-Warner bill, the white paper revealed potential situations in
which state and local leadership could lead to either increased
emissions, increased overall costs, or both. It makes the argument that “climate change is a global, not local, problem, perhaps

No comprehensive federal
climate change legislation
has been adopted.

European Union Emissions Trading System
The most significant market developed under the Kyoto
Protocol flexibility mechanisms is the European Union Emissions Trading System (“EU-ETS”).10 The EU-ETS, which
began operation in 2005, is comprised of twenty-seven European
member nations and sets a cap on the total emissions that can
be generated from power stations, certain large industrial facilities, and oil refineries. Facilities covered by the EU-ETS must
report their total emissions annually and surrender a number of
allowances equal to their total GHG emissions. Some allowances are distributed to facilities for free, others are auctioned
by governments, and others can be purchased on the market
from traders, governments, or other entities that possess them
(including allowances generated by credits in CDM or JI projects). If a facility has extra allowances after it surrenders those
necessary to match its annual emissions output, it can sell them
for profit. This provides an economic incentive to consistently
reduce emissions at a facility. On the other hand, if a facility
does not have enough allowances to cover its surrender requirement, it will have to purchase additional allowances to make up
the shortfall. This serves as an incentive to reduce GHG emissions, particularly if the cost of the allowances in the market is
greater than the cost of making modifications that lead to emissions reductions.
The current phase of the EU-ETS runs through 2012, to
coincide with the timeframe of the operation of the Kyoto Protocol. Regardless of whether there is a global agreement to replace
7
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providing less need for allowing States to be more stringent.”19
As a result, “a more stringent State program may just shift the
location of, rather than decrease, national emissions . . . .” 20 This
would occur when regulated entities move their operations from
states with higher (i.e., more expensive to comply with) standards to ones that follow the lower, federal standards.
The white paper does note, however, that state and local
authorities do have a significant, complementary role to play in
the effort to reduce GHG emissions. For example, building codes
that mandate the use of better insulation in new homes would
cause higher initial prices for consumers, but provide long-term
savings as a result of lower energy bills. These measures “could
capture . . . otherwise lost or uncovered emission reductions, and
thereby decrease the societal cost of achieving greenhouse gas
reductions.”21 The white paper also recognizes the importance
of adequate and efficient monitoring, reporting, and verification
of emissions. “It is probably more efficient to authorize State,
Tribal, and/or local governments to inspect sources to determine compliance with national monitoring and record-keeping
requirements than it would be to leave that exclusively to Federal inspectors.”22
Many state leaders, frustrated at slow federal action to
address climate change, are implementing both comprehensive and piece-meal programs at the state level to help reduce
GHG emissions. The following section discusses the actions
that states have taken on their own to reduce GHG emissions,
focusing heavily on cap-and-trade programs. Next, this Article
raises and analyzes the constitutional issues that may arise as a
result of state responses to this pressing global problem, focusing heavily on the constitutional issues raised by attempts to link
emissions trading systems among states and between states and
foreign parties.

U.S. State-Level Actions
Cap-and-Trade Programs
Although the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto
Protocol, there are several efforts underway to establish state- or
regional-level trading systems. These follow not only the model
of the EU-ETS, but also other successful domestic cap-and-trade
programs administered by the EPA, including the Acid Rain
Program.23
California is in the process of establishing its own capand-trade program. In September 2006, California adopted the
Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as A.B. 32.24 This
law, in part, allows the state to establish a cap-and-trade program
to help meet the goal of capping the state’s emissions at 1990
levels by 2020 and eventually reaching eighty percent below
1990 levels by 2050.25 The program would be administered by
the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), which is in the
process of adopting a scoping plan to identify California’s primary strategies for reducing GHG emissions under A.B. 32. The
goal would be to have the cap-and-trade program operating by
January 1, 2012.26 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has openly
expressed an interest in linking any cap-and-trade program, once
it is open for business, with the EU-ETS market.27
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In addition to California’s intrastate efforts, three interstate
groups are currently in the process of establishing carbon markets. One project, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),28 was initially formed in 2003 and is now made
up of ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic: Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. In addition, several eastern Canadian provinces have expressed interest
in joining RGGI.
The consortium administering RGGI has published model
rules for each of the states to adopt, and all ten states are in the
process of adopting them in statutory or regulatory form. The
goal is to have the market operating by January 2009. At this
point, it appears likely that the market will be ready to open at
that time, although all ten states may not be participating at the
outset, as a few may have outstanding issues to resolve in the
early stages of the program.
The second multi-state group, known as the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), consists of seven Western states and
two Canadian provinces: Arizona, California, Montana, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia, and
Manitoba. The WCI was established in February 2007, and as
a result is not as far along in the process as RGGI. WCI is currently in the design phase, having completed basic design principles and established a year-long work-plan.29 Its goal is to have
the design of the market-based mechanism completed in August
2008. Based on this timeline, it is unlikely that the WCI will be
able to establish a functioning market before 2011 or 2012.
A third group, consisting of nine Midwestern states and
the Canadian province of Manitoba, signed the Midwestern
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord in November of
2007, which is designed to establish greenhouse gas reduction
targets, a regional cap-and-trade protocol, and a regional system
to track and manage greenhouse gas emissions.30

Renewable Portfolio Standards
A renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) is a state-level
mandate requiring electric utilities to obtain a certain percentage
of their power from renewable resources. Twenty-four states and
the District of Columbia currently have RPSs, while four other
states have non-binding goals for adopting renewable energy.31
A typical RPS might call for having twenty percent of
energy produced from renewable resources by 2020. Currently,
Minnesota and Oregon have the highest standards calling for
twenty-five percent renewable energy production by 2025.32
The renewable resources that qualify for state RPS programs
generally include wind, solar (concentrated and photovoltaic), geothermal, and biomass. Nuclear power does not satisfy
RPS requirements and cannot be used to meet the renewable
standards.

Auto Emissions Regulations
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits states from issuing
their own auto emissions regulations. There is one exception that
applies only to California, as California was the only state regulating auto emissions prior to the enactment of the CAA in 1966.
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Section 209(b) of the Act allows California to seek a waiver
from the EPA, which shall be granted unless “the Administrator
finds that—(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and
capricious, (B) such State does not need such State standards
to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such
State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are
not consistent with section 202(a)” of the CAA.33 Other states
then have the choice of adopting the federal rule or the California rule.
Citing the fact that automobile emissions account for
roughly forty percent of GHG
emissions in California, the California Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill of 2002, known as A.B.
1493, requires CARB to adopt
“regulations that achieve the
maximum feasible reduction
and cost-effective reduction of
greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles.” 34 The regulations
are not fuel economy standards
per se, but instead regulate the
amount of GHG emissions that
automobiles sold in the state
may produce.
In 2004, CARB promulgated regulations pursuant to
A.B. 1493 calling for a reduction
in emissions by automobiles totaling over fifty million tonnes of
carbon dioxide by 2030.35 This equates to a twenty-seven percent reduction in automobile emissions by 2030. California formally sought a waiver from the EPA in December 2005.36 Since
California adopted its regulations, sixteen other states have followed its lead and passed laws requiring automobiles to meet the
California standards.
After the April 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,37 in which Massachusetts won a significant victory
that formally establishes EPA’s authority to regulate GHG gases
as pollutants, Governor Schwarzenegger met with EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson to encourage EPA to grant California’s
waiver application. However, in December 2007, Administrator
Johnson notified California that the waiver application would be
denied, on the grounds that California’s situation does not meet
the “compelling and extraordinary conditions” test.38 Identifying global climate change as a worldwide problem and citing
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,39 which
increased CAFE standards, the EPA determined that California’s
more strict GHG emissions reduction rule may not be enforced.
This was the first time, after more than fifty successful applications, that a waiver request under Section 209(b) was denied by
the EPA.40
California and several other states have since sued the EPA,
and the case is currently pending in federal court.41 For advocates
of state action to slow the impacts of climate change, the waiver
denial was both a significant blow to their efforts and a rallying

cry. Regardless of one’s views on the merits of the EPA decision, the decision underscores the importance of clarifying the
role of the states, as this waiver decision is likely to be a major
court battle lasting several years and costing millions of dollars.

Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards
In January 2007, California became the first state to adopt
a greenhouse gas performance standard (“GGPS”).42 This is a
facility-based emissions standard, affecting electric utilities,
which requires that all new long-term baseload generation commitments in California produce
no more emissions than a combined gas cycle turbine plant.43
It prohibits load-serving entities
(investor-owned utilities, energy
service providers, and community choice aggregators) from
entering into long-term financial commitments (five years
or more) for baseload generation with higher than proscribed
emissions, regardless of the type
of fuel used in the plant.44
This means that no new
coal-fired plants can be built
in California, nor can existing
plants make significant capital
improvements that do not conform to the GGPS. In addition, it prohibits California utilities
from contracting to import power from out of state that does not
comply with the emissions requirements of the GGPS.45

When states take actions
to regulate greenhouse
gases, it raises questions
about the extent of
state authority to regulate
the economy and
the environment.
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Constitutional Issues
The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal
and state governments to share power in certain areas, while
each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regulate. The power of the federal government is constrained by the
Constitution and does not include general police powers, which
are reserved to the states.46 State governments, however, may
not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce,
foreign affairs, and other areas of reserved federal power.
When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it
raises questions about the extent of state authority to regulate
the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading
programs or enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to
the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder
nature of emission trading and carbon dioxide emissions generally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can
potentially arise from state actions to reduce GHG emissions.

Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme Court
has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting
federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Commerce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition
on certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce,
invalidating the state law by negative implication.49
Although the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has
gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme
Court justices (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) reject it altogether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that
a majority of the Court would reject the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court,
state actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with
unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause,
but would be subject to invalidation only for express or implied
preemption by federal law.
The basic test for whether a state law violates the Commerce
Clause is to look first at whether the law discriminates on its face
against out-of-state entities or transactions.50 If there is facial
discrimination, which essentially means a protectionist measure
that is written in a manner that singles out foreign entities or
transactions for disadvantageous treatment when compared to
their in-state counterparts, then the state law will be invalidated.51 If there is no facial discrimination, the state law can still
run afoul of the Commerce Clause if it places unwarranted burdens on interstate commerce in a particular application or range
of applications.52 “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”53
A linked cap-and-trade program may raise questions of discrimination. One of the biggest issues with establishing regional
cap-and-trade programs is “leakage,” which occurs when a regulated entity imports cheaper, higher-polluting power from an
area outside the program to evade cap obligations. For example,
if an electrical utility in a state covered by RGGI did not possess
enough allowances for the current year, and it was more economical to purchase coal-fired electricity from the neighboring
state than to buy allowances on the open market, the emissions
produced by the neighboring utility company would “leak” into
the regulated space of the cap-and-trade system when the electricity was purchased by the RGGI-covered company.
This leakage issue creates a serious problem for regulators. If the trading system allows or remains silent on importing
power from states that leave GHG emissions unregulated, the
credibility of the program as a whole will become suspect. At
the same time, if the regional system were to attempt to ban the
purchase of any power from non-member states, there would be
at least a colorable argument of facial discrimination. In order
to avoid these problems, the designers of regional cap-and-trade
programs like RGGI will have to find innovative solutions that
can protect the integrity of the emissions reduction mechanisms
while at the same time avoiding potential constitutional pitfalls.
Linking a state or regional cap-and-trade program with a
foreign trading system like the EU-ETS would raise unique conWinter 2008

stitutional issues not present in a wholly domestic linkage situation. Emission trading linkages with foreign parties would create
a whole host of problems, from verification and standardization
of credits at an international level to accounting and securities
disclosure laws and regulations. Credits created by European
entities would require some sort of regulation under federal
securities and/or commodities law. The federal government
would have a good argument that states should not be involved
in activities over which they do not have full control. Because a
state cannot independently regulate securities and commodities
markets, it may be impossible for a state or group of states to
provide adequate oversight of a market linked to international
participants.
In addition, the Dormant Commerce Clause can potentially
affect attempts to institute greenhouse gas performance standards. This would not be a discrimination issue, as the performance standards are facially neutral. Rather, courts would have
to look at whether the performance standards unduly burden
interstate commerce. If California’s rules prohibit long term contracts for the in-state sale of energy from out-of-state coal-fired
plants, out-of-state producers are likely to cry foul and sue over
the lost business from California’s utilities. At that point, the
courts would have to weigh the relative benefits of California’s
standards against the burden they place on interstate commerce.

Compacts Clause
The Compacts Clause, Article I, § 10, cl. 3, reads in part:
“No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
power[.]”54
In reviewing claims under the Compacts Clause, courts
look generally to whether states are attempting to enhance their
power at the expense of the federal government.
Where an agreement is not ‘directed to the formation
of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States,’ it
does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not
be invalidated for lack of congressional consent.55
The first question that courts look at is whether a contractual
arrangement, such as a cap-and-trade system, reaches the point
of being a “compact” under the Compacts Clause. If it is a compact, then it generally must be approved by Congress or it will
be invalid.56 Once approved by Congress, it reaches the level
of federal law. Thus, for an unapproved state-to-state or stateto-foreign-party relationship to be valid, it must not reach the
formality of being a “compact” for these purposes.
To answer the first question, whether an arrangement is an
agreement or compact, the courts look to the general indicia of
a compact. The Supreme Court summarized the relevant factors
in Northeast Bancorp v. Federal Reserve,57 a decision involving
an agreement by holding companies to purchase banks:
The . . . statutes . . . both require reciprocity and impose
a regional limitation . . . . But several of the classic indicia of a compact are missing. No joint organization or
body has been established to regulate regional banking
10

or for any other purpose. Neither statute is conditioned
on action by the other State, and each State is free to
modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most importantly,
neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional
limitation.58
From the passage above, one can draw some general criteria
for determining whether a contractual relationship is an agreement or compact. There should be some sort of joint organization or body to govern the agreement, if necessary. It should be
binding; that is, no state can freely remove itself from the agreement. And it must require a reciprocity of the regional limitation,
meaning that one party cannot agree to a nationwide program
while another believes the agreement only covers a handful of
states.
Regarding a regional cap-and-trade program, courts are
unlikely to find that RGGI or a similar program is a compact,
unless the agreement contains language that conditions actions
(in one state) on actions by other states and is not freely revocable by participant states. It appears, based on Northeast
Bancorp, that a voluntary union, which allows for a state to back
out should it not want to participate, would not be considered a
compact for the purposes of the Clause.
However, it is difficult to see how a linked international
cap-and-trade framework could be crafted so as not to constitute a compact or even a treaty, which would be impermissible
under Article I, § 10, cl. 1, regardless of the presence or absence
of congressional approval. In order to have a properly functioning linkage between markets, there would need to be guarantees regarding enforceability and permanence. Without legally
enforceable guarantees about the quality of the credits being
traded, the markets are unlikely to succeed. There would be a
serious problem, for example, if an offset project in California
created credits that were purchased by a steel manufacturer in
France, and California de-linked itself from the markets. The
problem of how the French manufacturer would account for the
credits in the absence of a monitoring or verification mechanism
to account for what is happening in California is a significant
one. The only way to ensure the integrity of the credits being
traded in the marketplace is to create a framework that is robust
enough to protect all of the parties involved. This would presumably include the inability to voluntarily leave the program and
would be most easily accomplished with some sort of central
emissions registry that aggregates and processes data from all
participants. These components are almost certain to create a
compact under the Compacts Clause, which would then require
congressional approval in order to be valid.

Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2, defines the Constitution and laws made “in Pursuance thereof” as “the supreme
Law of the Land[.]”59 This provision allows federal law to preempt state law in certain circumstances.
“Even without an express provision for preemption, we
have found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in
at least two circumstances,” the Supreme Court noted in U.S.
v. Locke.60 “When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the
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field,’ state law in that area is preempted. And even if Congress
has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the
extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”61
A presumption of non-preemption arises in disputes involving the traditional police powers of the states; despite the presumption, even the police powers will yield when Congress
clearly intends to supersede state law.62 In addition, when there
is a history of significant federal presence in the area of regulation, there is no presumption of state law validity.63
With a cap-and-trade system, the question is whether any
federal law creates a conflict or if the federal government otherwise occupies the field. At this point, Congress has not passed
any legislation that would present a direct conflict with a multistate cap-and-trade system. Indeed, the federal government has
been remarkably absent from the field of greenhouse gas regulation in general.
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA,64 the federal government’s inaction becomes even more stark. The Court noted that
“EPA has not identified any Congressional action that conflicts
in any way with the regulation of greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles.”65 Although issued in the context of federal
regulations rather than state statutes, the point is the same: the
federal government has not taken efforts to regulate GHG emissions. Massachusetts v. EPA held that EPA has the authority
to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles because they fit
within the statutory definition of “air pollutant” under § 202(a)
(1).66 The case was remanded to the EPA for the agency to either
make a finding of endangerment and regulate auto emissions or
provide a reasoned judgment as to why GHGs do not contribute
to global warming and can thus escape regulation.67
Even if the EPA decides to regulate GHG emissions from
autos, that would not necessarily provide a conflict for a capand-trade program. Most proposals for cap-and-trade programs
only regulate tailpipe emissions indirectly. If they capture the
transportation sector, it is done upstream through regulating
the fuel industry, rather than limiting actual vehicle emissions.
As a result, it is unlikely that any forthcoming rule stemming
from Massachusetts v. EPA would preempt state cap-and-trade
initiatives.
The best case for federal preemption would arise if the
federal government instituted a similar cap-and-trade system
or other form of comprehensive carbon emissions regulation.
Any program that created a nationwide price for carbon would
likely be interpreted as directly conflicting with state programs;
in the alternative, courts would probably hold that federal efforts
occupy the field of GHG regulation. But lacking such a program,
as is currently the case, it is difficult to see any way in which
a state-organized cap-and-trade program could be preempted
under the Supremacy Clause.
Some congressional leaders are advocating for express preemption in any future comprehensive cap-and-trade bill. The
Dingell-Boucher white paper,68 which discusses the role of
federal, state, and local governments in efforts to reduce GHG
emissions, makes the case for express preemption. “[O]nce a
national, economy-wide cap-and-trade program is adopted, State
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or regional cap-and-trade programs may interfere with the efficient functioning of the Federal cap-and-trade program[.]”69 As a
result, “Chairman Dingell has made it very clear that he believes
that motor vehicle greenhouse gas standards should be set by
the Federal Government, not by State governments[.]”70 In addition, the analysis finds that compliance costs and overall system
costs (including regulatory overhead) are likely to be higher in
any duplicative system of federal and state/regional regulation.71
While the current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill actually encourages and provides incentives for states to take actions
above and beyond the federal cap-and-trade program,72 there is
a possibility that an express preemption clause could be part of
any final bill.
The Supreme Court recently looked at the scope of express
preemption of state laws, which may be relevant as applied to
future GHG regulations.73 In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transp. Ass’n, several transport carrier associations sued Maine
over regulations governing the conduct of carriers that deliver
packages containing tobacco, as a way to help prevent youth
from purchasing cigarettes through mail-order retailers. Federal
motor carrier law expressly preempts any state from “enact[ing]
or enforc[ing] a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”74
The state law, for example, required carriers to utilize a recipient-verification service, to ensure that the person who ordered
the tobacco is also the recipient, and that the recipient is at least
eighteen years old.75
In holding that the state law was preempted, the court noted
that “to interpret the federal law to permit these, and similar,
state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations. That state regulatory patchwork is inconsistent with Congress’s major legislative
effort to leave such decisions, where federally unregulated, to
the competitive marketplace.”76 This line of reasoning could be
relevant, particularly for state efforts to regulate GHG emissions
from automobiles.
Although there has not been affirmative congressional
action to deregulate GHG emissions, as there was with the motor
carrier industry, the threat of inconsistent state regulations is a
significant tool for the federal government to yield. The threat
of a patchwork of state laws was one of the major reasons EPA
Administrator Johnson decided to reject California’s application
for a waiver—even though there could never be more than just
the federal standard and the California standard in that instance.
The easiest way to prevent the threat of a patchwork of standards
is to include in any federal legislation an express preemption
clause that prohibits states from acting in a given area.77 Should
the federal government adopt comprehensive carbon legislation,
it is likely to include some level of express preemption of state
laws to ensure a consistent approach for the entire country. This
will inevitably lead to legal battles that delay the implementation
of any comprehensive carbon regulation program.

Interference with Foreign Affairs
The power to conduct foreign affairs is vested exclusively
in the federal government. Aspects of the power are constituWinter 2008

tionally divided between the President in Article II (e.g., power
to make treaties) and the Congress in Article I (e.g., power to
raise an army, declare war). States do not play a role in foreign
affairs, as it is important for the federal government to be able to
speak with one voice on behalf of the national interest for matters involving foreign affairs.
Generally, the only cases where courts have struck down
laws as interfering with foreign affairs power are “state or local
laws purporting to set up their own authorities as mini-statedepartments, with power to oversee and either approve or disapprove foreign regimes or the negotiation efforts of the U.S.
Executive Branch[.]”78
In Zschernig v. Miller,79 the Supreme Court invalidated
an Oregon law that prevented a nonresident alien from inheriting property unless certain conditions were met—primarily,
a reciprocal right for Americans in the alien’s country and the
assurance that any property received in Oregon would not be
confiscated at home. Noting that states are the typical forum
for probate matters, the Court still found the law problematic.
“The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the
descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must
give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.” 80 Zschernig involved a citizen of East Germany, a
country with which the United States had no treaties regarding
inheritance. Regardless, “even in absence of a treaty, a State’s
policy may disturb foreign relations.” 81
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 82 is the first in
a line of recent foreign affairs cases that focus on state attempts
to limit contact with foreign countries. The Crosby court heard
a challenge to a Massachusetts law that prohibited state entities
from buying goods or services from companies doing business
with Burma.83 At the time the law was passed, there was no similar federal prohibition, although a federal law providing for sanctions on Burma was enacted a few months later. Although the
Court spoke specifically of the Supremacy Clause, the decision’s
rationale focused heavily on how the Massachusetts law tied the
President’s hands and thus reduced his leverage against Burma.
We need not get into any general consideration of limits of state action affecting foreign affairs to realize
that the President’s maximum power to persuade rests
on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access
to the entire national economy without exception for
enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political
tactics.84
The Crosby reasoning was followed recently in an Illinois case.85 The district court there looked at an Illinois law
that regulated contact with and investment in Sudan and determined that the state law was unconstitutional, based primarily
on Supremacy Clause grounds. There was, however, extensive
discussion of the foreign affairs powers in the decision. Understanding that the federal government has a unique and exclusive
role in carrying out the country’s foreign policy, the court noted
that “the degree of impact a state law has or might have on the
national government’s conduct of foreign affairs is the relevant
inquiry.”86 In National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias,
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requiring pension funds to divest from Sudan, while potentially
raising difficulties for the fund managers, did not interfere with
the federal government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.87
The Giannoulias ruling also contains dicta that is supportive of state efforts to reach non-discriminatory agreements with
foreign entities: the court indicates that “it does not appear that
state and local governments are prohibited from entering into
‘sister state’ agreements or other bilateral agreements with subnational foreign governments or foreign trade associations.” 88
Finally, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,89 the
Supreme Court extended the ruling in Crosby to areas where
there was no explicit federal statute, but merely executive agreements between the President and heads of foreign states. Garamendi involved a California law requiring any insurer in the state
to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between
1920 and 1945. This was seen as a way of ensuring that claims
belonging to Holocaust victims were paid to any survivors and
their heirs living in California.
President Clinton, however, had made executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and France so that all claims
against German insurance companies relating to the Holocaust
would be heard by an international commission established for
that purpose.90 The Court noted that the President has considerable authority in the area of foreign relations and can act independently of Congress. “While Congress holds express authority
to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its
war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act.” 91 Thus, congressional silence does not undermine the executive agreements,
which can, even without an explicit conflict, preempt state laws.
Garamendi was a 5-4 decision, with Justices Rehnquist and
O’Connor in the majority. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which
was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, focused
on whether there was an explicit conflict between the executive
agreement and the state law. Without such a conflict the dissenting Justices would not allow an executive agreement to preempt
a state law. Justice Ginsburg also noted that “the notion of ‘dormant foreign affairs preemption’ with which Zschernig is associated resonates most audibly when a state action ‘reflects a state
policy critical of foreign governments and involves ‘sitting in
judgment’ on them.’” 92
Applying the case law above to a scenario in which states
attempted to link to a foreign trading system, the lack of a coher-

ent federal policy on GHG regulation at this point strongly points
to the constitutionality of such a linkage. The biggest potential
problem would occur if there is federal legislation that makes
mention of international linkages, or if the President makes clear
statements concerning national priorities for GHG regulation
that conflict with linking domestic trading systems with their
international counterparts.
Perhaps just as important, any attempt to link to foreign
emissions trading systems will be viewed very differently from
the Crosby and Giannoulias cases. States attempting linkages
will not be disparaging or otherwise passing negative judgment
on foreign parties, as occurred in those cases involving state laws
prohibiting or restricting commerce with rogue nations. Without
that factor, it is difficult to imagine how courts could find any
sort of interference with America’s foreign policy prerogatives.
Thus, cap-and-trade system linkages are likely permissible overtures to international partners, particularly if the federal government still has not undertaken a comprehensive scheme of carbon
regulation.

Conclusion
State governments continue to demonstrate leadership in
combating climate change—from adopting energy efficiency
standards to enacting renewable portfolio standards to developing cap-and-trade programs aimed at reducing carbon dioxide
emissions, often as part of regional compacts. At the same time,
the Congress is in the process of developing national climate
change legislation and agencies in the Executive Branch are
defining their roles. As the federal and state governments begin
regulating the same areas of the economy and the environment,
the potential for conflicting programs arises.
State programs are potentially vulnerable to a variety of
constitutional challenges, including through the Commerce,
Compacts, Supremacy, and Foreign Affairs clauses. As the federal government solidifies its approach to global climate change
over the next several years, the likelihood for preemption of
state programs will become more evident. It is apparent now,
however, that state programs are in serious jeopardy if the federal government actively seeks to restrict state authority. If the
current or future President does not want states to play an active
role in climate change regulation, he or she will have several
constitutional tools at their disposal to handicap the states’ abilities to create programs that reduce GHG emissions.
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2
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Kyoto Protocol, id. art 6.

7

Kyoto Protocol, id. art 17.

1 Intergovernmental

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 849, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
(last visited Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
3

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/kpeng.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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California Sues EPA After ‘Unconscionable’
Waiver Denial by Addie Haughey*

O

n January 2, 2008 the state of California filed a complaint in the 9th Circuit against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for its December 2007 denial
of a Clean Air Act waiver request made by California nearly two
years before.1
Under the Clean Air Act, California has the ability to enact
its own air pollution laws due to unique and extreme impacts of
pollution in the state.2 In order to implement stricter regulations,
California must acquire a waiver from EPA and the state has
done this nearly fifty times over the last three decades.3 Previous waivers allowed California to create laws requiring catalytic
converters, unleaded gasoline, and other major advancements
in air pollution reduction, which are often implemented on the
national level.4
A waiver seeking to impose stricter tail-pipe emission
standards was originally requested by California on December
21, 2005.5 The waiver was based on policy developed by the
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) that was intended to
phase in and ramp up greenhouse gas auto emission standards
starting with the 2009 model year.6 According to CARB, global
warming emissions would be cut by thirty percent by model year
2016, which is the equivalent to taking 6.5 million cars off California roads by 2020.7 The waiver request cited global warming
impacts on California’s expansive coastline and the Sierra Moun
tain snowpack to justify the need to regulate greenhouse gasses.8
The Clean Air Act also allows other states to adopt California’s standards if they prefer them over the federal alternative.9 To date, sixteen states comprising forty-five percent of the
US auto market have adopted or are in the process of adopting
California standards, which increases the impact of the proposed
standards, creating the effect of taking twenty-two million cars
off America’s roads by 2020.10
After California’s waiver request in 2005, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger made multiple efforts to force EPA to grant a
decision on the waiver, including filing suit in 2007.11 The EPA
denied the waiver12 on December 19, 2007 the same day that the
U.S. Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007.13 The final Act was a stripped down version of what
many environmentalists had hoped would be the largest advancement in energy policy in decades.14 Provisions that would have
allowed tax incentives for renewable energy were left out, but
the bill does create the first increase in corporate average fuel
economy (“CAFE”) standards since the 1970s.15 According to
the White House, new standards will reach thirty-five miles per
gallon (“mpg”) by 2020.16
Some question whether the waiver denial coming the same
day as the passage of the energy bill is a coincidence or an
engineered political compromise. EPA staffers anonymously
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revealed that Johnson made his decision against their unanimous
recommendations to grant the waiver.17 One staffer went so far
as to say “California met every criteria . . . on the merits. The
same criteria we have used for the last 40 years on all the other
waivers.”18 Johnson, on the other hand, said that his staff “presented [him] with a range of options with a lot of pros and cons”
which he considered before deciding to deny the waiver.19
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (“AAM”) adamantly denies a compromise, saying there are absolutely no linkages between the group’s decision to support the final version of
the energy bill and EPA’s denial of the California waiver.20 Critics point out the sudden reversal of AAM’s position after decades
of vigorous opposition to the increase of emission standards.21
Regardless of whether the political conspiracy theories are
correct, a bitter battle is brewing between the Schwarzenegger
and Bush administrations. California began an immediate volley of sharp words, attacking the EPA assertion that California’s
plan would not be as effective as the federal strategy. In his letter to Schwarzenegger, Johnson claimed that California’s plan
would only reach a 33.5 mpg standard as opposed to the federal
standard of 35 mpg.
Mary Nichols of CARB, who oversaw air regulations under
the Clinton administration, said that Johnson’s decision shows
“that this administration ignores the science and ignores the
law to reach the politically convenient conclusion.”22 Governor
Schwarzenegger called EPA’s decision “unconscionable” and
said the EPA was “ignoring the will of millions of people who
want their government to take action in the fight against global
warming.”23 California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
said Johnson “must have consulted a Ouija board, I don’t know
what else can explain his bizarre decision.”24
The Los Angeles Times reported that EPA technical and
legal staff predicted that if the waiver was denied, EPA would
likely lose a legal challenge to its decision, but that if the waiver
was granted and the EPA was sued by representatives of the auto
industry, that EPA is almost certain to win.25
In the last year several pro-state decisions have been handed
down in support of regulation of greenhouse gasses, including
Massachusetts v. EPA and Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombie. These cases and others involving environmental organizations are likely to give support to California in the upcoming
litigation. Despite any predictions, both sides appear ready for
a fight.
Endnotes: California Sues EPA continued on page 82
*Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.

14

Is the Clean Development Mechanism
Sustainable? Some Critical Aspects
by Dr. Christina Voigt*

T

Introduction

he Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) is rapidly
developing as an important element in international climate policy by providing a cost-effective means of complying with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. Defined in
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM provides for Annex
I Parties to implement project activities that reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) in non-Annex I Parties, in return
for certified emission reductions (“CERs”).1 The CERs generated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties
to help meet their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol
and can be traded on the international emissions trading market. Article 12 also stresses that
CDM projects should assist the
developing country host Parties (non-Annex I Parties) in
achieving sustainable development and in contributing to
the ultimate objective of the
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”).2
There are currently more than 900 registered CDM projects in forty-nine developing countries, and about another 2,000
projects in the project registration pipeline. The registered projects have resulted in 117,394,796 issued CERs.3 The CDM is
expected to generate more than 2.6 billion CERs, each equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide, by the time the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012.4
Therefore, the CDM is not only an innovative mechanism
that builds a bridge over the ‘North/South’ gap in the Kyoto
Scheme, but it also brings together private economic interests
and public climate policy by helping to channel private sector investment toward climate-friendly projects that otherwise
might not have taken place. A CDM project attracts substantial
transfers in financial and technological services to developing
countries while promoting climate protection and diminishing
the extent of national climate change mitigation in developed
countries.
Thus, it is crucial that a CDM project delivers real climate
benefits without causing other environmental damages, and
therefore upholds environmental integrity. Yet, how to ensure
the CDM’s environmental integrity is a legal challenge that
remains. Environmental impacts of the CDM have already led
buyers of carbon credits to increasingly try to protect them-

selves from liability for environmental damage caused by GHG
projects.5

Legal Challenges
The CDM is unique among the flexibility mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol in that it allows Annex I Parties to increase
their accumulated caps by obtaining emission credits generated
by investments in a CDM project in an uncapped, developing
(non-Annex I) Party. Each CER is an additional carbon tonne
which will entitle an Annex I, “investor,” Party to an equivalent increase in emissions from its territory, while remaining in
compliance.6
However, the lack of quantitative mitigation commitments
in CDM host countries and an
interest in a maximal number
of CERs resulting from a CDM
project create incentives for both
sides, CER-buyers/investors and
host states, involved in a CDM
project to inflate the amount of
CERs claimed.7 Therefore, the
more successful the CDM is at
generating CERs, the more an
Annex I Party can use those CERs to increase its territorial emissions above its cap, and the more important it is that each CER
corresponds to real, long-term, measurable emission reduction.
Apparently, with increasing volumes of CERs, the environmental performance of the entire Kyoto System depends upon the
environmental performance of the CDM. Environmental performance of the CDM depends on the demonstrated ability of
the CDM system to support the objective of the UNFCCC: to
stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at safe
levels.8 This ability of the CDM, coupled with avoiding other
environmental damages is usually referred to as “environmental
integrity.”9
The importance of environmental integrity has been made
obvious by the 2005 Meeting of the Parties (“MOP”) 1 when
adopting the Marrakech Accords (now titled Kyoto Rule Book).
In decision 2/CMP.1, “Principles, nature and scope of the mech-

The long-term, significant
reduction of GHGs is a
necessary condition for
sustainable development.
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anisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol,” the Parties emphasize that “environmental integrity is to be
achieved through sound modalities, rules and guidelines for the
mechanisms, sound and strong principles and rules governing
land use, land use change and forestry activities, and a strong
compliance regime.”10
In this Article, I will try to explore what this passage implies
for the CDM and attempt to highlight some aspects of the current design of the CDM that raise concerns about environmental
integrity.

Definition of
Environmental Integrity
Environmental integrity in general refers to the ability of
an environmental measure to reach its objective and purpose. It
therefore relates to the quality of the regime, its instruments, and
its institutions. In the context of the climate regime, the extent to
which the means are able to achieve the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC, as stated in Article 2, is essential in considering the
environmental integrity of the entire regime.
With regard to the flexibility mechanisms, environmental
integrity will depend on their capacity to ensure that the Parties included in Annex I do not exceed their assigned amounts.
Emissions, reductions, and removals need, therefore, not only
be quantifiable by using the same standard worldwide, but also
real, complete, accurate, long-term, environmentally conservative, comparable, and verifiable.
Particularly in the climate regime, environmental integrity
is a requirement for the promotion of sustainable development
by a climate measure. The long-term, significant reduction of
GHGs is a necessary condition for sustainable development. In
other words, no development is sustainable if the issue of tackling climate change is left unsolved.

Environmental Integrity of the CDM
In the particular case of the CDM, environmental integrity
can be defined in a wider and a narrower sense. In its narrower
(or primary) sense, it is the demonstrated ability to approve projects and to certify emissions reductions that are real and additional, for example, reductions that would not have occurred
in the absence of the project, and to support projects that contribute to long-term reductions in GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere.11 Environmental integrity in a wider (or secondary)
sense means that other environmental concerns need to be taken
into account and negative impact avoided. Special concerns in
this respect relate to biological diversity protection connected to
land use, land use change, and forestry projects.12 In particular,
these concerns exist where CO2 sequestration projects (biomass
or forest sinks) result in large-scale plantations of mono-cultural
and/or non-indigenous tree species that could pose a threat to, or
destroy local ecological systems.

Some Critical Aspects
Additionality and Leakage
One of the key issues for the environmental integrity of
CDM projects is the additionality of emission reductions or
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removals.13 Article 12(5)(c) of the Kyoto Protocol provides that
CERs shall be certified if based on reductions that are additional
to any that would occur in the absence of the project.14 Additionality is a necessary requirement for making the CDM function as a mechanism to compensate for emissions that are not
being reduced domestically by Annex I Parties.15 If CERs are
created that represent emission reductions that would have happened anyway, then these “paper reductions” will undermine the
integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.
Each project participant must demonstrate the additionality of the project in the project design document (“PDD”). Each
project must describe the baseline scenario from which this
additionality is measured. This baseline scenario represents the
GHG emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the
project. Problematic in this context is the counter-factuality of
the baseline scenario: the project developer needs to investigate
what would have happened if the project had not taken place.
This scenario can lead to hypothetical assumptions, which help
to inflate the amount of CERs.
To counter such incentives, the project must be based on
a baseline and monitoring methodology applied to the project
activity. The Executive Board (“EB”), which is assisted by the
Panel on Guidelines for Methodologies for Baselines and Monitoring Plans (“Meth Panel”), are to approve the methodologies.16
However, the issue here is whether the EB and/or the Meth Panel
are adequately equipped to carry out this task. Concerns have
arisen with respect to the member’s capacity to carry this task
and to the financial budget available for this kind of work.17
The PDD must further include the project boundary and any
adjustments for leakage. This means that a project must calculate
all GHG emissions under the control of the project participants
that are significant and reasonably attributable to the project
activity. These must then be adjusted for net changes of greenhouse gas emissions outside of the project boundary, which are
measurable and contributable to the project activity.18
Additionality coupled with prevention of leakage helps to
address concerns that investments in the CDM could displace,
rather than replace, GHG-intensive activities. An example of
such leakage would occur if a CDM project reduced fossil fuels
where it meant to, but also resulted in increases elsewhere. The
challenge, however, is how to define “project boundaries” and
“emissions under the control of the project participant” in this
context. “Leakage” might easily be detected if it happens in the
same industrial sector or the same region, however, increases
can also occur across country borders. These emissions might
hardly be found to be under the control of the project developer,
and thus not calculable in the baseline-scenario.
In order to survive an “environmental integrity check,” a
CDM project would need to prove that its additionality does not
lead to increased emissions elsewhere or slow climate change
mitigation efforts. It is within the climate regime that a solution
to this situation needs to be found. Therefore, the design of the
CDM has to prevent projects that lead to a net increase in emissions, whether that is in the same sector, in other sectors, in other
regions of the same country, or in other countries.
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The additionality criterion in its present state, despite being
crucial to the environmental integrity of the CDM, can create
adverse policy incentives to climate change mitigation. The
potential of CDM projects to generate much-needed investment
flows into a host country has led some developing countries to
back off from implementing more progressive energy or climate
policies and the respective legislation needed. These policies
and laws, if integrated into the baseline, would disqualify CDM
projects that aim at meeting these new standards or thresholds
because they no longer would be additional.19
In order to promote environmental integrity while encouraging progressive climate policies in these countries, a solution
to, and safeguard against, this disturbing situation must be found
within the climate regime.

Contribution to Sustainable Development
The contribution of the CDM to sustainable development
needs to be seen in terms of host country development, as
expressed as one of the CDM goals mentioned above. Given the
reference to the objective of the Convention and the role that climate change mitigation itself plays in sustainable development,20
any assessment of the CDM’s contribution must also recognize
the wider role projects and the mechanism itself can play as catalysts for sustainable development of host States.21
CDM’s contribution to sustainable development was subject to considerable debate during the negotiations of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords and is under improvement
still.22 In particular, host countries have been concerned about
their sovereignty and largely unwilling to accept externally determined sustainable development priorities imposed on them.23
This led to only marginal references to sustainable development
in the Marrakesh Accords, which leave the meaning of “sustainable development” undefined. Rather, under the climate regime,
it remains the host country’s sovereign prerogative to determine
whether a particular CDM project helps it achieve this goal.24
Thus, relatively little is achieved in terms of affecting the growth
pattern of developing countries.
A project is, in the absence of any alternative, considered
to contribute to sustainable development if it is congruent with
existing national development policies.25 This “subjective”
approach to sustainable development translates into curtailing
and challenging the potential of the CDM. Though, there are a
few concerns.
First, designing the CDM and meeting CDM project eligibility requirements present significant challenges because host
countries have different economic conditions, natural resources,
and development priorities. Thus, they have different perceptions about what is required to achieve sustainable development.
Selecting sustainable development criteria and assessing the sustainable development impact can therefore differ significantly
from one host country to another.
Despite several ideas about quality standards or indicators
of sustainable development,26 which provide some guidance on
what should be taken into account, in the end, it is currently the
host country’s sovereign decision to ascertain whether a CDM
project activity promotes its sustainable development targets.27
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Therefore, the Designated National Authorities (“DNAs”) in
developing countries are tasked with issuing a Letter of Approval
attesting to the project’s contribution to their countries’ sustainable development.28 A CDM project can only be registered if
such affirmation is provided to the CDM Executive Board. This
leads to uncertainty and creates a disincentive for investment
decisions.
Second, while there is, without a doubt, a strong potential
for synergies between addressing environmental problems and
national development goals,29 there is also the danger that accepting congruency with existing development policies may not lead
to a change of benefits to sustainable development since most
existing national development policies lead to increasing GHG
emissions.30 Thus, the congruency requirement is not a high
threshold, if any at all, in terms of sustainable development.31

Which Path to Follow?
From the point of sustainable development, a low energy
path is, most likely, the optimal way.32 However, most development paths are likely to lead to increasing energy demands
and depend on the availability of energy resources to meet these
demands. It is unrealistic to assume that developing countries, or
developed countries for that matter, will in the near future change
to development strategies based on constant or declining levels
of energy consumption. Energy is fundamental to advancing the
economic and social dimensions of sustainable development.33
However, sustainable development requires that, different from
the scenario outlined in Figure 1, meeting increasing energy
demand must not go along with increasing CO2 emissions.
Figure 1: Energy-Related CO2 Emissions34
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In 1987, the World Commission of Environment and Development (“WCED”) noted that it is essential that demands be met
by energy sources that are dependable, safe, and environmentally sound.35 In particular the latter, but arguably all three criteria for such “sustainable energy supply,” require the decoupling
of energy supply from increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
Achieving sustainable development in developing, and
developed, countries, thus depends on more efficient energy use,
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reduction of energy consumption, and, importantly, the decarbonisation of their economies. Unless the impact of the CDM
spurs climate-friendly policies in developing countries, it will
promote only one of the CDM’s triple goals: the cost effective
compliance of Annex I countries with their emission reduction
commitments. However, it will not contribute to the ultimate
objective of the UNFCCC, as it would not assist non-Annex I
Parties in contributing to stabilizing GHG concentrations, nor
contribute to the sustainable development of non-Annex I Parties in any meaningful way.
The question is whether developing countries should be
accorded a privileged position when considering their sustainable development path. The WCED, in promoting the transition
to a sustainable energy era, suggested that traditional fossil fuel
use should be accepted in developing countries in order to realize their growth potential, while
developed countries should seek
to limit their uses of fossil fuel.36
This recommendation is problematic. Sustainable development does not require increased
fossil fuel consumption in developing countries. What it requires
are equal development opportunities, however, these depend
on the availability of energy resources in general, and not only
fossil fuels. To grant developing countries a preferential “right”
to use fossil fuels would also burden them with an obligation
to reduce emissions. Rather, sustainable development requires
avoiding such a burden from the outset.
Sustainable development in developing countries means
enabling them to achieve higher levels of economic development with much reduced levels of greenhouse gas emissions and
environmental damage. Copying the negative example of industrialized nations is certainly not sustainable.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out the
inconvenient truth that, “energy security cannot be achieved
without recognition of the environmental consequences of
energy consumption, ‘especially our currently overwhelming and deeply entrenched reliance on fossil fuels.’”37 He said
“the need to increase energy supplies in order to fight poverty
could entail a vicious circle but added that this does not need to
happen” because energy supplies do not depend on fossil fuels
only.38
In order to move toward sustainable development, developing countries also must systematically decrease the carbon intensity of their economic development through renewable energy
systems, enhanced energy efficiency, and introduction of clean
technologies, with the financial and technological assistance of
industrialized countries. Thus, with respect to developing countries, the purpose of the CDM can be understood as assisting in
the transformation of their economies. Therefore, the CDM is a
crucially important global financial vehicle to catalyze national
transitions toward sustainable development in host countries

by increasing “green investment” flows into energy supplies,
transportation, and other industrial sectors.39 In this sense, it
is evident, as the acting head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat stated, “that the Kyoto Protocol is making a significant
contribution towards sustainable development of developing
countries.”40

Reality
The reality of CDM projects has so far been quite different
from their initial conception.41 As has been noted, almost all proposed and approved projects to date have primarily focused on
maximizing the generation of CERs instead of focusing on sustainable development.42 Thus, three contentious issues related to
carbon dioxide capture and storage (“CCS”), HFC-23 projects,
and forest conservation, arose.43
First, including CCS projects aimed at capturing CO2
emissions from industrial
sources and subsequently storing the gas underground or in
the sub-seabed of the oceans in
the scope of the CDM raises not
only complicated technological
questions with regard to ensuring permanence and monitoring, but also legal questions as
to whether the injection of CO2
in geological formations should count as a non-emission, emission reduction, or carbon sequestration.44 It also raises more
fundamental points as to the contribution to sustainable development of such projects. Critics allege that this kind of technological advance channels substantial research and development into
end-of-pipe technological fixes without contributing to longterm benefits to low-carbon intensive technological development. Though in fact, it might actually delay the transition from
fossil fuels to more sustainable energy systems.45 The Member
States of the Kyoto Protocol confirmed that
carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations should lead to the transfer of environmentally
safe and sound technology and know-how, Noting that
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special
report on carbon dioxide capture and storage provides
a comprehensive assessment of the scientific, technical,
environmental, economic and social aspects of carbon
dioxide capture and storage technologies as mitigation
options.46
However, it was also recognized that “there remain a number of unresolved technical, methodological, legal and policy
issues relating to carbon dioxide capture and storage activities
under the clean development mechanism” and “that there is a
need for capacity-building on carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies and their applications.”47 It is therefore timely
and necessary to place a wider assessment of CCS and sustainable development on the research agendas.
Second, another challenge to the promotion of sustainable
development by the CDM concerns the proposed inclusion of

The reality of CDM
projects has so far been
quite different from their
initial conception.
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HFC-23 projects. HFC-23, a greenhouse gas listed in Annex
A of the Kyoto Protocol, is a by-product in the production of
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC-22), an ozone-depleting gas
regulated under the Montreal Protocol. Incineration of HFC-23
at existing production sites is already an accepted and practiced
CDM project, generating low cost CERs ($0.50 per tonne of CO2
equiv.). Expanding the scope of CDM projects to new incineration sites could create the perverse incentive to increase the
production of HCFC-22 to generate larger amounts of HFC-23.
Sustainable development is further undermined by the fact that
HFC-23 projects provide no technology transfer to developing countries and the low cost CERs from these projects could
actually lead to outpacing other high-quality projects. Again, no
final decision has been taken on this issue and the MOP1 asked
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(“SBSTA”) for further elaborations.48 Also, it is recommended
that the discussions around this
issue seriously consider the
impacts on sustainable development due to the extension of
such projects.
Third, one of the major
omissions of the current design
of the climate regime is a plan
for reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing
countries and accounting forest conservation activities. A proposal by Papua New Guinea
and Costa Rica submitted to the 11th Conference of Parties
(“COP”)/MOP1 in 2005 seeks to include forest conservation
activities under the CDM or, alternatively, suggests elaborating
an optional Protocol to the Climate Convention. Yet, at COP13/
MOP3 held in Bali, there was still no final decision made regarding the role for avoided deforestation in the CDM. Thus, forest conservation, avoided deforestation, and accounting for both
will be dealt with as part of the post-2012 package. Still, the
inclusion of forest conservation projects could bring about the
win-win situation envisaged by sustainable development, where
economic value is attached to the protection of ecological assets.
For developing countries, CDM benefits from “avoided deforestation” could bring about social and economic improvements via
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in this case
ones not directly linked to the project, as well as wider environmental benefits, such as biodiversity protection.

To meet the requirements of sustainability, a CDM project
with adverse trade ramifications will need to demonstrate an
ability to overcome the still existing obstacles and shortcomings
of the Kyoto/Marrakech system.
The legal review of CDM projects, whether it takes place
under the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol,49 an international arbitral tribunal,50 or the WTO Dispute System, will
supposedly establish a definition of sustainable development
requirements under the CDM. Regardless, it is important that
climate law and practice construe a coherent understanding of
sustainable development. While searching for the conceptualization and definition of sustainable development as an external
tributary into international climate law, the converse normative
flow might be at least as valid and probable, and perhaps more
significant in the long run.51
If sustainable development
is to be seriously pursued, CDM
projects will need to go beyond
more immediate impacts and
provide “long-term benefits” as
required by Article 12(5) of the
Kyoto Protocol. However, those
immediate benefits are equally
necessary. No long-term benefits can be attributed to the CDM
if it does not lead to real, measurable, and additional emission
reductions.52
The benefits generated by CDM projects may lessen reliance on carbon-intensive development. An analysis of sustainable development benefits accruing from CDM projects has
identified the following advantageous impacts: direct financial
incentives for proving the competitiveness of new technologies
for energy reduction, renewable energy generation, and increase
of energy efficiency, such as sustainable energy technologies;
development of supporting policy initiatives; increased understanding and acceptance of the importance and application of
sustainable energy technologies; dissemination of best-practice
techniques; strengthening of local institutional, financial and
technological capacity; increased and sustainable foreign investment; and increased access to sustainable energy services.53
Arguably, the most sophisticated analytical methodology
for identifying sustainable CDM projects is the proposed Gold
Standard, though other approaches exist.54 The Gold Standard
aims to ensure that CDM projects deliver real emissions reductions and clear contributions to sustainable development. The
criteria established are divided into three screens: the project
type, additionality and baselines, and sustainable development.
In regards to the latter particularly, the Gold Standard creates
a sustainability matrix, in addition to an environmental impact
assessment and stakeholder consultation. The matrix aims at
assessing a project’s contribution to sustainable development
based on its environmental, social, and economic impacts.55 The
key variables are assessed on the basis of on-site measurement,
existing data, and stakeholder consultation, and can score nega-

The benefits generated
by CDM projects may
lessen reliance on carbonintensive development.

Safeguards
Sustainable development must be clearly defined, and seriously and actively pursued through the CDM. Ensuring the integrity of the CDM with regard to the sustainable development paths
of host countries, demands strong safeguards. However, no such
safeguards exist for ensuring sustainable development. Despite
the above-proposed relatively straightforward definition of sustainable development in a climate context, for example, where
economic growth is decoupled from GHG emission growth, the
climate regime has yet to embrace this understanding.
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tive or positive. If the overall contribution is positive and nonnegative in all key components, then a project is considered as
contributing to sustainable development.
While the Gold Standard certainly is laudable, its success
will depend on its acceptance by project developers, host and
investor countries, and the multilateral climate regime, particularly the Executive Board. So far, it has acquired a closer and
more specific understanding of sustainable development. The
Gold Standard, together with other approaches to identifying
“sustainable” CDM projects,56 helps to clarify the substance of
sustainable development not only in the particular context of
CDM projects, but also beyond this mechanism. The identified
criteria and components, if they are accepted and used to guide
further project development, would reflect the understanding of
the international community, both North and South, of sustainable development. This understanding could be decisive if compliance with WTO norms were at stake.

Procedurals
Additionally, procedural safeguards of direct contribution of CDM projects to sustainable development in developing countries, more specific requirements on sustainable impact
assessment, public consultation and participation, and benefit
sharing57 have yet to be included in the CDM regime.58

Impact Assessment
As with the response to sustainable development indicators,
the idea of a mandatory environmental and sustainable impact
assessment for all CDM projects was seen as an infringement on
the sovereignty of potential host States. As a result, the final language of the agreement is weak, requiring nothing more than an
analysis of environmental impacts only if the host country makes
it mandatory for the project to be approved.59 The CDM Modalities and Procedures do not provide for a situation where the host
country does not have any laws on environmental impact assessment. However, if stakeholders have concerns about the local
environment or the social impact of a CDM project, then the
project should be evaluated under the highest international environmental and social assessment procedures and standards.60
However, the more stringent the rules on environmental and
sustainable impact assessment are, the more costly CDM projects might become. Since a host country benefits from a CDM
project, the absence of harmonized international rules may create an incentive for the host country to refrain from insisting on
a thorough impact assessment, in order to make its own market
attractive for CDM projects. “The CDM’s geographical flexibility,” warn Meijer and Werksman, “should not become a means
of channelling projects to host countries with the lowest environmental standard.”61
Internationally harmonized rules on environmental and
sustainable impact assessment of a CDM project would counter
such a perverse incentive. In order for a CDM project to pass a
sustainability test, they might, indeed, be necessary. Still, such a
test would evaluate the circumstances of a particular CDM project. In this case, it needs to be shown that the environmental and
sustainable impacts were thoroughly assessed.
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Public Participation
Involvement of stakeholders, defined as “the public, including individuals, groups or communities affected or likely to be
affected” by the CDM project,62 gives an opportunity to a wider
circle to comment on CDM projects at various stages of the project cycle. The modalities of the CDM require certain types of
information to be made public. Public participation could lead
to benefits in regards to environmental integrity and sustainable
development. Local communities and NGOs could influence
project design as their knowledge of local conditions might be
of particular value, thus making it easier for project developers
to recognize community needs and gain public support, and to
avoid delays, financial risks, local unrest, or legal action.
So far, stakeholder involvement requirements are only of a
procedural character. Comments from the public must be invited
and compiled and form an official input as part of the validation
and registration process of a project. However, the concerns of
stakeholders are not required to be substantially reflected in the
project development. Again, these restrictions on direct public
involvement resulted from the unwillingness of countries with
different approaches to public participation to agree on harmonized standards.63
However, the requirements of environmental integrity and
sustainable development may demand a stronger commitment
to stricter and harmonized standards for and more direct influence of public involvement.64 The reference to international
standards for public participation would prevent a “race to the
bottom” toward countries with low or no regulation on public
involvement.

In Sum
Despite the fact that it is the stated goal of the CDM to
achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and to assist nonAnnex I countries in developing sustainability, the present regulatory framework remains somewhat rudimentary in setting up
and standardizing essential substantial and procedural requirements for meeting these goals. Therefore, the rather pragmatic
and fragmented approach taken so far to ensure the CDM’s environmental and sustainable integrity will need to be replaced by a
stronger, harmonized regulatory framework.

Conclusion
Whether the CDM will provide a basis for future multilateral climate policy depends on the willingness of nations to
commit themselves to the deeper emission cuts that, as scientific
evidence suggests, are necessary.65 Discussions about the CDM
during the negotiations of COP13/MOP3 in Bali in December
2007 signified the considerable potential of the CDM to bring
about consensus on the terms of global climate policy at some
point in the future.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, noted at this
event:
The CDM has been the focus of intense scrutiny, and
rightly so, by those who wish to ensure the mechanism’s environmental integrity and contribution to
sustainable development, as well by those who want
20

to ensure cost effectiveness. The conclusion that we
can draw, looking back from this milestone, is that the
CDM is delivering what it was meant to deliver—emission reductions and development. What’s more, it has
shown that it can evolve, adapt and improve.66
This positive conclusion will also be subject to scrutiny
and criticism in the future. Despite the achievements, much still
needs to be done in order to secure sound environmental outcomes of the CDM.
Whether the CDM is going to play an important role in any
post-2012 agreement will depend on the CDM’s ability to meet
its triple goals: to assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development, to contribute to the ultimate objective of
the Convention, and to help Parties included in Annex I achieve
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.67

Still, the increasing interest in the CDM has spread to nonKyoto countries as well. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of seven U.S. states, for example, envisages a cap-and-trade
system to be in place by 2009. The plants covered by the scheme
will presumably be allowed to use “offset credits,” emissions
reductions achieved outside the electricity sector. Such credits
could be “born in the USA” following similar rules as those
from projects generating emissions reduction under the CDM.
However, the plan envisages that under certain conditions, they
may also stem directly from CDM projects.
The implications for the environmental integrity of the CDM
should non-Kyoto Parties be allowed to receive CERs are yet to
be assessed. While the interest in the CDM is steadily increasing, so are the challenges to ensuring its environmental integrity
and its contribution to sustainable development.
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International Trade Law and the
“Carbon Leakage” Problem:
Are Unilateral U.S. Import Restrictions the Solution?
by Bernd G. Janzen*

A

Introduction

t the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Bali, Indonesia, negotiators overcame
tremendous differences to agree on a “Bali Roadmap”
process intended to determine a successor to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”),1 whose current commitments to reduce
global greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions expire in 2012.2 While
the United States rejected the
Kyoto Protocol,3 there appear to
be decent prospects that it will
join its post-2012 successor.4
Among other ambitious
goals, the Bali Roadmap process, through the “Bali Action
Plan” agreement, calls for the
development of both national
and international measures to
mitigate climate change, based
on a “shared vision for longterm cooperative action.” 5
However, reflecting a deep rift
between developed and developing countries, the Bali Action
Plan prescribes “common but
differentiated responsibilities”6
in which developed countries
commit to quantified and verifiable GHG emission reductions, but developing countries are only required to contribute
“appropriate mitigation actions . . . in the context of sustainable
development.”7 In short, under the Bali Roadmap, only developed countries must actually reduce GHG emissions.
This core doctrine of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the Bali Roadmap may have been politically indispensable to reaching agreement in Bali, but it has substantial
complicating implications for international trade in goods and
the competitiveness of U.S. industries. The problem, in a phrase,
is “carbon leakage.”8 If developed economies like the United
States and EU impose higher costs on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
and other GHG emissions (the economic consequence of setting and tightening caps on such emissions) than do developing
countries, one result will be an incentive to shift GHG-intensive

manufacturing from the former to the latter. This could lead to
the reduction of such production in developed countries and an
increase in exports of GHG-intensive goods from developing
to developed countries.9 In the context of China’s massive and
growing trade surpluses and its emergence as the world’s largest emitter of CO2,10 lawmakers in the United States and other
developed countries face a tricky challenge—how to proceed
with the urgent task of imposing
meaningful national curbs on
GHG emissions while ensuring
that domestic industries are not
disadvantaged by imports produced pursuant to less onerous
emissions requirements.
In the United States, unilateral trade restrictions appear
to be emerging as a mechanism
of choice as Congress evaluates its options for legislating a
solution to the carbon leakage
problem. However, it is far from
clear if the trade restrictions
under consideration comply
or conflict with current global
trading rules under the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”).
Such restrictions also do not
appear to mesh well with U.S.
trade policy, which generally
favors trade liberalization. Unilaterally imposed national trade restrictions would also, at first
blush, appear inconsistent with the goal established in the Bali
Action Plan of a globally coordinated approach to the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions. This Article examines the most
visible proposed legislative solution to carbon leakage currently
under consideration in the United States in light of WTO rules,
U.S. trade policy, and the multilateral goals espoused in the Bali
Action Plan. This Article also proposes that current U.S. trade
remedy laws provide a useful analogy for understanding and
addressing the concerns of domestic manufacturing industries as
they grapple with the carbon leakage problem.

In the United States,
unilateral trade
restrictions appear to be
emerging as a mechanism
of choice as Congress
evaluates its options
for legislating a solution
to the carbon
leakage problem.
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Regulating U.S. Imports to Ensure
Fair Competition
Of the various recent legislative proposals that would reduce
U.S. emissions of GHGs, the most prominent is the America’s
Climate Security Act of 2007 (“ACSA”), introduced by Senators
Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and John Warner (R-VA) on October 18,
2007.11 ACSA would establish a national emissions cap on six
GHGs, including CO2, which would decline from 2012 through
2050,12 and would institute mechanisms to allocate emissions
allowances to a range of covered U.S. GHG-emitting industries.13 Senators Lieberman and Warner introduced ACSA in the
Senate two months prior to the release of the Bali Action Plan,
and the ACSA is not expressly tied to that multilateral process.
However, both measures are a clear reflection of the strong political will in the United States
and in many other countries to
move quickly and in a globally
coordinated fashion to reduce
GHG emissions and stave off
the worst expected effects of
climate change.
Recognizing the adverse
competitive effects that could
result to U.S. manufacturing
industries competing against
foreign industries not subject
to such measures—i.e., the carbon leakage problem—ACSA
would require the Administration to urge other countries to
adopt comparable measures to
reduce GHG emissions.14 Otherwise, U.S. industries would
have systemically higher compliance costs than their foreign competitors—and such an
imbalance would only increase
over time as U.S. emissions
caps decline. But also recognizing that a globally coordinated
approach to reducing GHG emissions may or may not occur,
ACSA would, as of 2020, require importers of GHG-intensive
products to declare to U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) either that: (1) the imported goods are covered by special international allowances created under ACSA,15 or (2) the
exporting country is one deemed under ACSA to have taken
measures to reduce GHG emissions comparable to those taken
by the United States.16 The import provisions expressly cover
GHG-intensive manufactured goods such as iron, steel, aluminum, cement, bulk glass, and paper, and would extend to any
manufacturing production process that generates GHG emissions “comparable” to the expressly covered products.17 Thus,
ACSA has the obvious potential to impose very substantial
compliance costs on U.S. importers of a wide range of manufactured goods, and seems certain to alter the competitive balance
between U.S. and foreign firms supplying ACSA-covered goods

to the U.S. market. While these added import compliance costs
(in essence, constituting a trade restriction) would be justified
from the U.S. perspective as attempting to restore the competitive balance of U.S. industries harmed by imports from countries with less stringent emissions restrictions, it seems unlikely
that U.S. trading partners would willingly accept such unilateral
import restrictions.
ACSA’s import restrictions are not the only type of mechanism under consideration as the U.S. Congress examines how
to address competitive disadvantages to U.S. industries resulting from the carbon leakage problem. The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce identified
two other possible mechanisms to address the competitiveness
concerns for U.S. industry associated with carbon leakage in a
widely cited January 2008 White
Paper.18 One is the adoption of
carbon intensity standards for
energy-intensive products, which
would apply to all such products
sold in the United States regardless of their origin.19 Fees would
presumably be imposed on products that do not meet those carbon
intensity standards, to compel
the sale in the United States of
only those products that do meet
those standards.20 The American
Iron and Steel Institute and the
Steel Manufacturers Association
are major proponents of carbon
intensity standards, and have
criticized the proposed ACSA
import mechanism for, among
other things, encouraging foreign
governments to provide subsidies
to their exporters to the United
States of greenhouse gas-intensive goods.21
The third possible option for addressing carbon leakage
identified in the White Paper would make foreign countries’
access to U.S. carbon markets contingent on their imposition of
GHG emissions restrictions comparable to those adopted in the
United States.22 Such incentives could take several forms, such
as more generous terms of access for countries that agree more
quickly to emissions caps comparable to those imposed in the
United States.23 However, import restrictions along the lines of
those proposed by ACSA, while contentious, are generally seen
at this point as having the best chances of passage in the U.S.
Congress.
The EU is also contemplating unilateral trade measures that
could restrict imports as part of its ambitious drive to reduce
carbon emissions across a wide range of industries by twenty
percent by 2020.24 While no such import measure is currently
in effect, EU leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy
and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso have

The EU is also
contemplating unilateral
trade measures that could
restrict imports as part of
its ambitious drive
to reduce carbon emissions
across a wide range
of industries by twenty
percent by 2020.
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repeatedly referred to the possibility of imposing a carbon tax
or allowance requirement (similar to the scheme contemplated
by ACSA) on imports from countries not in compliance with
Kyoto Protocol emission reduction requirements (i.e., the United
States).25 These suggestions have drawn strong criticism from
U.S. trade officials, who warn that such proposals could facilitate WTO-inconsistent trade protectionism under the guise of
environmental protection.26
Notably, the recent proposed directives of the European
Commission that form the centerpiece of the ambitious EU climate change package do not, with certain limited exceptions,
impose restrictions on imports.27 However, the economic burden
of the carbon leakage problem is potentially just as acute for EU
industries as it is for U.S. industries. It therefore seems inevitable
that the EU will eventually need to contemplate some scheme
akin to the ACSA import restrictions to address the competitiveness concerns of its carbon-intensive industries as emissions
restrictions begin to increase production costs. Indeed, European steelmakers recently threatened to delay expansion plans in
Europe pending EU adoption of appropriate measures to account
for the competitive impact of carbon-intensive imports.28

Testing ACSA’s Import Provisions Under the
WTO and U.S. Trade Policy
The trade provisions of ACSA clearly raise the question of
U.S. compliance with obligations under the WTO. The question of WTO compliance has been at the forefront of Congress’
consideration of ACSA’s import measures.29 The debate potentially implicates many aspects of the WTO Agreements, but
centers around two core concepts: (1) the “national treatment”
principle of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”), which, in essence, obligates WTO Members
to ensure that imported goods are subjected to regulatory and
tax treatment no more burdensome than the treatment to which
the same goods, produced domestically, are subjected;30 and (2)
the GATT Article XX defense, which allows WTO Members
to take discriminatory action against imports where “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”—but only
where such action does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” 31 or represent a disguised trade restriction.32
GATT Article XX, the plain language of which does not seem
to perfectly capture the concerns surrounding GHG emissions,
is as close as the WTO Agreements come to permitting trade
restrictions based on climate change mitigation.33 It remains
unclear—and the source of considerable concern—whether U.S.
laws such as ACSA would be vulnerable to attack from WTO
Members alleging that ACSA discriminates against their exports
to the United States, but that it does not meet the narrow GATT
Article XX tests permitting such trade discrimination.34
In the most recent relevant case, involving a Brazilian ban
on imports of retreaded tires, the WTO Appellate Body found
that, while Brazil’s import ban constituted a permissible means
of protecting human health, the fact that Brazil also permitted
imports of retreaded tires from neighboring MERCOSUR countries resulted in trade discrimination not rationally connected to
the human health objective of the import ban.35 Because of this
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absence of a rational connection between the objective of the
import ban and the manner in which it was applied, the import
ban did not satisfy the narrow GATT Article XX test. This most
recent WTO decision—in particular the rational connection test
applied by the WTO Appellate Body—provides an important
roadmap for U.S. lawmakers crafting climate change legislation,
but by no means answers whether ACSA or other such legislation, once implemented, would pass the GATT Article XX
test if challenged. As noted in the congressional White Paper
discussed above, “while Congress has control over which traderelated measure to include in a climate bill, the determination of
such a provision’s legitimacy under WTO rules is out of U.S.
hands.”36
The retaliation issue matters, because a loss at the WTO
could mean the conferral on U.S. trading partners of substantial retaliation rights. Previously stung by WTO losses providing substantial retaliation rights to the complaining WTO
Members,37 U.S. law- and policy-makers are justifiably nervous
about the possible outcome of a WTO challenge to ACSA’s
import provisions.
ACSA’s import measures also are likely to re-activate the
longstanding debate about whether the WTO Agreements prohibit or allow trade regulation based on so-called processes and
production methods (“PPMs”). The basic terms of the debate can
be summarized in the following question: May WTO Members
regulate imports based on the way a good is made (i.e., PPMs),
or must WTO Members base such regulation on the physical
attributes of the good in the condition as imported? It is easy to
see why some might characterize ACSA’s import provisions as
PPMs, as their application arguably hinges on the “emissions
footprint” of the imported good, rather than its physical characteristics at the time the good crosses the border.
The WTO jurisprudence to date does not provide a definitive answer on the WTO-consistency of PPMs, and WTO experts
are divided on the question. One recent commentator assembled
a long list of statements supporting the view that PPMs can
never (or almost never) be justified under WTO rules, and then
proceeded to “debunk the myth of illegality.”38 The most commonly cited standards in WTO case law for analyzing PPMs are
in the multiple decisions in the Shrimp-Turtle Case, in which
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged a U.S. ban
on the importation of shrimp caught in a manner that adversely
affected threatened sea turtles. These complaining WTO Members alleged, inter alia, that the ban violated the U.S. obligation under the WTO to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of
imports from these countries.39 The U.S. defense turned on the
application of GATT Article XX, described above.
One aspect of the WTO Appellate Body’s ultimate decision
in the Shrimp-Turtle Case could be central to any future case
challenging ACSA’s import provisions as WTO-inconsistent
PPMs. In upholding a modified version of the U.S. import ban
as consistent with GATT Article XX, the WTO Appellate Body
concluded that a WTO Member can show that an import restriction does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” for purposes of GATT Article XX if that WTO Member
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attempts to negotiate an international agreement ensuring equal
treatment of all affected trading partners. As the WTO Appellate Body explained, the key is not whether such an agreement
is actually reached, but whether the WTO Member asserting
a GATT Article XX defense has made a “serious, good faith
effort” to reach such agreement.40
Given the ongoing interplay of U.S. legislative efforts to
impose a national scheme to limit GHG emissions and the international UNFCCC process, it is too soon to say if the United
States would be able to rely on the “international negotiation”
defense of the Shrimp-Turtle Case. Notably, ACSA section
6003 would require the United States to engage in international
negotiations with the objective of coordinating global GHG
emissions reductions in a manner consistent with the goals of
ACSA. However, at this point we can only speculate if ACSA
will even be enacted into law.
The Bush Administration also expressed concern that import
restrictions like those proposed in ACSA pose trade policy problems beyond possible inconsistency with U.S. WTO obligations.
As recently expressed by U.S. Trade Representative Susan C.
Schwab, unilateral U.S. trade restrictions designed to compel
reductions in foreign emissions of GHGs are “a blunt and imprecise instrument of fear” that could poison commercial relations
and trigger retaliatory measures by U.S. trading partners.41 Such
mirror actions could quickly harm U.S. exports, and could take
years to resolve if challenged at the WTO.42
Rather, the consistent message from U.S. Trade Representative Schwab has been that, instead of crafting import restrictions
that will somehow ensure a competitive, level playing field as
countries commit to GHG reductions, the priority of the United
States should be to harness trade liberalization to enhance the
global distribution of goods and services that contribute to climate change mitigation. At the core of this effort are the ongoing
WTO negotiations toward an Agreement on Trade in Environmental Goods and Services (“EGSA”).43 The mandate for these
negotiations, set out in the 2001 WTO Doha Declaration,44 is
the “reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to environmental goods and services.”45 When
originally conceived, this mandate did not expressly include climate change. Nor did the mandate provide any guidance on what
goods and services should be deemed “environmental.” But the
United States and many other WTO Members now view a multilateral EGSA as an important tool in combating climate change,
and state that this effort complements the UNFCCC process. As
recently explained by U.S. Trade Representative Schwab, the
current framework for such an agreement, as jointly proposed
by the United States and the EU, would increase global trade in
climate-friendly technologies (such as wind turbines and photovoltaic solar panels) by as much as fourteen percent, thereby
contributing significantly to global reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions.46
As of this writing, the Administration and Congress appear
to be headed for a show-down this year on ACSA’s import provisions. As a practical matter, the debate seems likely to carry
forward into a new Congress and Administration in 2009.
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ACSA and U.S. Trade Remedy Law
Notwithstanding the possibility of claims that ACSA’s carbon leakage provisions may violate U.S. WTO obligations and
send signals to U.S. trading partners inconsistent with current
U.S. trade policy, the carbon leakage provisions may also be
viewed as consistent in spirit with long-accepted norms under
U.S. trade remedy laws.
Like many WTO Members, the United States maintains
antidumping and countervailing duty laws that permit domestic
industries to petition the government (or allow the government
on its own initiative) to impose import duties to redress injurious import practices. Under the U.S. antidumping law, the U.S.
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) may order CBP to impose
on imports antidumping duties in an amount equivalent to the
difference between the actual import values, as adjusted under
the statute, and their deemed “fair value.”47 Similarly, under the
U.S. countervailing duty law, DOC may impose duties to offset
subsidies provided by foreign governments to the extent they
confer an unfair benefit on imports and certain other conditions
are satisfied.48 These laws are expressly permitted by WTO
rules,49 and are widely seen as a necessary escape clause from
the presumption of trade liberalization that permitted the WTO
Agreements to be reached in the first place.50
The trade-restrictive provisions of ACSA may be seen as
expanding the universe of import practices that should be deemed
“unfair” under U.S. law. As noted, international trade law, as
reflected in both U.S. domestic law and the WTO system, recognizes that import pricing below certain levels (whether due to
“dumping” by foreign exporters or subsidies provided by foreign
governments) is a form of unfair trade that, when causing harm
to domestic industries, may be redressed through import duties.
This notion of unfair trade is based purely on how an imported
product is priced. ACSA would arguably expand this accepted
notion of unfair trade to take into account how imported products are made—specifically, the volume and nature of the GHGs
associated with their manufacture. ACSA would, in essence,
dictate that the price of U.S. imports reflects the externalized
environmental costs of GHG emissions. Just as the U.S. antidumping law provides a remedy to domestic manufacturers that
must compete against unfairly low-priced, or “dumped,” imports,
ACSA would provide a remedy to domestic manufacturers that
must compete against imports that were manufactured under less
stringent GHG emissions standards—in other words, a remedy
against a newly recognized form of environmental dumping.
However, unlike the U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty laws—which cover approximately one percent of the total
value of U.S. imports—ACSA could potentially apply to a very
substantial percentage of U.S. imports. As explained above,
“covered goods” under ACSA include iron, steel, aluminum,
cement, bulk glass, and paper, as well as many other unspecified manufactured goods accounting for “comparable” levels of
greenhouse gas emissions.51 Thus, ACSA (or any comparable
legislation to equalize the climate change impact of imports with
domestically produced goods) could represent a major expanSustainable Development Law & Policy

sion of the concept of “unfair trade.” Still, the core concept of
ACSA’s trade provisions are analogous to U.S. trade remedy
law in that their purpose is to equalize the competitive impact
of imports with the same types of goods produced domestically
through recognition of an “unfair” advantage conferred on the
imports.

Conclusion
The political will to sharply reduce GHG emissions—at
least in the United States and the EU—seems to be strong and
intensifying. The major U.S. presidential candidates all support the implementation of a national cap-and-trade system to
reduce greenhouse gases, and all support U.S. participation in
the UNFCCC process. Senator Baucus has spoken of “the moral
imperative to deal with climate change.”52 Further, the introduction of ACSA by Senators Lieberman and Warner signals a
bipartisan consensus for ambitious action on climate change.
However, the “carbon leakage” problem that ACSA’s trade
provisions attempt to address—a critical component of the
bill from the perspective of U.S. GHG-emitting manufacturing industries—may also constitute a major hurdle to ACSA’s
enactment into law. For one, there seems to be significant risk
that ACSA’s trade provisions, if enacted, could trigger WTO
complaints against the United States and, potentially, retaliatory action to the detriment of U.S. exporters. This risk is one
reason the current Administration is wary of proposals to penalize importers of GHG-intensive goods, and is instead promoting
other mechanisms, such as a multilateral EGSA, that would rely
upon trade liberalization, rather than trade restriction, to combat climate change. However, these objections to ACSA’s trade
provisions cannot be expected to lessen the concerns of U.S.
GHG-intensive manufacturing industries which, absent such
provisions, would likely face declining competitiveness vis-àvis their foreign rivals not subject to GHG emissions restrictions
of the same magnitude as imposed in the United States. These
U.S. industries can be expected to press for equalizing measures,

akin to the trade remedy laws, to ensure “fair” competition with
imported goods manufactured under less stringent GHG emissions standards.
The controversy surrounding ACSA’s trade provisions also
underscores the imbalance between U.S. domestic and multilateral efforts to reduce GHG emissions. GHG emissions and
climate change are a problem of the “global commons,” and
therefore require a globally coordinated approach as embodied
in the UNFCCC process and Bali Roadmap. Yet, as explained
above, the Bali Action Plan does not expressly commit developing countries to undertake reduction in GHG emissions. In
the face of this asymmetry of commitments between developed and developing countries, it is reasonable to expect the
United States (and the EU) to explore domestic laws and other
mechanisms that would unilaterally attempt to compel countries
with less stringent GHG emissions standards to tighten them.
That is what ACSA seeks to do—first through a mandate for
the Executive Branch to negotiate a global agreement to reduce
GHG emissions in a coordinated fashion, and second, through
import requirements that would redress any competitive imbalance experienced by foreign manufacturing industries exporting
to the United States.
It remains unclear how much of the burden developing
countries will accept as the Bali Roadmap process produces a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol (if it does). But it is clear that,
the less they do, the greater will be the pressure on U.S. and
EU lawmakers to ensure, through unilateral trade measures like
ACSA’s import provisions, that their industries are protected
from imports produced under less costly emissions standards.
Political realism suggests that trade mechanisms will be tools of
choice in this effort—whether or not they are found to comply
with current WTO rules, the Administration’s trade policy preferences, or the “shared vision” principles espoused in the Bali
Action Plan.
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Conservation Easements and Climate Change
by Daniel L. Aaronson & Michael B. Manuel*
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Introduction

overnments at all levels are increasingly engaging the
challenges posed by global climate change. Conservation easements have provided income tax deductions to
their grantors for decades in recognition of certain special benefits
afforded by the conservation of land subject to the easement.1 As
policy makers search for effective means to address climate
change issues, conservation easements may well be recognized
as an important tool. However,
the current law of conservation
easements does not recognize the
full potential for carbon capture
resulting from land conservation,
in part because the tax code limits the types of land that may benefit from such easements. Current
laws will need to be revised and
expanded to better recognize the
climate change benefits that could be achieved from placing land
under conservation easements.

Tax Deductions for Donated
Conservation Easements
While taxpayers are generally not permitted to take charitable deductions for contributions of less than the taxpayer’s
full interest in property, the Internal Revenue Service makes an
exception to this rule in the case of deductions for “qualified
conservation contributions.”8
As a general rule, the available income tax deduction for
a qualified conservation contribution is equal to the fair
market value of the subject
property before the conservation easement was put in place,
minus the fair market value of
the property after it has been
encumbered by the conservation easement.9 This formula
is intended to compensate the
grantor of a conservation easement for the lost development potential that results from the conservation easement’s imposition of development restrictions.10
Another potential tax benefit of a validly created conservation easement is that the easement may serve to lower the
assessed value of the property on which it is placed. Put simply,
property taxes are based on two things: the assessed value of the
parcel, and the local tax rate.11 In many taxing jurisdictions, the
assessed value of a parcel is determined based on the property’s
highest and best use, which often assumes the maximum level of
development allowable under applicable zoning regulations.12
Many states allow for—or even expressly mandate—the reassessment of land upon which a conservation easement is created,
requiring the assessor to take into account the conservation easement’s development restrictions in determining the property’s
value.

The current law of
conservation easements
does not recognize the
full potential for
carbon capture.

Conservation Easements
A conservation easement is a legal agreement, made
between a landowner and an eligible organization, that serves
to restrict the activities that may take place on the landowner’s
property.2 The restrictions embodied in a conservation easement apply to all future owners of the burdened land and may
be enforced by the easement holder or in some cases by the state
attorney general.3 A conservation easement can cover all or part
of the property, and can restrict the uses of various parts of the
property differently.4 Conservation easements are individually
negotiated and the restrictions that a conservation easement
imposes on the landowner will thus vary from one conservation
easement to another.5
Ownership of land has often been likened to a bundle of
sticks, where each stick represents a particular right associated
with the land.6 Landowners may elect to sell or donate individual “sticks,” such as the right to construct buildings, or the
right to harvest timber, while preserving other rights associated
with the land.7 A landowner who grants a conservation easement
gives up only those rights that are spelled out in the conservation easement, retaining all others. The conservation easement
has thus emerged as one of the most popular land conservation
tools in the United States because it allows its holder, typically
a land trust, to protect land without the necessity of owning and
managing the property.
27

Common Law Impediments to the
Enforceability of Conservation Easements
In today’s practice, conservation easements are exclusively creatures of statute.13 This is because under the common
law, the perpetual enforceability of conservation easements is
doubtful.14

* Daniel L. Aaronson is an Associate in Goldberg Kohn’s Climate Change &
Resource Conservation Group and the firm’s Real Estate Group. Michael B. Manuel is a Principal in Goldberg Kohn’s Real Estate Group and is the Chair of the
firm’s Climate Change & Resource Conservation Group.
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In order to be enforceable under the common law, the property interest created by a conservation easement must be classifiable as one of three types of servitudes: (1) an easement, (2) a
real covenant, or (3) an equitable servitude. For all three classes
of servitudes, troublesome common law doctrines serve as obstacles to perpetual enforceability.15 Despite its nomenclature, a
conservation easement is not enforceable under the common law
as an easement because it does not fall within one of the four
recognized types of negative easements, which are defined as
easements granting the right to restrict the types of activities that
can be performed on a parcel of land.16 Conservation easements
are not enforceable in perpetuity as equitable servitudes because
they run afoul of what is known as the “touch and concern” doctrine.17 Courts also have generally held that a real covenant held
“in gross”—one which benefits a
specific individual rather than a
specific parcel of land—cannot
be binding on successive landowners due to its failure to satisfy
the “touch and concern” test.18
In light of the aforementioned
impediments to the enforceability
of conservation easements—and
recognizing the fact that, from a
land preservation standpoint, the permanence of a conservation
easement is its most critical aspect—states began to enact conservation easement legislation in the 1980s.19

typically also impose a conservation purpose requirement that
in many instances mirrors that of the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC”). A conservation easement that is granted to an eligible donee and satisfies the requirements of both the applicable
state conservation easement statute and the IRC will yield an
income tax deduction for its grantor and will be enforceable in
perpetuity.

“Conservation Purposes” and Carbon Sinks
Not every parcel of land is eligible for preservation by
way of a conservation easement. The IRC and the various state
conservation easement statutes provide that the property to be
protected by a conservation easement must possess significant
conservation or historic preservation values.26 Determining
whether a particular parcel of
land exhibits such conservation
values is an inexact science.
The tax code recognizes
only four legitimate conservation purposes: (1) preservation
of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the
general public; (2) protection
of a significant wildlife habitat
or plant community; (3) preservation of open space (including
farmland and forestland) for the scenic enjoyment of the general
public or pursuant to government policy; and (4) preservation
of a historically important land area or a certified historic structure.27 As a general rule, a conservation easement that satisfies
one of the conservation purposes recognized by the tax code will
also be deemed to satisfy the conservation purpose requirement
of the applicable state conservation easement statute. A conservation easement cannot yield tax benefits to its grantor, nor will
it likely be perpetually enforceable under state law, if it does not
fit into one of the four recognized conservation purposes.
In the case of undeveloped land that a landowner does not
intend to open to the general public, a conservation easement will
most likely be appropriate if the land is home to an “ecologically
significant” habitat of flora or fauna28 or if there is sufficient
public road frontage for the easement area to provide a scenic
view to passersby.29 IRS regulations and recent jurisprudence
have shown both of these conservation purposes to be unduly
difficult to satisfy. Land to be protected by a conservation easement will not be deemed ecologically significant if it does not
contain endangered or threatened species or adjoin a designated
conservation area such as a state or national park. Meanwhile,
the open space conservation purpose is notorious for its ambiguity. One thing IRS regulations have made clear, however, is
that the preservation of “ordinary” tracts of land would not be
deemed to yield the significant public benefit requisite for purposes of satisfying the conservation purpose test.30
The current law of conservation easements does not recognize the potential for carbon capture resulting from land
conservation. Otherwise “ordinary” tracts of land can produce

Not every parcel of land
is eligible for preservation
by way of a
conservation easement.

Statutory Conservation Easements
In the early 1980s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed model state legislation
intended to strengthen the reliability of conservation easements
as a land preservation tool by exempting them from the common
law doctrines that would otherwise impede their enforcement.20
This model legislation, titled the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”), has since been adopted in twenty states,
while most others have enacted functionally equivalent legislation modeled after the UCEA.21 Conservation easements that
satisfy the requirements of the local state conservation easement
statute are often referred to as statutory conservation easements.
Statutory conservation easements are sheltered from the
impediments to enforceability that would otherwise plague them
under the common law. The UCEA and the various state conservation easement statutes place conservation easements beyond
the reach of the “touch and concern” doctrine by providing that
a conservation easement is valid even though its benefit does not
touch and concern real property.22 The other primary obstacle
to enforcement of conservation easements under the common
law—that a negative easement may serve only a limited number of recognized purposes—is also expressly eliminated by
statute.23
Statutory conservation easements must be granted in favor
of a non-profit land trust or a governmental agency.24 Private
foundations or other for-profit entities are ineligible grantees of
conservation easements.25 State conservation easement statutes
Winter 2008
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a significant social benefit by acting as carbon sinks, as growing vegetation absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.31
Young forests comprised of still-growing trees are especially
effective at absorbing carbon dioxide,32 but even the conservation of mature forests can result in emissions reductions by
preserving existing carbon stocks where development—which
releases carbon—might otherwise occur.

Conclusion
The defining characteristic of a conservation easement is the
yielding of a public or social benefit from preserving land in its
natural state. But present laws do not recognize carbon capture
as a legitimate social benefit. If the law could develop so that
carbon attributes are recognized as valid conservation purposes,
the conservation easement could become a meaningful component of the overall climate change solution.
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Securing Rights to Carbon Sequestration:
The Western Australian Experience
by Sandra Eckert & Richard McKellar*
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Introduction

rganic carbon sequestration through vegetation growth
is the only realistic means of removing carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere. Increasing vegetation and biomass stocks can therefore be a valuable means to limit atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations until energy efficiency,
low greenhouse gas emitting energy and agricultural options,
and other emission reduction initiatives can be implemented at
a scale required to limit the growth, and ultimately reduce, the
amount of global greenhouse gas emissions.
For over ten years commercially-oriented tree plantation
interests in Australia have recognised the potential for carbon
sequestration offset credits to augment the income from other
plantation products. Income from the sale of offset credits could
expand the geographic area over which tree and mixed species
plantations could be a viable land use, contributing to the growth
of the domestic plantation industry.
In addition, revegetation through plantation establishment
and other means provide further environmental and social benefits in Western Australia (“WA”), such as groundwater salinity
reduction, surface water production, erosion control, biodiversity protection, and regional economic diversity. Encouraging
revegetation is therefore a matter of keen interest to the State
Government for sustainability objectives.
While the scientific notion that increasing biomass will
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is conceptually
simple, there are significant challenges in converting those carbon dioxide removals into commercially tradeable commodities,
even with the clear recognition of Emission Reduction Units
under rules established pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol.
Any emission accounting or trading program which seeks
to include carbon offset credits resulting from organic sequestration must address several key issues, of which additionality, permanence, quantum, and ownership are the most fundamental.
Ownership raises some of the most complex issues associated with the creation and trading of organic carbon sequestration rights, especially where other benefits, such as harvestable
timber, improved ground water quality, erosion control, or biodiversity enhancement, are created by the same actions.
This paper addresses the approach taken in WA to overcome
barriers associated with ownership of carbon sequestration offset credits generated by the establishment of forest plantations
(Kyoto Article 3.3), followed by a brief summary of the position
in the other Australian States.
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Carbon Sequestration Rights:
A New Right in Property
Where all rights associated with the establishment of plantations are held by the same party, carbon sequestration rights
are coincident with rights to other plantation products. Where
carbon sequestration rights are separated from other rights, however, several issues need to be addressed. For example, how
does ownership of carbon sequestration differ from ownership
of sequestered carbon? What legislative guidance is required to
support the commercial interests of both parties? How can carbon sequestration rights be protected from loss or injury from
negligence, natural risks, or other commercial imperatives (e.g.
harvesting of plantation products)?
An example will illustrate these challenges. Farmer A leases
part of his farm to Corporation B for thirty years for plantation
establishment. Corporation B holds all rights to the plantation,
including carbon sequestration rights, and agrees to pay an
annual land rent to Farmer A. Corporation B sells rights to the
lease and the timber to Corporation C and rights to the benefits
and risks arising from carbon sequestration to Corporation D.
Since the mid-1990s, most contractual arrangements relating to tree plantations in WA have included provisions identifying the ownership of benefits arising from carbon sequestration
by the plantations. The complexity and cost of contracts for carbon sequestration rights has led all Australian State governments
to legislatively create a separate carbon sequestration right. This
approach, apparently unique to Australia, has increased certainty
and reduced costs to land holders and traders in carbon sequestration rights.

Western Australia’s
Carbon Sequestration Legislation
The approach taken in WA has been the broadest of the
Australian jurisdictions. The forms of carbon sequestration that
can give rise to carbon rights are not limited in any way, and
do not require a direct link to a silvicultural project or any form
of forest management. The approach reflects several important

* Sandra Eckert B. Juris LlB (Hons) Grad Dip Prop has twenty years experience
as a property lawyer in Western Australia, both in private legal practice and in
the State public service providing advice to the Government on the administration
of Crown land. She was instructing officer on the property aspects in the drafting
of the Western Australian Carbon Rights Act 2003. Richard McKellar BSc, MSc
LlB has worked on many aspects of climate change science and policy for twenty
years in Western Australia. He was a member of the Western Australian Carbon
Rights Task Force, which developed the conceptual basis for the Western Australian Carbon Rights Act 2003.
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considerations. First, a broad enabling legislative framework
was considered most appropriate to support activities that might
be accountable and tradeable under international and national
rules that are still emerging and are likely to be further altered
over coming decades. Second, market-based instruments established by the Kyoto Protocol will be able to distinguish between
differing types of carbon sequestration products. Finally, revegetation could reverse past damage to Western Australia’s land
and ecosystems resulting from clearing for agriculture, urban
use, infrastructure, or by vegetation destruction through rangeland activities such as grazing.
Western Australia has an area of approximately 2,527,620
square kilometres. Approximately ninety-three percent of this
area is held as Crown land, and the remaining seven percent is
held as freehold land.1 There are two types of freehold land in
Western Australia. The dominant system is Torrens title land,
which comprises almost all of the freehold land in WA. The
Torrens system is a system of title by registration of dealings
in land in the Register held at the land registry office. The system is established under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)
(“TLA”). One of the fundamental principles underlying the Torrens system is the concept of indefeasibility of title. Essentially,
the registered proprietor’s title is paramount (except in the case
of fraud) and held only subject to the interests registered in the
Register and certain specified exceptions.2 The State in effect
guarantees the title to land, and interests registered in respect
of the land, by providing for a right to claim against the State
if a person is deprived of his or her land due to a number of
circumstances.3
The other type of freehold land is old system title land,
which comprises 0.1 percent of the seven percent of freehold
land in Western Australia. This system of title relates to Crown
grants of freehold that were made prior to the introduction of
the Torrens system of title,4 and which have not since been converted to Torrens system land.5 Under this system, title to land
is established by an unbroken documentary chain of title for at
least thirty years prior to the agreement to sell.6
The administration of Crown land in WA is governed by the
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) (“LAA”). “Crown land” is
all land that is not freehold land.7 It is land held by the Crown,
or the State.
However, all dealings in Crown land are registered under
the single registration system provided for in the TLA.8 Consequently, the holder of an interest registered in respect of Crown
land has the same indefeasible title as a freehold land owner,
subject to the exceptions contained in section 68 TLA and certain other exceptions arising from its nature as Crown land as set
out in section 81T of TLA.

Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA)
The Western Australian Carbon Rights Act 2003 (“CRA”)
establishes a new, separate interest in land known as a “carbon
right.”
A carbon right comes into existence once it is registered on
the title to the land.9 The person registered as the proprietor, or
owner, of the carbon right on the title to the land has security of
31

title to the carbon right, via the benefits of the indefeasibility and
other provisions under the TLA. A carbon right can be registered in respect of any Torrens title freehold land and any Crown
land.10 The only land in Western Australia in respect of which
a carbon right cannot be registered, and therefore cannot be created, is old system title land. Generally, it can be dealt with in
the same way as any other interest in land.11
The intention of the CRA is to establish the legal certainty
and security of a carbon right as an interest in respect of certain identified land. A carbon right gives the owner “the legal
and commercial benefits and risks arising from changes to the
atmosphere that are caused by carbon sequestration and carbon
release occurring in or on land in respect of which the carbon
right is registered.”12
The CRA does not operate to determine or set the value of
the carbon right. Its commercial value, and therefore tradability,
is left to the market to determine, in the same way that the value
and tradability of any other interest in land is determined by the
market. This is evident from the Second Reading Speech for the
CRA when it was introduced into the Legislative Assembly by
the Honourable Francis Logan MLA when he said:
The Carbon Rights Bill will provide security for the
owner of the carbon right in land by enabling a carbon right to be registered on the land title . . . Issues
such as measuring the carbon that has been sequestered
and stays there, provisions for disease and fire protection and whether a particular type of sequestered carbon can be traded and so on are left to the market to
determine.13
This intention was reiterated later in the Second Reading
Speech in the following terms: “Registration will clarify the
ownership of the right . . . but it gives no guarantee as to how
much carbon is there, whether it will remain there or what value
it may have.”14
The owner of the carbon right does not need to be the same
person who is the owner of the land to which it relates. However, if they are not the same person, the carbon right can only
be created with the land owner’s consent.15
The definitions of “carbon sequestration” and “carbon
release” in section 3 of the CRA make it clear that the changes
relate to anything stored in or on the land. Consequently, it
relates to changes in carbon storage in any form—in the soil of
the land, or in the trees or other forms of vegetation on the land.
The owner of the carbon right, however, does not own the
carbon itself stored in or on the land. That interest remains with
whoever owns the matter in which it is stored—for example the
land owner, or the holder of a plantation interest under section
7(1) of the Tree Plantation Agreements Act 2003 (WA) (“TPA”).
A plantation interest is a separate interest in land (again registered on the title to the land under the TLA), in which the ownership of trees on the land is separated from ownership of the land
itself (contrary to normal common law principles).
As a consequence of the separation of the ownership of
the carbon right from the carbon itself, the owner of the carbon
right must have a mechanism by which carbon changes in or
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on the relevant land can be controlled, in order for the carbon
right to have some continuing certainty of its commercial value.
This is done, in a legal sense, by providing for the creation of a
concomitant, separate interest in land known as a “carbon covenant.” The carbon covenant is also registered on the title to the
land,16 allowing the land owner, or others with an interest in the
same or other land, to agree with the owner of the carbon right
(who must also be the owner of the carbon covenant)17 to do,
or not to do, certain things on the land. This will have the effect
of encouraging carbon sequestration on the land, and mitigating
carbon release from the land, as much as possible.
For example, the carbon covenant may include provisions
as to how the land will be used or managed to decrease the risk
of fire or pests, thereby reducing the risk of carbon release and
increasing carbon sequestration in the trees or vegetation on
the land. Similarly, altered grazing patterns of livestock may
increase the chance of carbon sequestration.
The carbon covenant runs with, and binds, the land so that
future owners of the land will be bound to comply with them,
and any future owner of the carbon right (and therefore the carbon covenant) will have the benefit of the covenants.18
The carbon covenants are enforceable through legal proceedings in the same way that any other interest in land is
enforced at common law. Any failure to comply with the carbon
covenant is a civil matter between the relevant parties, which
will be adjudicated by the courts.

Uptake of Carbon Rights
The development of the CRA was a government initiative
to promote the development of the forest plantation industry
to expand regional economic opportunities, provide domestic
wood products, support woodchip exports, replace logging of
old growth forest, and gain the broader environmental benefits
of revegetation, by reducing transaction costs and increasing
certainty associated with establishing and trading carbon sequestration rights.
Australia’s plantation and timber industries have included
carbon rights considerations in their contractual arrangements
for at least fifteen years and Australia’s financial industry developed emission trading frameworks during the mid-1990s. Yet,
because Australia’s national government until recently refused
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and has not established domestic
sectoral or other emission limits or taxes, there exists no basis
for either international or domestic commercial trading of carbon
sequestration or any other emission reduction units. Therefore,
there has been virtually no incentive for parties to undertake
the costs of establishing carbon sequestration right ownership
through registration under the CRA, and consequently, the
uptake on registering carbon rights has been relatively slow.
As of October 2007, only twenty-four carbon rights had
been registered since the CRA’s proclamation on March 24,
2004.19 Of these, only ten have had accompanying carbon covenants registered. There are only three instances where a carbon
right, a carbon covenant and a plantation interest under the TPA
have been registered. Four plantation interests have been registered without an accompanying carbon right.
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The number of dealings registered does not provide an indication as to the size or number of properties involved, however,
as one dealing may affect more than one area of land, if the same
person owns more than one property.
Similarly, it is not possible to draw any conclusion as to the
relationship between the uptake of carbon rights and the forest
plantation industry. This is because tree plantation companies
have in the past secured their interests in the land by a variety
of means including timber share-farming agreements under section 34B of the Conservation and Land Management Act 1984
(WA)20 or a lease, and these remain available along with the
more recently enacted plantation interest. One of the reasons for
the slow uptake of registration of carbon rights is the number of
requirements that need to be met before they can be registered.
The area of the land over which the carbon right is being
registered must be clearly identifiable.21 If the carbon right is
over the whole of the land in a property, then the description is
simply the same as the current land description for the property.
If the carbon right is only over part of the land in the property,
then a suitable diagram needs to be prepared with co-ordinates.
If the area over which the carbon rights are to be registered has
not already been surveyed for other purposes (such as the registration of a plantation interest), a considerable cost burden is
imposed. In most cases this would be borne by the carbon right
holder.
The carbon rights are required to be registered separately
on the title to each property. Any dealings with the carbon right
will require the consent of any person having an interest in the
carbon right itself and in many cases, the owner of the underlying land and any person having an interest in that land. This is
likely to act as a disincentive to the development of a trading
market in carbon rights per se, as the conveyancing costs and
other administrative requirements will be too costly, intensive,
and time consuming. However, it may lead to the development
of a wholesale market, where brokers accumulate and hold the
individual carbon rights from land owners and aggregate them
for on-sale to industrial or other companies seeking credits in a
carbon trading system.

Carbon Sequestration Rights in Other
Australian States
The following table sets out a comparison of the forms of
legal recognition of carbon sequestration rights, and the limits
on that recognition, that have been enacted in legislation in the
other Australian States.
Almost all of the other Australian State jurisdictions have
limited their recognition of carbon rights to carbon sequestration
in trees or forest vegetation. New South Wales is most restrictive in that it is limited to trees or forest on the land after 1990.22
However, the approach in Queensland is more liberal as the carbon sequestration right is one of several potential forest products
and can also relate to vegetation more generally.23
All jurisdictions allow for ownership or the benefits of a
carbon right to be separated from the ownership or benefits of
the trees or vegetation. In addition, the rights can run with, and
bind the future owners of, the land over which the rights exist.
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Table: Summary of Carbon Sequestration Legislation in Australia, other than Western Australia
Jurisdiction

Definition of the Right

VICTORIA
Forestry Rights Act
1996

“Carbon sequestration right”
Deemed not to be
means a right to commercially exploit
an interest in land
carbon sequestered by trees (§3)
(§14(2))
Created under a “carbon rights 		
agreement” (§12)		

Limited to carbon sequestered by
trees (§3)
Can be separated from ownership of
trees (§12)
Applies to freehold land only (§4)

NEW SOUTH WALES
Conveyancing Act
1919

“Carbon sequestration right”
means a right conferred on a person by
agreement or otherwise to the legal,
commercial, or other benefit (whether
present or future) of carbon sequestration
by any existing or future tree or forest on
the land after 1990 (§87A)
Carbon sequestration right included in a
“forestry right” (§87A)

Forestry right
deemed a profit a
prendre (§88AB)
Forestry covenant is
an interest in land
(§88EA(5))

Limited to carbon sequestered by
trees on land after 1990 (§87A)
Can be granted separately from
forestry right in respect of crop of
trees on land (§87A)

Form of property, in
the nature of a chose
in action (§3A(1))
Attaches to the forest
vegetation to which
it relates (§3A(2))

Limited to absorption of carbon in
“forest vegetation” (trees or other forms
of forest vegetation) (§§3 & 3 A)
Can be separated from ownership
of forest vegetation (§3A(2))

“Carbon right” is the capacity of forest
vegetation to absorb carbon from the
atmosphere (§3A(1))
Created under “forest property (carbon
rights) agreement” (§5(3))
		
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Forest Property Act
2000

Nature of the Right

Limitations on the Right

“Natural resource product” includes
Does not create an
Limited to absorption of carbon by,
carbon stored in a tree or vegetation
interest in land
or storage of carbon in, trees or
and carbon sequestration by a tree or
(§61J(4))
vegetation (Schedule 3)
vegetation (Schedule 3)
Rights are a profit a
Agreement can be limited to these
Owner of land may enter into an
prendre (§61J(5))
natural resource products relating to
agreement about a natural resource 		
carbon sequestration and/or storage of
product on the land (§61J(1))		
carbon (§61J(3) & Schedule 3)
			Note the effect of these provisions is
that ownership of carbon stored in trees
or vegetation, and the ownership of the
carbon sequestration right in respect of
them, can also be separated
QUEENSLAND
Forestry Act 1959

TASMANIA
Forestry Rights
Registration Act 1990

“Carbon sequestration right”
Deemed to be a
means a right conferred on a person
profit a prendre
(by agreement or otherwise) to the legal,
(§5(1))
commercial or other benefit (whether 		
present or future) of carbon sequestration
by any existing or future tree or forest on
the land (§3)
Carbon sequestration right included in a
forestry right (§3)		

Neither the Northern Territory nor the Australian Capital
Territory have enacted any legislation, so any relevant common
law principles apply in these jurisdictions.

Conclusion
The new Australian government elected on November 24,
2007 has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, potentially leading to the
capacity to export carbon sequestration rights (using the Joint
Initiative mechanism) and to a domestic emissions market. Internationally, a greenhouse gas limitation regime is being negotiated for the period following the first Kyoto Protocol reporting
period.
33

Limited to carbon sequestration by a
tree or forest (§3)
Can be separated from ownership of
trees (§3)

As the CRA covers all types of carbon sequestration on
all but less than 0.1 percent of land in Western Australia and
focuses on creating certainty of ownership, the Western Australian Carbon Rights Act will be able to support initiatives
under any future national or international emission regime that
includes organic carbon sequestration as an option to generate
offset credits.

Endnotes: Securing Rights to Carbon Sequestration
continued on page 85
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It’s Not Easy Being Green:
Reflections on the American Carbon Offset Market
by Laurie A. Ristino*
Introduction

Additionality

ver the past few years, the U.S. carbon offset market has
experienced tremendous growth.1 This expansion can
be attributed to several factors, including the creation
of regional greenhouse gas (“GHG”) initiatives, the anticipation of federal regulation, and growing public concern regarding
climate change. In the absence of a national system of carbon
offset standards, a confusing myriad of methodologies governs
the creation of offsets. The media has repeatedly questioned the
credibility of carbon offsets, likening them to papal indulgences
for environmental sins committed.2 Indeed, the emphasis on offsets to mitigate climate change has distorted their appropriate
role in any future national framework to address climate change
and may distract from the more
fundamental changes needed to
address climate change. Likewise, the ease at which some
offsets are acquired to reduce
emissions serves to over-simplify the comprehensive, national
response that is necessary to
address climate change.
On the other hand, high
quality offset projects can play a
role in the near term to mitigate
climate change by reducing net carbon emissions in a cost-effective manner.3 Additionally, the growth of the carbon market
reflects, in part, American society’s genuine desire to address
climate change, and this impetus should be preserved and
encouraged. Assuming the enactment of a federal cap-and-trade
system, rigorous requirements for the creation and maintenance
of carbon offsets will be needed to ensure market certainty and
emissions reductions.

The reduction in emissions achieved with offsets is called
“additionality.” Additionally is defined as emission reductions
that occur solely as the result of voluntary or regulatory GHG
market incentives, not reductions that would have occurred anyway.4 A deceptively simple concept, additionality in practice
can be difficult to assess, but it is critical to viable carbon credit
creation. Achieving additionality requires policy clarity, rigor,
and transparency.

O

Regulatory & Voluntary Offsets
There are two general categories of offsets: regulatory
and voluntary. The former are regulated by emerging state and
regional cap and trade frameworks like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”)
or mandated by law such as Oregon’s requirement that all new
power plants in that state offset part of their carbon dioxide
emissions.5 The latter include
offsets that are purchased by
individuals, organizations,
government, and corporations
voluntarily seeking to reduce
their carbon footprint. Voluntary offsets are purchased either
through the Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”), America’s
only legally binding commodities market for emissions trading
and offsets, or through over-the-counter (“OTC”) transactions.
Since both categories of offset projects purport to result in emissions reductions, similar standards for verifying and monitoring
should apply.
Each trading system establishes its own standards for offset project creation, including verification, monitoring, baseline
determination, and permanence, resulting in an inconsistent
array of methodologies. For example, under RGGI, which is
comprised of 10 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states, only afforestation projects on land that has not been forested for ten years are
eligible forest offset projects, and the carbon sequestered must
be protected through a permanent conservation easement.6 In
contrast, under CCX, afforestation projects undertaken on sites

High quality offset
projects can play a role
in the near term to
mitigate climate change.

An Overview: Carbon Offsets
Under a cap-and-trade regime, a limited percentage of a
regulated industry’s emission reduction requirement may be met
with the purchase of carbon offsets. Offsets are different from
on-site reductions because they mitigate regulated source emissions by reducing emissions through an unregulated sector GHG
reduction project. Some offset projects remove GHGs from the
atmosphere; other projects are designed to reduce future emissions. Offset projects include terrestrial carbon sequestration,
such as afforestation or reforestation, improved range management, no-till practices on agricultural lands, as well as projects
that invest in renewable energy, methane capture, and energy
conservation.
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unforested as of January 1, 1990 are eligible.7 Instead of a conservation easement to ensure project permanence, CCX holds in
reserve twenty percent of all CCX afforestation offsets to insure
against catastrophic losses. Landowners must indicate in writing
their intent to maintain forest for at least fifteen years.8 As is
generally the case in the voluntary market, CCX has a broader
array of eligible offset project
types, such as agricultural soil
carbon sequestration, when compared to RGGI. Regulated markets tend to be more restrictive to
ensure a greater confidence level
in offset credibility.
In contrast, OTC offsets are
not governed by any regulatory
or legally binding regime. The public is generally more familiar with OTC offsets, which include many of the popular retailtype offsets offered by both for profit and non-profit entities. For
example, Expedia, Orbitz, and Travelocity offer individuals the
opportunity to offset their travel emissions by adding the cost
of offsets to the travel bill. These offsets are provided by different partners, e.g., Carbonfund, Terapass, and The Conservation
Fund, each with different offset prices and policies.9
The quality of retail offsets is uneven, and there is no standard certification of offsets upon which consumers can rely. To
address this information gap, Clean Air-Cool Planet commissioned a 2006 report as an effort to evaluate carbon offset providers to the retail market. The report ranked, on a scale from
1-10, thirty retail offset providers based upon several criteria
and found that only eight of the thirty providers had a score of
five or more.10 In addition, there have been voluntary efforts to
develop offset standards such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard.
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has been reassessing its consumer protection guides related to environmental
marketing claims (carbon credits and renewable energy certificates) to help prevent false or misleading claims to the public.
However, FTC’s review focuses on its consumer protection role,
not on establishing environmental performance standards.11

ment, The Nature Conservancy, and Ducks Unlimited. Powertree retains the rights to emission reductions associated with the
project and distributes the credits to its member companies. In
addition, there is an emerging industry associated with carbon
offsets, including credit brokers, aggregators, providers, and
verifiers.
The agricultural sector
has embraced offsetting for its
potential to generate $8 billion in revenue.13 The American Farm Bureau Federation
has stated that agriculture and
forestry should have unlimited
access to the offset market.14
In 2007, Iowa Farm Bureau
launched a wholly owned subsidiary, AgraGate Climate Credits
Corporation, to expand its existing offset aggregating business.
AgraGate pools together carbon offset credits produced from
offset projects on farms, ranches, and forests and then offers the
credits for sale on the CCX. To date, the company has enrolled
more than a million acres of land.15
Non-profits are using carbon offsets projects to fund conservation. Ducks Unlimited, for example, is currently offering to
purchase carbon credits from landowners in the prairie pothole
region (the Dakotas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Montana) who place
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) grassland easements on
their property.16 The carbon credit payment is in addition to the
easement payment. Ducks Unlimited transfers the credits to an
environmental asset manager, which sells the credits to investors. The organization’s website does not explain how paying
for the carbon credits in addition to the payment for the conservation easement, which protects the land from conversion, meets
the test of additionality. Ducks Unlimited uses the revenues from
the credits sold to purchase more easements.
Likewise, the federal government has experimented with the
carbon offset market as a funding stream. Federal land management agencies’ budgets have increasingly been directed toward
firefighting17 with the budget in other programs areas reduced.18
Partnerships with non-profit organizations have provided much
needed funding to restore areas previously burned by catastrophic wildfire. In 2007, the Forest Service signed an agreement with the National Forest Foundation (“Foundation”),19
under which the Forest Service identifies and makes available
appropriate National Forest System lands for reforestation projects, and other lands within National Forest Systems for acquisition and afforestation. In return, the Foundation collects and
provides funds to carry out reforestation, afforestation, and
acquisition. No carbon credits are created or traded. The Foundation established the Carbon Capital Fund through which individuals and organizations wishing to offset their emissions may
donate funds to support these reforestation efforts.
Some of the funding generated by the Forest Service’s partnership with the Foundation was used to reforest acreage burned
by fires and damaged by tornados on national forests in Idaho
and Montana. Forest Service Chief Gail Kimbell has stated that

The agricultural sector
has embraced offsetting.

Offsets: Something for Everyone?
The U.S. carbon offset market has been marked by an exuberant entrepreneurialism informed, in part, by a desire to do
environmental good on the one hand and, on the other, tap into a
significant revenue and funding stream.
Businesses are participating in the offset market for a variety of reasons, including demonstrating corporate responsibility,
hedging against future regulation, and gaining market experience. Companies are both purchasing offsets to reduce their
carbon footprint and acting as offset project proponents. As is
the case with individuals purchasing offsets, the media has questioned the environmental efficacy of these offsets.12 In anticipation of GHG emissions regulation, businesses, especially
power companies, have established offset projects. For example,
twenty-five power companies established Powertree Carbon
Company (“Powertree”) to invest in carbon offset projects in the
Southeast with various partners, including the federal govern35
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these reforestation efforts are not necessarily intended to replace
all the carbon released by wildfire but to have those sites begin
storing carbon at a good rate as soon as possible.20
For several years now, the Department of Interior has been
using the funding that carbon offset projects generate to restore
existing public lands and acquire new lands. In August of 2002,
the FWS, which administers the
National Wildlife Refuge System,
dedicated the Red River National
Refuge. FWS was able to do so
with the financial assistance of
Entergy Corporation and The
Conservation Fund.21 Entergy is
a major global energy company
that, among other things, delivers
electricity to over two million customers in the Southeast. The
company had planted more than 180,000 trees to restore native
bottomland and sequester carbon.

deforestation accounts for eighteen to twenty-five percent of
global emissions, mainly from developing countries.24 Underscoring the complexity of climate change mitigation, there is
some evidence that all avoided deforestation and reforestation
projects do not provide equivalent mitigation benefits. In particular, preservation in the tropics may be more beneficial than
in snowy climes because forests dampen the reflectivity of
the snow, known as the albedo
effect, and trap heat.25
In the United States, the
use of public funds, including
existing easement acquisition
programs, to protect private
forested lands meeting specific
carbon sequestration criteria and management goals may be a
more rational public policy response to prevent emissions from
forest degradation. Public incentives provide greater transparency regarding what is really being paid for: ecosystem services.
This approach would reflect society’s determination that the
continued ecosystem services these lands provide, such as clean
water, wildlife habitat, and carbon sequestration, are vital public
goods, and society will pay for them.
There are other categories of non-regulated emissions
sources that may not result in robust or efficient offsets, and
therefore, alternative strategies may be considered to address
those sectors. For example, carbon offsets from sectors that
already receive government financial assistance so that receiving payment for offsets results in “double-dipping;” projects
for which extant public programs already provide a mechanism
to require GHG reduction practices; offsets from categories of
projects that are difficult or expensive to verify and/or quantify;
and offset projects involving resources where there is a legal
requirement to manage those resources sustainably.
Along the lines of using existing infrastructure to maximize
carbon sequestration, a Pew Center for Climate Change report
addressing agricultural and forest lands carbon sequestration
concluded that agricultural and forest lands can play a key part
in climate change mitigation and that much of the infrastructure
needed to increase carbon sequestration on those lands is already
in place, mainly in the form of conservation programs authorized by the 2002 farm bill.26 The report proposed that a variety of tools can be used by the Federal government to increase
sequestration, including education, incentives, and results-based
system of payments that encourages local innovation. 27
Another example of using public programs to incentivize
emissions reductions is in the federal grants context. Recently,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed “The College Opportunity and Affordability Act,” H.R. 4137, which reauthorizes
loans, grants and assistance programs to make education more
accessible to students. The bill also ties several of the grants to
how much universities reduce their carbon footprint and requires
new campus buildings to meet or exceed certain energy efficiency standards.28

The quality of retail
offsets is uneven.

Offsets in Perspective
This enthusiastic participation in, and promotion of, the
burgeoning offset market has, arguably, inflated the appropriate
role of offsets in any national strategy to address climate change.
Similarly, the focus on offsets as an environmental panacea has
distracted from the comprehensive approach that is necessary to
begin mitigating climate change. The reality is that addressing
climate change requires fundamental changes to American infrastructure and assertive public policy to support such changes, of
which carbon offsets will play a limited role.22
In a cap-and-trade system, offsets are only a part of the
equation. Under the RGGI Model Rule, for example, initially
only 3.3 percent of a source’s compliance obligation may be met
by offsets.23 This ensures that bona fide emissions reductions are
achieved by the regulated entity. The use of carbon offsets represents a policy choice to use regulated industries to fund GHG
reductions for unregulated activities, in lieu of public incentives and standards to achieve such reductions. Given the challenges of creating credible offsets as well as other public policy
concerns, an initial inquiry should be made whether an offset
approach is best to effectuate reductions in a particular sector of
emissions sources.
One instance where using an offset mechanism to address
emissions may not be optimal, at least in the United States, are
those projects seeking to prevent future occurrences resulting in
GHG emissions, such as deforestation. In these cases, the regulated industry is essentially meeting its current emission reduction requirement by helping prevent additional emissions from
another source sometime in the future. There are technical hurdles associated with avoidance of deforestation projects, including determining a baseline from which additionality is then
measured. This is because project proponents have to essentially
estimate when such forests might be deforested.
That is not to say that such projects should not be part
of a climate change mitigation strategy. In a 2007 report, the
Global Canopy Programme described the immense contribution
of GHG emissions from deforestation. According to the report,
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Conclusion
Addressing climate change requires a robust, national
response, including making fundamental changes to American infrastructure, incentivizing the use of existing renewable
and clean technologies, fostering technology development and
deployment, and reducing consumption in order to create a more
sustainable America. Climate change can be a tremendous driver
for innovation, and progressive public policy can facilitate this
process.

Carbon offsets have the potential to play an effective, interim
role as part of an overall comprehensive federal framework that
uses multiple strategies to address climate change. However, a
national regulatory framework that takes a disciplined approach
to offset creation is needed to ensure high quality offsets resulting in real climate mitigation. Such an approach will also help
provide needed credibility to the offset market and more effectively harness for the good of the environment the significant
investments being made in the offset market. 29
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The Future of the EU Emissions Trading System
by Erika Lennon*

S

lightly more than a year after ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
in October 2003, the European Commission established
the European Union Emissions Trading System (“EUETS”), a cap-and-trade system, to help implement its goals
under the Kyoto Protocol.1 Now, as the reporting period for the
Kyoto Protocol begins, the European Union (“EU”) is looking
beyond 2012 and creating plans for the future.
The EU-ETS has completed its first phase (2005–2007) and
is currently beginning its second phase (2008–2012). In these first
two phases, the EU-ETS was limited to installations in certain
industries, namely energy activities, production and processing
of ferrous metals, activities involving pulp and paper production, and carbon dioxide emissions.2 Additionally, the structure
of the EU-ETS centered on allocations through National Allocation Plans (“NAPs”) 3 and the predominantly free distribution
of allowances.4 Each country submitted a NAP laying out its
number of allowances and its allocation plan, then at the end of
the year each country reported its emissions and could sell any
leftover allowances.5 Thus, these initial EU-ETS phases establish the system, but are limited in scope.
As the “cornerstone for the EU’s strategy for fighting climate change,” the EU-ETS must be continued and strengthened.6 To establish a proposal for phase three, the Commission
used three guiding objectives: to fully exploit the potential of the
EU-ETS to the EU’s overall greenhouse gas reduction commitments; to refine and improve the EU-ETS based on experience;
and to contribute to the transformation of Europe into a “low
greenhouse-gas-emitting economy” and to create incentives for
low carbon investment decisions by “reinforcing a clear . . . and
long term carbon price signal.”7
The Commission issued a draft proposal on January 23,
2008 that included an overview of the provisions and specific
language to amend the EU-ETS directive.8 This draft proposal
acknowledges the EU commitment to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by at least twenty percent below 1990 levels by 2020.9
The new proposal tries to create a more harmonized system to
exploit the benefits of emissions trading and facilitate linking
the EU-ETS with other emissions trading systems that may
emerge while avoiding distortions in the market.10 In addition
to increased harmonization, the proposal includes new industry
sectors and new gases, which will allow for new investments
and new abatement opportunities, hopefully leading to increased
efficiency.11 The expansion of the EU-ETS to include more
industries and gases other than carbon dioxide is a key provision
in the fight against climate change.12 It is estimated that there
will be six percent increase in coverage—about 120 to 130 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent when compared to phase two and
will cover almost half of Europe’s emissions.13
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Another key part of the proposal is the shift from individual
country NAPs to a Community-wide quantity of allowances.14
The initial Community-wide cap will base the number of allowances on the average total number of allowances issued by
Member States during phase two.15 Additionally, it will create
greater harmonization across countries by standardizing allocation rules, which will help prevent countries from having NAPs
that favor certain industries.16 Further, the draft proposal calls
for a decrease in allowances yearly from 2013 to 2020 so as to
reduce overall emissions in a cost-effective way.17 Reducing
allowances yearly will not only help the EU meet its emissions
reduction goals, but do so in a way that avoids instability and
uncertainty.
The new draft proposal calls for the auctioning of allowances, which is distinguishable from the initial phases of the EUETS, when most of the allowances were given away for free.18
The draft calls for the full auctioning of allowances in the power
sector, but for the free allocation of allowances in other sectors
of industry initially, with a program to eliminate all free allocations by 2020.19 It is proposed that the power sector, due to its
inclusion in the current EU-ETS scheme, have auctioned allocations, whereas other industries are given some free allowances
to help adjust to the emissions trading system. Moreover, the
draft proposal recognizes that some industries could suffer from
“carbon leakage” due to international competition, thus it allows
consideration of this factor in assessing whether to auction off or
freely distribute allowances.20 Further, a portion of the proceeds
from the auctioned allowances will go to programs designed to
fight climate change and to adapt to its inevitable effects.21
As the international community works towards a postKyoto agreement, the EU has put forth a new plan to fight
climate change with a focus on expanding and refining the EUETS. The proposed changes in the EU-ETS show the steps the
EU is taking to fight climate change in the upcoming decade. By
expanding and harmonizing the EU-ETS, the proposal looks to
the post-Kyoto world and the changes to come.

Endnotes:
1

Council Directive 2003/87/EC, preamble, para. 4, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 275)
(EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri= CELEX:32003L0087:EN:HTML (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter
EU-ETS Directive].

Endnotes: The Future of the EU Emissions Trading System
continued on page 86
* Erika Lennon is a J.D. candidate, May 2008, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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Recent Developments in Australian Climate
Change Litigation: Forward Momentum From Down Under
by Tracy Bach & Justin Brown*

S

Introduction

tudies indicate that Australia has one of the worst environmental records of any developed country.1 Particularly striking is its role in the climate change debate:
despite being the current leading emitter of greenhouse gases in
the world on a per capita basis, Australia originally joined the
United States in refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol.2 These disparate climate change positions have a common denominator:
coal.3 Australia is the world’s fourth largest coal producer and
largest coal exporter, sending out approximately sixty percent of
its annual production, which accounts for almost thirty percent
of global coal exports.4 Not only is the country’s trade economy
reliant on coal,5 so too is its electricity production: over seventyfive percent of Australia’s electricity comes from burning coal.6
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14.2%

Figure 17

Brown coal
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As Dr. Mark Diesendorf, Director of the Sustainability
Centre at Sydney’s University of Technology, pointed out, “[t]
he greenhouse pollution produced by these [coal fired] power
stations is equivalent to the annual emissions from about forty
million cars, four times Australia’s actual car fleet.”8
But today, the business as usual mentality and relative
environmental indifference is quickly becoming a thing of the
past. Ubiquitous climate change headlines both popularize the
issue and arguably educate the public.9 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (“IPCC”) Fourth Assessment
Report unequivocally documents the scientific consensus on climate change’s anthropogenic sources.10 Closer to home, record
drought in Australia and its toll on the agricultural sector—particularly cotton exports—has raised awareness and concern over
global warming.11 Such a massive turn in public perception has
led to a political reevaluation of Australia’s climate change position. On November 24, 2007, Labor Party candidate Kevin Rudd
was elected Prime Minister in the world’s first climate change
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election.12 Promising to make the issue a priority, Rudd immediately signed the Kyoto Protocol and played an active role in the
United Nations’ climate summit in Bali.13
The growing scientific consensus about climate change and
Australians’ fears about irreversible ecological impacts have led
to a search for more proactive domestic regulation via environmental impact assessments (“EIAs”). During the past five years,
Australian conservation foundations have spearheaded a grassroots movement to use the courts as a tool for climate change
reform. In so doing, these environmental advocates have pushed
the judiciary to interpret and apply the Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999 (“EPBC Act”) to climate change. Through a series of cases,14 courts decided that
EIAs required under the EPBC Act and relevant state environmental planning statutes15 must consider climate change and
its intergenerational effects. Reaching this conclusion required
case-by-case analysis of the EPBC Act’s terms in light of its
overall purpose. It also required a measure of courage, for, by
taking a general environmental protection statute and applying
it progressively to the home-grown causes of global climate
change, Australian judges have stepped into a breach that legislators and executive branch agencies have typically avoided.16
This Article seeks to explain how Australian jurisprudence
came to take this position on climate change. In Part I, we briefly
describe the EPBC Act, its key principles and provisions, and
how these ideas made their way into national legislation. In
Part II, we explore the recent climate change decisions of various federal and state trial and appellate courts. We specifically
analyze how key EPBC Act provisions have been interpreted
to require recognition of global and intergenerational accountability for Australia’s coal industry. Finally, in our conclusion
we discuss how the EPBC Act and Australian courts contribute
to the broader narrative of climate change litigation currently
occurring around the world.17

Part I:
Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act of 1999
The EPBC Act established a schema of EIA requirements
and guidelines. Although a federal statute, individual Australian
states and territories look to its principles and structure when

* Tracy Bach is a professor of law at Vermont Law School (“VLS”). Justin Brown
is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at VLS. Professor Bach and Justin Brown have conducted this research for the Climate Legacy Initiative (“CLI”), a scholarly collaborative of VLS and the University of Iowa College of Law. For more information
about the CLI, visit http://www.vermontlaw.edu/cli/index.cfm?doc_id=1403.
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formulating their own environmental regulations. Along with the
general objectives of protecting the environment and conserving
biodiversity, the EPBC Act takes a strong stand on sustainable
development and intergenerational equity.18

Precursor Principles
After signing many international environmental treaties and protocols beginning in
the 1980s, the Commonwealth,
states, and territories of Australia adopted the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable
Development (“NSESD”) and
the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment
(“IGAE”) in 1992. These two
agreements established ecologically sustainable development as
an accepted principle of environmental policy across all levels
of government.19 The NSESD provides a framework for policyand decision-making. Its adoption came largely in response to
the 1987 release of Our Common Future by the World Commission on Environment and Development (commonly referred
to as the Brundtland Commission).20 The NSESD thus lays out
a cooperative approach to ecologically sustainable development
that emphasizes long-term benefits over short-term gains. Taking into account Australia’s unique natural environment, the
values of the Australian people, and the prevailing patterns of
economic production and consumption, the NSESD defined
ecologically sustainable development as “using, conserving
and enhancing the community’s resources so that ecological
processes, on which life depends, are maintained and quality
of life for both present and future generations is increased.”21
The NSESD’s five principles, announced after consultation with
Australia’s manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and fisheries
sectors, include:
1. integrating economic and environmental goals in policies and activities;
2. ensuring that environmental assets are properly valued;
3. providing for equity within and between generations;
4. dealing cautiously with risk and irreversibility; and
5. recognizing the global dimension.22
Although each level of government adopted these principles,
they implemented them according to their own needs and
priorities.23
Most Australian governments signed off on the IGAE one
month before the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio, as a direct reflection of Australia’s commitment to the environment. In it, the parties acknowledged that
environmental concerns and impacts respect neither physical nor
political boundaries and thus have inter-jurisdictional, international, and global impacts.24 Similar to the NSESD, the IGAE
declares that “ecologically sustainable development . . . provides
potential for the integration of environmental and economic considerations in decision making and for balancing the interests

of current and future generations.”25 Government parties also
agreed that environmental decisions need to take into account the
precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, conservation
of biological diversity and ecological integrity, and improved
valuation, pricing, and incentive
mechanisms.26   Importantly,
the IGAE sought to harmonize Commonwealth and State
approval processes, to promote
efficiency and limit duplication.
The IGAE report concluded by
pointing out the potentially significant impact of greenhouse
gas-enhanced climate change on
Australia’s natural, social, and
working environments, as well
as on the global community.27

Ubiquitous climate change
headlines both popularize
the issue and arguably
educate the public.
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The EPBC Act’s Terms
When enacted in 1999, the EPBC Act set out eight “Objects
of Act:”
1. protecting the environment, especially “matters of
national environmental significance;”
2. promoting ecologically sustainable development through
conservation and sustainable use;
3. conserving biodiversity;
4. protecting and conserving heritage;
5. promoting cooperation among governments, community,
landholders, and indigenous peoples;
6. implementing cooperatively Australia’s international
environmental responsibilities;
7. recognizing the role of indigenous people; and
8. promoting the use of indigenous peoples’ knowledge.28
To achieve these objects, the EPBC Act very practically
committed to “strengthen[ing] intergovernmental co-operation,
and minimi[zing] duplication through bilateral agreements,”29
“adopt[ing] an efficient and timely Commonwealth environmental assessment and approval process that will ensure activities
that are likely to have significant impacts on the environment are
properly assessed,”30 and “promot[ing] a partnership approach
to environmental protection” with states and territories, landholders, and indigenous people.31
Given the EPBC Act’s grounding in the NSESD and IGEA,
the Act includes a separate section explicitly stating the five
principles of ecologically sustainable development:
1. decision-making processes should effectively integrate
both long-term and short-term economic, environmental,
social, and equitable considerations;
2. if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not
be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation;
3. the principle of intergenerational equity—that the present generation should ensure that the health, diversity
and productivity of the environment is maintained or
enhanced for the benefit of future generations;
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4. the conservation of biological diversity and ecological
integrity should be a fundamental consideration in decision-making; and
5. improved valuation, pricing, and incentive mechanisms
should be promoted.32
EPBC Act assessment and approval is required for actions
that are likely to have a significant impact on: (1) a matter of
national environmental significance; (2) the environment of
Commonwealth land (even if taken outside Commonwealth
land); and (3) the environment anywhere in the world
(if the action is undertaken
by the Commonwealth). 33
The EPBC Act characterizes
“action” broadly to include a
project, development, undertaking, activity, or series of
activities.34 When a person
or Commonwealth agency
proposes to take an action it
believes may be “controlled”
under the EPBC Act, it must refer the proposal to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment and Water Resources.35 To
make this determination, the Minister “must consider all adverse
impacts (if any) the action “(i) has or will have; or (ii) is likely to
have.”36 To apply this language, policy guidelines instruct that:
1. a “significant impact” is an impact which is important,
notable, or of consequence, having regard to its context
or intensity;
2. whether or not an action is likely to have a significant
impact depends on the sensitivity, value, and quality of
the environment which is impacted, and on the intensity, duration, magnitude, and geographic extent of the
impacts; and
3. the significant impact does not need to have a greater
than fifty percent chance of happening. Rather, all that
is required is that it has a real and not a simply remote
chance or possibility. If there is scientific uncertainty
about the impacts of an action but the potential impacts
are serious or irreversible, the precautionary principle is
applicable.37

Environment & Heritage v. Queensland Conservation Council) precedent,38 for it established the test used to determine the
scope of a controlled action under section 75 of the EPBC Act.
In this case, a developer applied to the Commonwealth Environmental Minister for EPBC Act approval of a dam construction project in Central Queensland. The dam’s principal purpose
was to supply water to irrigate cotton farms. If constructed, the
dam would have significantly affected river flow traveling into
the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (“GBRWHA”).
Because the dam would directly
impact certain threatened species,
the Minister found the construction
of the dam to be a controlled action
only in that regard. The dam’s
indirect impacts on migratory species, for example, and on the GBRWHA, through agricultural runoff,
were deemed not controlled actions
under this direct effects test.
In response, the Queensland
Conservation Council (“QCC”)
challenged the direct effects test, asking the Minister to do environmental impact assessments for the indirect impacts the dam
would have on the downstream Great Barrier Reef and Dawson
floodplain.39 The federal trial court held that the Minister had
erred by refusing to consider the impacts of associated agricultural development and the reviewing court affirmed, concluding that the Minister had wrongfully construed the “all adverse
impacts” language.40 The Court of Appeals determined that these
statutory words include “each consequence which can reasonably be imputed as within the contemplation of the proponent of
the action, whether those consequences are within the control of
the proponent or not.”41 Furthermore, “impact” means the influence or effect of an action, which may readily include the indirect consequence of an action—even possibly the results of acts
done by persons other than the principal actor.42 The court did
put limits on these indirect effects, however: they must be “sufficiently close to the action to allow it to be said, without straining the language, that they are, or would be, the consequences of
the action on the protected matter.”43 Thus, as long as potential
impacts do not lie in the “realm of speculation,” they are controlled actions.44

The EPBC Act
established a schema of
EIA requirements and
guidelines.

Part II:
Climate Change and Intergenerational Rights
Case Law
Australian courts have taken the lead in connecting global
climate change to domestic environmental planning and economic development. Using the EPBC Act and its core principle
of intergenerational equity, courts have asserted the government’s responsibility to assess even the indirect impacts of coal
industry expansion, in light of its greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and their contribution to global climate change.

Reaching the Indirect Effects of Development
To understand the recent flurry in climate change litigation,
one has to first understand the Nathan Dam (Minister for the
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Regulating Coal Mining and its Indirect Effects
on Climate Change
The decision in Australian Conservation Foundation & Ors
v. Minister for Planning stands as one of the world’s first climate
change lawsuits resolved in favor of environmentalists.45 In this
case, the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station and its owner,
International Power Hazelwood (“IPH”), sought to develop an
additional coal field to ensure a supply until at least 2031. 46
Although IPH created an environmental effects statement,47 it
only addressed the release of GHG during coal extraction and
not from its subsequent burning in IPH’s power station.48 On
July 12, 2004, the Australian Conservation Foundation (“ACF”)
petitioned to have the future release of GHGs from the power
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

station considered. The panel rejected the petition and the ACF
referred the matter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”).
The VCAT concluded that GHGs released from power station operation constitute a relevant planning concern when determining whether a coal mine field should expand. Although it
looked to several sections of the Victoria’s Environment Protection Act when construing the relevancy of panel submissions,49
notably section 21(1)’s relatively simple requirement that the
submission be “about an amendment,” it is the Tribunal’s adoption of the indirect test from Nathan Dam’s EPBC Act interpretation that stands out. To find a sufficient nexus between the
amendment and the effect, the VCAT reasoned that
the approval of [the] Amendment will make it more
probable that the Hazelwood Power Station will continue to operate beyond 2009; which, in turn, may
make it more likely that the atmosphere will receive
greater greenhouse gas emissions than would otherwise
be the case; which may be an environmental effect of
significance.50
Thus, the GHG submission is “about” the planning amendment
because an indirect effect of expanding coal mine operations is
an eventual increase in GHG emissions.51
Although complicated procedurally, this VCAT decision is
vitally important climate change jurisprudence in Australia. By
deciding that applications for permits or amendments to planning schemes must consider all relevant environmental impacts,
both direct and indirect, it paved the way for greenhouse gas
emissions produced through future burning of the coal to constitute relevant considerations in the present.
Two years later, another coal mine expansion challenge
shifted the judicial discussion to the burden of proving when
a project’s local GHG emissions have a significant impact. In
Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v. Minister for Environment & Heritage,
the preservation society argued that two proposed coal mine
projects fell under the EPBC Act’s “controlled action” provision because burning coal from these mines would produce massive amounts of GHGs, which in turn would lead to increased
global warming.52 But in this case, the Minister’s environmental
impact assessment had already considered the possibility that
GHGs might cause climate change and that it, in turn, could
adversely affect protected areas. When reviewing this data to
determine whether the project amounted to a controlled action,
requiring the next level of scrutiny in an environmental impact
statement, the Minister saw such future impacts as too speculative. He found no strong evidence suggesting the project would
increase overall GHG emissions: if the coal did not come from
these mines, he reasoned, other mines would feed the power
plants.
The Court agreed with the Minister’s reasoning, finding that
GHGs generated in the extraction, transportation, and burning
of coal were unlikely to have a “significant impact” on a matter of national environmental significance.53 The Court rejected
Whitsunday’s interpretation that “likely,” under section 75 of
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the EPBC Act, meant “possible.”54 It consequently concluded
that the Minister had lived up to the Australian Conservation
Foundation’s baseline of taking GHGs into account in the environmental assessment phase; having done so procedurally, it
could now conclude substantively that the burning of coal was
not likely to have a significant impact on a protected area or species. In this manner, Whitsunday Branch established a new focus
on the “likely” requirement and on the amount and kind of information needed to prove it.
With the courts having established both a GHG accounting baseline and a tighter nexus between these emissions and
their specific impact on the Australian environment, a third case
decided in neighboring New South Wales (“NSW”) staked out
new territory by bringing ESD principles to the fore. In Gray v.
The Minister for Planning,55 Centennial Hunter Party Limited
applied for approval to construct and operate a large, open cut,
coal mine at Anvil Hill under the New South Wales Environment Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 (“EPA Act”). The
mine would have an estimated production capacity of 105 million tons of coal per year and an estimated twenty-one-year life
span. Gray, a law student, challenged the Director-General of
the Department of Planning’s acceptance of the company’s proposed environmental assessment because it ignored the indirect
effects of GHG emissions released from burning Anvil Hill coal
at power stations.
The Gray Court began with the principle that EIAs extend
to the “whole, cumulated and continuing effect” of an activity so
long as it is relevant and reasonable.56 The Court reasoned that
because a sufficiently proximate link exists between the mining of thermal coal in NSW and global warming, an assessment
would enable the decision-maker to make an informed decision
regarding potential environmental consequences.
Climate change/global warming is widely recognized
as a significant environmental impact to which there
are many contributors worldwide but the extent of the
change is not yet certain and is a matter of dispute. The
fact there are many contributors globally does not mean
the contribution from a single large source such as the
Anvil Hill Project . . . should be ignored in the environmental assessment process. . . . That the impact from
burning the coal will be experienced globally as well
as in NSW, but in a way that is currently not able to be
accurately measured, does not suggest that the link to
causation of an environmental impact is insufficient.57
In reaching its decision, the Court relied explicitly on ESD
principles, particularly intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle.58 It reasoned that environmental impact
assessments are key considerations because they include the
public interest and they enable the “present generation to meet
its obligation of intergenerational equity by ensuring the health,
diversity and productivity of the environment is maintained and
enhanced for the benefit of future generations.” 59 The Court
observed how cumulative impact determinations help a decision
maker to more accurately predict future environmental effects,
while viewing impacts in a piecemeal fashion undermines the
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planning process. Notably, the Court read the ESD principles
set out in the Act’s objectives section to apply to all of its parts,
including Part 3A’s environmental assessment requirements.60
Based on these principles, the Court held that a decision maker
is legally required to consider intergenerational equity during
the environmental assessment process61 and specifically rejected the
argument that a GHG assessment
without coal burning emissions
appropriately took into account
ESD principles.62
The Anvil Hill project is under
a new round of judicial scrutiny,
following amendment to its EIA
to account for the impact of its
coal burning. The Minister for the
Environment and Water Resources
decided in early 2007 that the Anvil
Hill Project is not a controlled
action under the EPBC Act, because
the action is not likely to have a significant impact on any of the matters protected under the Act.63 After
examining the assessment reports submitted by the Anvil Hill
Project Watch Association (“AHPWA”) and taking into account
the precautionary principle and public comments, the Minister
found that “a possible link between the additional greenhouse
gases arising from the proposed action and a measurable or
identifiable increase in global atmospheric temperature or other
greenhouse gas impacts is not likely to be identifiable.”64 “The
climate system is complex,” it reasoned, and connecting specific
sources of GHG to potential impacts on protected matters is
“uncertain and conjectural.”65
On appeal, the AHPWA challenged the Minister’s interpretation of section 75(2)’s “likely” language, arguing that he
erroneously required a “measurable or identifiable increase in
the global atmospheric temperature or other greenhouse gas
impacts”66 and thus misconstrued the causal relationship necessary for legal responsibility.67 The correct test, according to
the AHPWA, is whether the proposed action is likely to have
an impact on a matter protected under Part 3 that is “important, notable, or of consequence having regard to its context
or intensity.”68 A single judge of the Federal Court rejected
AHPWA’s contextual argument, finding that the relatively small
contribution of Anvil Hill’s proposed emissions to total global
emissions fell short of a significant impact.69 AHPWA appealed
to the full Federal Court on October 11, 2007.70
The most recent coal mine expansion case, Xstrata Coal
Queensland Pty Ltd. v. Queensland Conservation Council,
recites familiar facts but adds a new twist in its remedy request:
the QCC argued for a conditional permit as long as the company
could “avoid, reduce or offset the emissions of greenhouse gases
that are likely to result from the mining, transport and use of the
coal from the mine.”71 The proposed mine would produce up
to 2.5 million tons of black coal a year for fifteen years, which

would be used in domestic and/or export markets for electricity production. The QCC relied heavily on evidence that GHG
emissions from human activities (particularly energy production) cause climate change, which in turn levies significant
economic, social, and environmental costs on Australia and the
world. But cross examination
of their experts brought out
that the mine’s annual contribution to GHG emissions
was minimal and that substantial scientific challenges
to the IPCC report and the
Stern Review exist.72
While the Court considered ESD principles, it was
not satisfied that QCC had
established a demonstrable
causal link between the proposed mine’s GHG emissions
and any discernable harm.73
The only sure impact the
Court saw was the adverse
economic consequences of
restrictive growth; absent universally applied policies for GHG
reduction, it concluded that requiring this mine to limit or reduce
its GHG emissions would be arbitrary and unfair.74 Thus, the
Court recommended that the Minister for Mines and Energy
grant Xstrata’s additional surface area application as well as
approve the environmental authority application under the Environmental Protection Act. The QCC appealed and the Queensland Court of Appeal remitted the matter to the Land Court for
rehearing, based on procedural grounds.75 Now the Land Court
must re-evaluate the climate change science to determine if coal
companies will not only have to assess their contribution to climate change, but initiate programs in order to avoid, reduce, or
offset GHG emissions.

Australian courts
have taken the lead
in connecting global
climate change to
domestic environmental
planning and economic
development.
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Conclusion: Next Steps in Climate Change
Litigation Down Under
On one level, the victories experienced by climate change
advocates seeking to use EIAs to make explicit the link between
coal mining, coal burning, greenhouse gas emission, and global
warming are real ones. The language in the EPBC Act and
related state environmental statutes has been interpreted broadly,
in light of overarching principles of ecologically sustainable
development. Importantly, this application to climate change
has resulted in EIAs having to account for the indirect effects of
burning coal. Yet on another level, it would be relatively easy to
see these requirements as pyrrhic victories, for no coal expansion project has been stopped in its tracks. Each was slowed
down, admittedly, by the litigation and resulting requirements
of more careful analysis and documentation of GHG emissions.
But even the robust statutory language enshrining the precautionary principle and intergenerational equity did not keep an
Australian coal mine from expanding.76
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Nonetheless, these recent Australian climate change decisions have pointed a certain way. As the Australian government undergoes major changes in the wake of Rudd’s election,
the international community fashions an agreement to succeed
the Kyoto Protocol, and the IPCC continues to refine its data,
the questions of causation, burdens of proof, and evidentiary
requirements that made Australian courts pause before holding individual coal mines accountable for their contribution to

c limate change will soon likely find answers. Thus via case-bycase judicial interpretation of statutory intent, which provoked
and refined this analysis of ecologically sustainable development in practice, Australian climate change litigation has played
an important role in showing how individual countries might
grapple with issues like climate change that cross temporal and
spatial boundaries.
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China’s Renewable Energy Law:
Not Enough to Overcome China’s Energy and Environmental Problems
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*

C

hina’s rapid economic growth over the last two decades
has brought numerous environmental problems. Today,
China contains seven of the ten most polluted cities in
the world and is now the second-largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, behind the United
States.1 China’s new renewable
energy law recognizes the looming energy and environmental
crisis on the horizon but may not
be enough to solve the problem.
Current trends show China’s
energy use growing faster than
its GDP.2 Over two-thirds of its
energy is produced from coal.3
Current projections for China’s
energy consumption in the near
future could be as much as fifty percent higher than expected.4
Given China’s dependency on coal for energy, its greenhouse
gas emissions could grow equally as fast unless there is a significant shift to cleaner energy sources.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China passed a comprehensive renewable energy law on
February 28, 2005. The law sets an aggressive target for renewable energy—fifteen percent of China’s energy will come from
renewable sources by 2020, up from approximately seven percent today.5 Overall, the law calls for the creation of 137 gigawatts of new renewable power generation in the next thirteen
years.6 The law offers financial incentives, like a national fund
to foster renewable energy development, discounted lending,
and tax preferences for renewable energy projects.7 Due to the
new law, China showed a sixty percent increase in wind power
generation between 2004 and 2005; biogas and solar show similar growth.8
Unfortunately, this growth of renewable energy may not
be enough to have a substantial impact on China’s increasing
dependency on fossil fuels. This is due in part to the fact that
renewable energy projects have much higher up-front costs
than fossil fuel projects, making financing of the projects much
more difficult. Additionally, due to antiquated laws governing
coal energy production, the environmental controls for renewable energy projects are much stricter than those for coal plants,
making approval for energy projects much more costly and
difficult.9
The Chinese law also mandates that power grid operators
purchase energy produced from renewable sources at a price set
by state authorities.10 For example, the national rate set for wind

energy is 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour, a forty percent increase
over the average 4.5 cent rate for coal-generated power.11 Unfortunately due to the higher cost for wind energy production, even
at 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour, wind farm development in China
is still slow.12 At this rate, only
one-third of one percent of
wind projects approved in 2004
were completed and none were
approved in 2005 or 2006. 13
Mongolia pays between 8 and
9.5 cents per kilowatt hour for
wind energy and is projected
to see rapid growth in renewable energy development.14 To
increase the speed of development, some of China’s provincial governments are now allowing payments of around 8.1 cents
per kilowatt hour. All wind projects selling at that rate have been
completed.15 These provincial rate increases have helped considerably, doubling installed wind capacity in China in 2006.16
At its current rate of consumption, China is likely to face
serious energy shortages and growing environmental problems
as it draws upon readily available coal resources and oil imports
to remedy the problem.17 China’s renewable energy law is not
facilitating development of renewable sources fast enough to
meet demand, and new and creative solutions are needed to meet
this challenge.

Renewable energy projects
have much higher
up-front costs than fossil
fuel projects.
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Landmark Agreement to Strengthen
Montreal Protocol Provides Powerful
Climate Mitigation
by Donald Kaniaru, Rajendra Shende & Durwood Zaelke*

L

Introduction

ast September’s historic agreement under the Montreal
Protocol to accelerate the phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”) marked the first time both developed and developing countries explicitly agreed to accept binding
and enforceable commitments to address climate change.1 This
is particularly significant because the decision was taken by
consensus by the 191 Parties to the Protocol—all but five countries recognized by the United
Nations. 2 Accelerating the
HCFC phase-out could reduce
emissions by sixteen billion
tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (“CO2e”) through 2040.3 In
terms of radiative forcing, this
will delay climate change by up
to 1.5 years.4 This is because, in
addition to depleting the ozone
layer, HCFCs also are potent
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—
with some thousands of times more powerful than carbon dioxide (“CO2”) at warming the planet. Thus, from September 2007
both Montreal and Kyoto can be considered climate protection
treaties.
The HCFC agreement and its climate benefits were possible
largely because of the Montreal Protocol’s unique history of
continuous adjustment to keep pace with scientific understanding and technological capability.5 The Parties to the Protocol
generally regard the treaty as fair, due to its objective technical assessment bodies and its effective financial mechanism,
the Multilateral Fund. These features and others have made the
Protocol the world’s most successful multilateral environmental
agreement, phasing out ninety-five percent of global production
of ozone-depleting substances in just twenty years and placing
the ozone layer on a path to recovery.6
The Montreal Protocol offers additional opportunities to
reduce GHG emissions further, including by creating greater
incentives for the recovery and destruction of ozone-depleting
substances currently in chemical inventory or contained in
refrigerators, air conditioners, and other products and equipment
still in service or not yet disposed.7 As with the HCFC agreement, these opportunities can achieve immediate and substantial reductions in GHG emissions, as well as further speed the
recovery of the ozone layer. More significantly, they can be pur-

sued immediately and independently of the international climate
treaty negotiations.

The Montreal Protocol:
“Start and Strengthen”
In 1987, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol required a
freeze in halon production and a fifty percent reduction in the
production of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), and have continually strengthened the treaty since then as it became clear that
ozone protection required that
other ozone-depleting substances
must be controlled and as new
environmentally-superior substitutes and alternatives were developed. This is one of the great
strengths of the Protocol, and it
did not arise by accident. To the
contrary, the treaty is designed
to be flexible, allowing the Parties to strengthen and fine-tune
its provisions to stay abreast of
current scientific understanding and technological capability.8
As Mostafa Tolba, the fomer UNEP Executive Director and
“father” of the Montreal Protocol, has said of the treaty’s evolution: “Start and strengthen.” 9
Adding or removing substances from the treaty’s control
measures generally requires an “amendment,” which then must
be ratified by each Party’s government.10 Amendments can be
time-consuming, often taking years, or even decades, before
every Party completes ratification. For example, the most recent
“Beijing Amendment” agreed on in 1999 did not enter into force
until January 2001 and today is ratified only by 135 of the 191

The Montreal Protocol
offers additional
opportunities to reduce
GHG emissions.
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Parties to the Montreal Protocol. The treaty has been amended
four times.11
But the Parties can change or, more specifically, accelerate
the Protocol’s phase-out schedules by “adjustment ,” a procedure
used six times. Adjustments do not require ratification and take
effect within six months of agreement, except for parties that
affirmatively opt out. In the United States, for example, Congress included “adjustments adopted by the Parties thereto and
amendments that have entered
into force” in its definition of the
Montreal Protocol when it incorporated its provisions into the
1990 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act.12
The adjustment procedure
was instrumental in the evolution
of the Protocol. The original text
of the 1987 Protocol included
only CFCs and halon ozone-depleting substances and required
developed countries to phase out fifty percent of CFC production
by 2000 and to freeze halon production. This was woefully inadequate in terms of protecting the ozone layer, but nevertheless a
political and diplomatic triumph given concerns at the time that
the science was not yet certain, the substitutes did not yet exist,
and the projected costs looked prohibitive.
Shortly after the Protocol entered into force, the science
of stratospheric ozone depletion and the Antarctic Ozone Hole
were confirmed with empirical evidence—showing that the
situation was potentially more grave than originally perceived.
The modest control measures imposed in 1987 created a market
for substitutes and alternatives, which were quickly developed
and deployed. And many businesses complied at no cost or, in
some cases, at a profit. As a result, the fifty percent phase-out of
CFCs by 2000 was subsequently adjusted in 1990 to require a
seventy-five percent phase-out by 1998 (and one-hundred percent by 2000), and then adjusted again in 1992 to require a onehundred percent phase-out by 1996—all within the treaty’s first
five years. Through amendment and adjustment, the Montreal
Protocol now regulates ninety-six different chemicals used in
more than 240 sectors and thousands of applications.

Estimates reported by the Montreal Protocol’s Technology
and Economic Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) showed that HCFC
use could exceed 700,000 tonnes by 2015—roughly five times
more than the TEAP’s 1998 projection of just 163,000 tonnes.13
The Protocol’s Scientific Assessment Panel reported in 2006
that the recovery of the ozone layer to pre-1980 levels would
likely be delayed by fifteen years over Antarctica, to 2065, and
by five years at mid-latitudes, to 2049, with the delay at midlatitudes partly due to the high
estimates of future production of HCFCs.14 In addition,
the Environmental Investigation Agency reported in 2006
that HCFC emissions by 2015
could cancel out the reductions
achieved by the Kyoto Protocol during its first commitment
period of 2008–2012.15
The increased HCFC use was driven partly by economic
growth in developing countries and by a “perverse incentive”
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”).16 The most commonly used HCFC is HCFC-22,
which produces by-product emissions of HFC-23 when it is
manufactured. Under the CDM, eligible HCFC-22 producers in
developing countries could generate Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) by capturing and destroying HFC-23 by-product
emissions.17 HFC-23 is a super-GHG with a global warming
potential (“GWP”) of 11,700.18 HFC-23 CERs could earn up
to ten times the cost of capturing and destroying HFC-23 emissions and are exceeding the sales revenue of HCFC-22,19 effectively subsidizing the cost of producing HCFC-22 and driving
its expanded use, including in applications where it has not been
widely used or had already been replaced.20
The original HCFC control measures were not negotiated
with these higher than expected levels in mind. Originally,
the Montreal Protocol required developing countries to freeze
HCFC consumption by 2016 at 2015 levels and phase-out one
hundred percent of HCFC production by 2040. It required developed countries to phase out 99.5 percent of HCFCs by 2020,
with 0.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until
2030.21 By early 2007, there was concern that without urgent
action, developing countries would have difficulty in complying
with the 2016 freeze and the 2040 phase-out.22

The adjustment procedure
was instrumental in the
evolution of the Protocol.

Rapid Increase in HCFC Use Threatens
Climate as well as Ozone
At their nineteenth meeting on September 22, 2007, the
Parties agreed to adjust the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the
phase-out of HCFCs. Fittingly, the meeting celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol.
HCFCs are ozone-depleting substances regulated under
the Montreal Protocol as “transitional” substitutes for the more
damaging CFCs. Like CFCs, they were used in a variety of
applications, including refrigerators and air conditioners, as
foam blowing agents, and as chemical solvents. By 2006, it was
clear that the use of HCFCs in developing countries was growing rapidly and threatening the recovery of the ozone layer and
potentially undermining efforts to mitigate climate change.
47

Montreal Protocol’s Success Made It
the World’s Best Climate Treaty
As it approached its twentieth anniversary, the Montreal
Protocol already was widely considered the world’s most successful multilateral environmental agreement. But what many
did not know is that its success in phasing out ozone-depleting
substances also made it the world’s best climate treaty—so far.
The publication of a groundbreaking paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (“PNAS”) calculated
the climate benefits of the Montreal Protocol, and the results
helped spur the international community to action.23 Because
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

CFCs are such potent GHGs, the Montreal Protocol is reducing
emissions by 135 GtCO2e between 1990 and 2010 and delaying
climate forcing by seven to twelve years.24 When pre-Montreal
Protocol efforts to protect the ozone layer are included, such as
voluntary reductions in CFCs and domestic regulations in the
1970s, the delay in climate forcing is thirty-five to forty-one
years.25
The PNAS article drew greater attention to both the ozone
and the climate impacts of the increased HCFC use. It became
the foundation for key Parties and non-governmental organizations to make the case for strengthening the Montreal Protocol
by accelerating the HCFC phase-out to maximize its climate
benefits—as well as to ensure the continued success of the treaty
in protecting the ozone layer. In particular, the article received
considerable attention at meetings of the Stockholm Group, an
informal gathering of ozone and climate experts that played a
critical role in reviewing the technical and economic data supporting an accelerated HCFC phase-out and building consensus
among developed and developing country governments.

Proposals to Accelerate HCFC Phase-Out
Cited Climate Benefits
In March 2007, an “unusual coalition” of nine Parties submitted six separate proposals (some jointly) to accelerate the
phase-out of HCFCs.26 Proposals came from both developed
and developing countries, and nearly all cited the potential climate benefits of an accelerated HCFC phase-out, as well as the
ozone benefits. Small island and coastal developing countries,
including Argentina, Brazil, Mauritius, and the Federated States
of Micronesia, were among the Parties stressing the need to
take immediate action to mitigate the causes of climate change
as part of their justification for an accelerated HCFC phase-out.
The United States also referenced climate considerations in its
proposal, which put forward one of the most aggressive accelerated phase-out schedules.
The Parties met at the 27th Open-Ended Working Group in
June 2007, to discuss the proposals and recognized a “clear need
to accelerate the timetable for the phase-out of ozone-depleting
substances, in particular HCFCs.”27 On June 7, the G8 Summit
Declaration added further support, committing to “accelerating
the phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency
and climate change objectives.”28
As the twentieth anniversary Meeting of the Parties
approached, key Parties and influential scientists and policymakers began to weigh in on the HCFC issue. Dr. Mario Molina,
who in 1995 shared the Nobel Prize with Dr. Sherwood Rowland for their work in the 1970s on the impacts CFCs had on the
ozone layer, wrote an influential opinion piece for the Financial
Times of London, stating,
Now it is time for the ozone treaty to make its role in
reducing climate emissions more explicit. This should
start next month with an agreement among the parties to accelerate the phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons
in a way that promotes energy efficiency and climate
change objectives. . . . In the light of the short time
Winter 2008

before we reach the planet’s ‘tipping point,’ they cannot afford to fail.29
As the negotiations progressed, the key questions, particularly for developing countries, were the availability of substitutes
and whether assistance through the treaty’s financial mechanism,
the Multilateral Fund, would be available.
With regard to substitutes, the evidence clearly showed that
they were commercially available for virtually all HCFC applications. The UNEP 2007 Synthesis Report concluded that technically and economically feasible substitutes were available for
almost all HCFC applications.30
Financing the accelerated phase-out was more complicated.
Under the 1990 Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, developed country Parties must provide financial assistance, through
the Multilateral Fund, to developing country Parties to cover the
agreed incremental costs of making the transition out of ozonedepleting substances and into more environmentally friendly
substitutes and alternatives. Thus far, the Fund has disbursed
approximately $2.3 billion in financial assistance. The high levels of HCFC use, particularly in China, meant that the amount
of financial assistance would need to increase substantially to
cover incremental costs for HCFCs at a time when many donor
Parties were expecting financing for the Montreal Protocol to be
winding down. Indeed, many thought the ozone layer problem
had already been solved and the time had come to discontinue
the Montreal Protocol itself.

HCFC Agreement Provides for
Climate-Friendly Substitutes and Financing
After a week of intense negotiations in Montreal, the Parties reached an agreement to accelerate the HCFC phase-out.31
For developing countries, the new control measures shift the
base year from 2015 to an average of 2009 and 2010 and the
freeze date from 2016 to 2013. Developing countries must then
phase-out ten percent of production by 2015, thirty-five percent
by 2020, 67.5 percent by 2025, and 97.5 percent by 2030, with
2.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until 2040.
Developed countries, many of which have already completed a
transition out of HCFCs, must now phase-out seventy-five percent of production by 2010, instead of sixty-five percent, with
a 99.5 percent phase-out by 2020, and 0.5 percent allowed for
servicing existing equipment until 2030.
Accelerating the HCFC phase-out will reduce emissions an
estimated sixteen GtCO2e or more through 2040, with the actual
climate benefits depending on the success replacing HCFCs with
zero and low GWP substitutes, and/or preventing future emissions of these substitutes by providing for a robust system to
recover and recycle or destroy used chemicals at equipment endof-life.32
In an effort to maximize these potential climate benefits, the
adjustment decision calls on the Parties to “promote the selection of alternatives to HCFCs that minimize environmental
impacts, in particular impacts on climate” and to give priority to
“substitutes and alternatives that minimize other impacts on the
environment, including on the climate, taking into account glob48

al-warming potential, energy use, and other relevant factors.”33
By explicitly referencing the climate impacts of HCFC substitutes and alternatives, the adjustment marks the first time that
both developed and developing countries have agreed to accept
binding commitments to mitigate climate change.
The adjustment decision also includes provisions to ensure
that developing countries receive financial assistance through the
Multilateral Fund to make the transition out of HCFCs, although
the details of implementation will continue to be negotiated at
the Fund’s Executive Committee
meetings.
The agreement was hailed
worldwide. Achim Steiner, the
Executive Director of the United
Nations Environment Programme,
called it “the most important
breakthrough in an environmental negotiation process for at
least five or six years because it
sets a very specific target with an
ambitious timetable.”34 Romina
Picolotti, Argentina’s Minister
of Environment and an early and
vocal proponent of the accelerated HCFC phase-out, described it
as “important for the ozone layer, and even more important for
the climate. It shows us what we can do when we have the spirit
to cooperate.”35

tion of an amount of one chemical, for example, CFCs, would
allow the production or consumption of an equal amount, on an
ODP-weighted basis, of an ODS from another chemical group,
for example, HCFCs.40 It could include programs to encourage
greater recovery and recycling or destruction, such as Refrigerant Reclaim Australia.41 In addition, the Chicago Climate
Exchange issued the first carbon offset methodology in late 2007
that would allow the destruction of ODS banks to generate offset
credits.42
One additional benefit of
a robust recovery and recycle/
destruction program is that it
undercuts the traditional paradigm where consumption of
ODS or ODS substitutes is
treated as equal to emissions.
With guaranteed recovery and
destruction, it would be possible to allow the continued
use of certain chemicals whose
direct impacts on the ozone and
the climate may be high, but
whose indirect benefits, such as
improved energy efficiency, make them desirable to available
alternatives.43
There is growing support for new measures creating greater
incentives for the recovery and destruction of banks. At the September 2007 Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol,
the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Stephen Johnson, challenged, “all delegations to consider ways
of destroying the banks of ozone-depleting substances currently installed in equipment. These large sources of CFCs and
other ozone-depleting substances represent a ripe opportunity
to both further protect the ozone layer and to reduce emissions
that contribute to global climate change.”44 At the December
2007 Climate Conference in Bali, the United States, Argentina,
Micronesia, and Mauritius answered this challenge at a side
event organized by the Institute for Governance & Sustainable
Development, where they stated their interest in strengthening
the Montreal Protocol to address the threat from banks.

In March 2007, an
“unusual coalition” of
nine Parties submitted
proposals to accelerate the
phase-out of HCFCs.

Next Up at the Montreal Protocol:
Creating Greater Incentives
for the Recovery and Destruction of Banks
There are several other measures that the Parties can take
that will mitigate climate change, including the “practical measures” developed as part of the Ozone Secretariat’s Workshop on
the IPCC/TEAP Special Report held in July 2006.36 The TEAP
calculates that an accelerated HCFC phase-out plus the “practical measures” identified at the Workshop can result in cumulative emissions reductions of about 1.25 million ozone depleting
potential (“ODP”) tonnes and thirty GtCO2e.37
In particular, banks of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances (“ODSs”) represent a significant threat to the ozone layer
and the climate. Banks are defined as ODSs contained in existing equipment (e.g. air conditioners and refrigerators), products
(e.g. foam insulation), and stockpiles (e.g. the military stockpiles various chemicals for specialized uses). These exist in both
developed and developing Parties. Approximately 7.4 GtCO2e
of CFCs, currently contained in banks of existing equipment and
products, is expected to be released into the atmosphere between
2002 and 2015.38 There will be additional significant emissions
beyond 2015 as more CFC and HCFC-based equipment reaches
end-of-life.39
Emissions of CFCs and other ODSs from banks could be
avoided by creating greater incentives for their recovery and
destruction. This should include allowing destruction credits to
carry forward for more than one year, to be traded between Parties, and to transfer among chemical groups, where the destruc49

Other Measures
Other strategies for strengthening the Montreal Protocol
were described in the original SDLP article,45 including exempting HCFC-123 from phase-out and allowing its continued use
until superior substitutes are developed, based on its negligible
ozone impacts and the energy efficiency advantage of HCFC-123
chillers over the primary alternative, HFC-134a, where HCFC123 results in lower GHG emissions associated with power generation to run the chillers, as well as lower operating costs over
the thirty-year life of the equipment.
The Montreal Protocol also should strengthen its compliance efforts by building on work already underway in the Secretariat, UNEP OzonAction’s compliance assistance program, and
elsewhere, to promote an ambitious capacity building program.
This can be accomplished by linking with the Green Customs
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Initiative of UNEP, and the International Network for Environmental Compliance & Enforcement. A much more aggressive
effort is warranted by the combined ozone and climate benefits
from strict compliance.
With regard to the use of ODSs for feedstocks, process
agents, and quarantine and preshipment (“QPS”) applications,
requiring mandatory periodic review of current uses and their
direct and indirect impacts on the ozone and climate, utilizing a
Life Cycle Analysis, would lay the groundwork for future action
banning the use of ODSs where alternatives that are less harmful
to the environment are available. Half of the HCFC-22 produced
today is used as feedstocks and process agents exempt from the
Montreal Protocol accelerated phaseout; and thus half of the
global emissions of HFC-23, a super GHG, is a consequence
of allowing exempted HCFC uses. Unfortunately, the Montreal
Protocol and its TEAP have not yet investigated the technical
feasibility of reducing and eliminating these uses—including the
options of not-in-kind technology for the products that currently
depend on HCFCs in production.
Finally, the Montreal Protocol also should require use of the
concept of Life Cycle Climate Performance (“LCCP”), which is
considered a practical elaboration of Life-Cycle Analysis. LCCP
was proposed by the TEAP to calculate the “cradle-to-grave” climate impacts of the use of ODSs in equipment. Direct emissions
result from the leaks of chemicals into the atmosphere. Indirect
emissions result from the energy consumption due to manufacturing, operation, and disposal at the end of product life and
also account for the carbon content of the fuel utilized in each
process and product life. The Mobile Air Conditioning Climate
Protection Partnership has posted its LCCP model on the U.S.
EPA website showing the combined climate life cycle impact

of refrigerant greenhouse gases directly emitted and the indirect
greenhouse gas emissions of fuel used to produce, power, transport, and dispose the equipment.46

Conclusion
The Montreal Protocol and its success in protecting both
the ozone layer and the climate show that global environmental problems can be solved through international cooperation.
As the world works toward a post-2012 climate treaty, the
twenty-year history of the Montreal Protocol offers invaluable
lessons for climate negotiators and demonstrates the potential
of international environmental law in the pursuit of sustainable
development.47
Climate mitigation under the Montreal Protocol is one of
several key strategies for achieving immediate climate mitigation, along with strategies for energy efficiency, reductions in
black carbon, or soot, expansion of renewables, and enhancement and protection of forests and other sinks. These and other
immediate mitigation strategies are needed to buy critical time
to develop a sufficiently strong post-2012 climate regime.
It is impossible to say just how much the planet will warm
before triggering abrupt climate changes, but critical thresholds could be as near as ten years away, and it is imperative
to strengthen the Montreal Protocol to avoid every ton of CO2e
emissions that it can. In addition to finishing the job of protecting the ozone layer, this is one of the best insurance policies the
world can buy to give us time to succeed with our long-term
climate controls. And it is an insurance policy that we can be
confident will be delivered by the world’s best environmental
treaty.
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to leak away rather than paying the costs of destruction.

Endnotes: Landmark Agreement to Strengthen Montreal Protocol
continued on page 87
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Analytical Tools Shaping the Next Generation
of Carbon Regulation and Trading:
The New York Metropolitan Area Case Studies
by Edward J. Linky, Vatsal J. Bhatt & John C. Lee*

T

Introduction

he next generation of carbon regulation is under discussion. The United Nations Climate Change Conference
in Bali, Indonesia concluded with the collective sense
that the United States is now an
active participant in the future of
an international carbon regime.
Undoubtedly, skepticism about
U.S. domestic regulation of
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) as
well as the timetable for U.S.
participation will remain. State,
regional, and local initiatives to
control GHGs, principally from
the electric power sector, however, are well developed and
on the road to implementation
with draft administrative rules
available for public review and
comment. For instance, in the Northeastern United States, the
most familiar of these initiatives is the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the recently implemented Western
Regional Climate Action Initiative (“WRCAI”) has gained sizeable momentum in the West. It is unlikely these initiatives will
be tabled to wait for a uniform federal response.
On the programmatic side, New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg’s administration has created PlaNYC 2030, an initiative to bring clarity and definition to principles of urban sustainability. As well-intentioned as these efforts are, the first two
remain confined, as RGGI is in its first generation with limited
scope and geographical coverage, and the PlaNYC is still a
programmatic goal statement with some initial implementation
projects. The New York City-based Regional Plan Association
has launched an integrated energy-land use-transportation and
GHG mitigation program, Long Island 2035, in Nassau and Suffolk Counties, which adjoin the five county-boroughs of New
York City.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”)
Regional Office in New York City (“U.S. EPA Region II”) has
formed a diverse partnership with Brookhaven National Laboratory, academic institutions, regional transportation, and land
use planning organizations to develop a suite of analytic system models which can provide a quantitative vision of technology and management strategy options for reducing the region’s

c arbon footprint while maintaining the energy demands of the
community and the servicing of environmental infrastructure.
In this Article we provide results of a case study using models completed for New York City and one under development
for Long Island, which utilizes
an integrated urban energywater systems analysis tool.
The case study demonstrates
integration of the MARKAL
model with land use, transportation, and human health models. Combined with appropriate
stakeholder participation, such
case studies promise to influence the current environmental
regulatory regime, including
multi-media aspects of carbon
control, whether at the regional
or national level.

The next generation of
carbon registration and
exchange is going to be
far more rigorous than
its predecessor.
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Top-down and Bottom-up Initiatives
U.S. Carbon Regulation and Markets

The next generation of carbon regulation in the United
States is under consideration with three competing pieces of legislation in the United States Senate: S.280, S.485, and S.1766.1
This next generation legislation will be much more sophisticated
and hence, more complicated than previous energy and air regulatory schemes such as the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and
the Energy Policy Act Amendments of 2006. The goal of this
proposed legislation is to account for GHG generation from the
usual industrial, commercial, and residential sources, in addition
to land use patterns. The successor to the Kyoto Protocol of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change now
under discussion is very likely to address key performance elements such as “additionality and leakage.” Both of these ele-

* Edward J. Linky, Esq. is Senior Energy Advisor, U.S. EPA Region II and can
be reached at Linky.Edward@epamail.epa.gov. Vatsal J. Bhatt and John C. Lee
work at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and can be reached for comment
at vbhatt@bnl.gov and jcl@bnl.gov. This Article is written as part of the authors’
program responsibilities at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
Brookhaven National Laboratory. The activities presented describe ongoing work
in U.S. EPA Region II in collaboration with the Brookhaven National Laboratory
in support of the Air Quality Management and Climate Partnership Programs.
The Article is the responsibility of the authors.
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ments have been issues surrounding carbon market exchanges
in the United States and the European Union. Further, a future
Asian Climate Exchange located in India or China poses additional challenges to those who claim carbon reductions and then
post them for sale and exchange. Thus the next generation of
carbon registration and exchange is going to be far more rigorous than its predecessor.
Despite the sense of inevitability surrounding U.S. carbon
legislation and presumed conformance to the Kyoto successor,
the timing of such measures remains very uncertain. For this
reason, this paper focuses on bottom-up initiatives, particularly those in the Northeastern United States. In this region and
specifically in the New York Metro area, there are a variety of
mega-stakeholders that are uniting behind several sustainability
plans and programs. These initiatives are not dependent on any
of the top-down legislative proposals described above, and they
may very well act independently of them for a period of time.
As is suggested below, one particular analytical tool—the New
York Metro MARKAL Integrated System model—can produce
a quantitative vision for any of
the efforts described below either
individually or collectively. The
output of this tool can help shape
more precise regulatory schemes
and financing mechanisms for
greenhouse reduction technologies and strategies, and, as we
show, help produce higher quality carbon credits which will be
well received in the domestic and
international markets.
Enactment of any of the top-down approaches will ultimately need to be reconciled with regulatory and planning initiatives already launched in the Northeastern and Western States.
Currently, these initiatives are limited to electric power production facilities, but if federal legislation is not enacted then these
initiatives will likely expand in the near future, probably around
2012.2 RGGI is further along the regulatory track with the adoption of a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) and a Model
Rule on power plants3 working its way into several states’
administrative rule procedures. The Western States Initiative
was recently launched in 2007.4
The next wave of regulatory and planning initiatives is found
at the local level of government. It is at this level that the body
of this Article concentrates. Networks of researchers, municipal
and regional government officials, and regional offices of federal
agencies and one National Laboratory have coordinated their
efforts in the New York Metropolitan area. This evolving network illustrates how local interests and needs can move ahead of
top-down federal and even international regulatory schemes. The
applications of the New York Metro MARKAL tool range from
the next generation of electric power production and wastewater
treatment facilities down to community redevelopment through
zero thermal footprint zoning ordinances. The goal of ongoing
studies using this tool is not to direct or influence the regulatory

process per se but to suggest that with proper analysis virtually
any of the GHG reductions requirements through international
treaty or federal/state legislation can be met with existing and
emerging technologies. This analytical framework provides legislators and policy makers with a quantitative vision of a sustainable future. To be sure, this sustainable future will require an
extraordinary amount of self-discipline, which the United States
has not needed since World War II and the international community has never faced: holding carbon caps in place for at least
a century with the possibility of returning the climate in time to
the patterns of the last century.5

New York Metropolitan Area’s
Bottom-Up Initiatives
There are three on-going programs in the New York Metro
region, which directly focus on climate change and sustainability. These are: New York Metro Urban Modeling Consortium,
PlaNYC, and the Regional Plan Association’s Fourth Regional
Plan, and the Northeast “Mega region.” Since each of these
efforts is either utilizing or considering the MARKAL tool, a
brief description of each plan is
warranted, as it will help crystallize some of the proposed
future uses of the tool. As will
be illustrated below, PlaNYC
still needs a unifying tool that
can, for example, evaluate
the costs and benefits of using
shade trees either in combination or as a substitute for other
forms of building energy efficiency. Through its work with the
Urban Modeling Consortium, the NYC MARKAL is uniquely
positioned to provide guidance.

The next wave of
regulatory and planning
initiatives is found at the
local level of government.
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The New York Metro Urban Modeling Consortium
This Consortium is composed of the U.S. EPA Region II,
Brookhaven National Laboratory, The Earth Institute at Columbia University, Units of the City University of New York, and
the NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies (“GISS”). Each
of the members had been engaged in loosely affiliated research
in various aspects of climate change in New York City, however, the principal focus of these efforts is the urban heat island
(“UHI”) and its impact on the electrical power network along
with air quality implications for human health.
U.S. EPA Region II facilitated a MOU to be ultimately
signed by Consortium members, containing a set of principles
for climate models and their applications. These principles were
adopted from the American Council for an Energy Efficient
Economy and essentially pledge the signatories to total transparency and critical examination in modeling and applications. It is
thought that this declaration of principles is the first of its kind,
at least in the United States. The central model in the Consortium is the New York Metro MARKAL. Other models involve
climate and health models as well as weather related models
from Columbia University and NASA-GISS, respectively.
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To date, the Consortium has advised several Community
Planning Boards—the ultimate decision-makers on zoning
ordinances—on low climate impact zoning ordinances based on
the thermal impact of new development or redevelopment projects on their areas. The recent sale of two middle class housing developments Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village to
private developers has raised concerns about the future sustainability of these forms of public housing in an urban, heat-islandintensified environment.6

PlaNYC
Mayor Bloomberg’s Administration has created an ambitious and groundbreaking public forum on the future of the five
boroughs of New York City through PlaNYC.7 The effort has
three basic areas for public input and technical research: population growth, infrastructure needs, and maintenance and greening
of the city in order to cope with rising temperatures and sea level
rise. The planning horizon is 2030. Within PlaNYC there is a
comprehensive discussion of energy costs and carbon emissions
from an ineffective market, inefficient buildings, and growing
needs. The needs are exemplified by both the quantity and quality of electric power needed to service the demands of a dynamic
academic and private sector research community along with
enhanced entertainment and information services demanded
in the commercial and residential sectors. Key elements of the
energy section of PlaNYC include reforming the planning process for new generation, recognizing that attention must be paid
to the transmission and distribution of electricity, and creating
an energy efficiency authority. The working group for PlanNYC
has completed a GHG inventory for the city and identified that
the building sector is the biggest contributor. The Regional Plan
Association8 has stated that there are approximately 940,000
buildings in the five boroughs (counties) of New York City but
that currently only 400 are “green” in some form.
The green category includes Energy Star Rated Buildings
along with LEED certified, plus all other forms of green designation. Clearly, if the city is to reduce its GHG emissions from
the building sector, a massive effort must be mounted to stimulate energy efficiency. Technology and accounting mechanisms
exist through the Energy Star Buildings Program to reduce electric power consumption in most building types by forty percent.
The principal objective of the Energy Efficiency Authority will
be to dramatically increase the efficiency of the building sector
and lower electric power consumption.
A second element of PlanNYC is “Million Trees NYC,” a
city-wide initiative to restock and reforest parks and street trees
to plant one million trees within the 2030 horizon of PlanNYC.
Trees can be effective in cooling certain types of buildings but
are not considered as a cooling strategy per se in PlaNYC. Trees,
and by implication vegetative roofs, can also have storm water
control benefits. Finally, it is believed that to make use of the
extended benefits of urban canopy, key regulatory issues not
even yet identified must be faced. For example, only fifty percent of the urban canopy is thought to be under public control.
High costs associated with maintaining the urban canopy as an
effective technique for reducing climate impacts may lead to an
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understanding that the canopy should be designated as a regulated utility and governed by enhanced control schemes. However, one never gets to that threshold issue unless a quantitative
analysis conducted by the NYC MARKAL is completed.

The Regional Plan Association and
the Northeast Mega Region
In a joint venture, the Regional Plan Association (“RPA”)
and the Lincoln Land Institute (“LLI”), convened a meeting in
Healdsburg, California to examine the concept of mega regions
in the United States.9 The Regional Plan Association has taken
this report a step further and produced America 2050, in which
ten emerging mega regions in the United States are identified.10
Beyond identifying the regions the initiative is trying to identify
the relationships that define mega regions and test new financing and governance methods as well as finding equitable mechanisms to distribute benefits to bypassed regions.
One of the ten mega regions in the American 2050 report is
the Atlantic Coast Northeast region. The RPA usually produces
in a decadal frame its vision for its traditional region—the thirtyone counties of New York City, central and northern New Jersey,
western Connecticut and downstate and central New York State,
which includes Nassau and Suffolk County, collectively known
as Long Island. The RPA is using Long Island as a test bed for
smart growth and low-carbon approaches to land use and envisions using the Long Island extension of the NYC MARKAL as
its principal analytical tool.11
Long Island’s basic infrastructure, including its commuter
railroad, electric generating stations, and wastewater treatment
plants, are all threatened by a rise in sea level.12 Whether the
existing network can be maintained cost effectively or will have
to be modified to serve new population centers protected from
the sea in a more efficient land use pattern, is the type of longrange low-carbon direction that will be explored in this planning
paradigm. How the state’s public utility regulatory structure
may need to be reshaped to accommodate a future of low-carbon requirements and an impending sea level rise can at least
be preliminarily quantified by the NYC MARKAL-Long Island
extension.

Future Directions for the Regulatory Process
As we noted, in the on-going RGGI rule adoption process,
the regulation of power generation facilities in the signatory
states will change by 2012. Regulatory elements of PlaNYC in
the energy sector will stimulate markets for energy efficiency in
buildings and these efficiency improvements may generate tradable carbon credits in the New York State electric grid. Planning processes under development on Long Island and at the
Community Planning Board in New York City can potentially
reshape zoning ordinances relating to low-carbon and low-thermal impact on land use patterns.
The New York City MARKAL and its Long Island extension are tools fully capable of responding to all of the challenges
noted above. This bottom-up approach can serve as an example
of how low-carbon planning approaches can be implemented
when guided by a tool such as an urban-based MARKAL.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Urban Energy, Water, and
Solid Waste Systems Analysis

The MARKAL model is a technology-driven linear optimization model of the urban energy system that runs in five
year intervals over a fifty year projection period.13 MARKAL
provides a framework to evaluate all resource and technology
options within the context of the entire energy/materials system, and it captures the market interaction among fuels to meet
demands (e.g., competition between gas and coal for electricity
generation). The model explicitly tracks the vintage structure of
all capital stock in the economy that produces, transports, transforms, or uses, energy and the associated materials.
In MARKAL, the entire energy system is represented as
a network based on the reference energy system (“RES”) concept. The RES depicts all possible flows of energy from resource
extraction, through energy transformation, distribution, and
transportation, to end-use devices that satisfy the demands of
useful energy services (e.g., ton in cooling, lumen-second in
lighting). Figure 1 illustrates a simplified RES in graphical form.
The U.S. MARKAL model has detailed technical representations
of four end-use sectors: residential, commercial, industrial, and
transportation, as well as fossil fuel and renewable resources,
petroleum refining, power generation, hydrogen production, and
other intermediate conversion sectors.
Technology choice in the MARKAL framework is based on
the present value of the marginal costs of competing technologies in the same market sector. On the demand side, the marginal
cost of demand devices is a function of levelized capital cost:
Operation and Maintenance (“O&M”) cost, efficiency, and the
imputed price of the fuel used by these devices. For a specific
energy-service demand and period, the sum of the energy-service

An integrated urban energy-water systems analysis tool,
Urban MARKAL, recently developed by the Brookhaven
National Laboratory, has the capability to influence existing air,
water, solid waste, and zoning regulations. The urban energy
model, MARKAL, along with the building energy simulation
model and a meso-scale climate model, was developed under a
grant from the U.S. EPA Region II. Water and wastewater analysis capabilities were integrated with urban energy in MARKAL
with the grant from the U.S. Department of Energy’s (“DOE”)
grant to support the Energy-Water Nexus program. The Urban
MARKAL model incorporates a technology database rich with
existing and future technologies that is tied to the performance
of urban infrastructure systems. The Urban MARKAL model
incorporates active and passive approaches to central and distributed energy resources, electric grids and energy consumption, water supply and wastewater treatment grids, and passive
approaches to reducing thermal load on the sites of public housing and commercial building projects.

MARKAL Modeling Framework for
Integrated Strategic Planning
Energy, water, wastewater, and solid waste disposal systems
are highly interdependent. For optimal sustainable operation of
cities, long-term strategic planning and management is required
for the detailed sub-system and the integrated macro-system.
MARKAL provides a comprehensive and integrated systems
planning and management methodology.
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output of competing technologies has to meet the projected
demand in that period. The relative size of the energy-service
output, or market share, of these technologies depends not only
on their individual characteristics—technical, economic, and
environmental—but also on the
availability and cost of the fuels
they use. The actual market size
of a demand sector in the future
depends on the growth rate of the
demand services and the stock
turnover rate of vintage capacities.
MARKAL dynamically tracks
these changes and defines future
market potential. Another factor considered in MARKAL that
affects the market penetration of a
specific demand device is the sustainability of the expansion in
the implied manufacturing capacity to produce these devices.
On the supply side, the technology choices made in
MARKAL are based on the imputed price of the energy products
(e.g., coal, natural gas, biomass) and the marginal cost of producing energy from conversion technologies (e.g., power plants,
burners, distributed generation plants) to meet electricity demand
(endogenously determined in MARKAL). The cost of resource
input for production, exogenously projected in MARKAL, such
as imported oil prices and cost of uranium ore, together with
the characteristics of supply technologies (including electricity generation) determine the market share of a particular fuel
type and the technology that uses it. The supply-demand balance
achieved for all fuels under the least energy-system cost represents a partial equilibrium in the energy market. In particular,
the intertemporal new investments in nuclear technologies under
this equilibrium determine the market deployment of these technologies. Additionally, policies can be modeled that explicitly
or implicitly provide economic incentives for less competitive technologies to accelerate their learning curves or market
penetration.

current and projected energy and electricity demands, electricity
transmission and distribution requirements, and peak load patterns in the city and selected hot spots. EnergyPlus, a building
energy simulation model developed by the U.S. DOE, is used to
quantify specific building enduse energy flows and electricity load patterns.17
During the same time,
the New York State Energy
Research and Development
Authority (”NYSERDA”) and
Department of Environmental
Conservation initiated a project to examine “green” UHI
mitigation strategies like urban
forestry and green/reflective
roofs. The project, comprising Hunter College, City University of New York, and the NASA-Goddard Institute of Space
Studies, uses a meso-scale climate model, MM5, supported by
geographical information system-based land use and land cover
models. Researchers on both projects had long-standing cooperation on related projects such as the Metroeast Regional Climate
Study for New York City. This study was part of the U.S. Global
Change Research Program and had basic scoping elements of
energy saving and UHI.
Cooperation between these two projects was sought to quantify UHI effects in EnergyPlus resulting from “green” mitigation
strategies. The reduction of end-use energy demands in buildings due to these changes is measurable in EnergyPlus, which
is then fed to MARKAL to measure peak load and emission
reductions. Figure 2 schematically represents the “portfolio of
models” approach and interactions of EnergyPlus and UHI study
with MARKAL framework
The energy utility for New York City, the Consolidated Edison Company, identified overloaded sub-stations and high heat
emitting locations considered as hot spots to study the impacts
of mitigation strategies and reduced electric demand during
the summer peak period. The New York City MARKAL project considered the Lower Manhattan hot spot as a case study to
measure the benefits of the mitigation strategies. This task of
integrating all modeling approaches, however challenging, provides an insightful methodology to enable New York City and
other urban areas to develop and test policies for energy efficiency and UHI mitigation and to determine the expected economic and pollution prevention (“P2”) metrics for mitigation
policies.18 This experimental exercise provides a “validation of
concept,” and it is anticipated that as the exercise moves toward
a “proof of concept” methodology that will be prudent enough to
be used at a utility scale.
The model calculates the least-cost system configuration
that satisfies externally defined demands for final energy services
(e.g., air conditioning), while taking into account environmental
objectives such as reductions in CO2, NOX, and SOX emissions.
The MARKAL outputs include quantified P2 metrics
for each time period over the time horizon of interest such as

Energy, water,
wastewater, and solid
waste disposal systems are
highly interdependent.

New York City Integrated MARKAL for
Urban Electric Peak Load Studies
Brownouts and blackouts in America’s Northeast and West,
as well as in Europe in the recent years, have been attributed to
overloaded grids and substations coupled with the UHI effect.14
Ensuing adverse economic impacts led to lawsuits against the
utilities.15 Concerned with the economic impacts along with
the effects on human health, energy, and the environment, planners have felt the need for better energy planning and mitigation
strategies in major metropolitan areas.16
The New York City integrated MARKAL project, supported by U.S. EPA Region II, is a collaboration of Brookhaven
National Laboratory (“BNL”) and State University of New York
at Stony Brook. The project uses a portfolio of models interactively to evaluate mitigation strategies covering demand-side
management (e.g. energy star technologies) and UHI mitigation
measures, such as city greening techniques. A detailed New York
City multi-regional MARKAL model was developed to simulate
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p rojected reductions in waste emissions from stack gases from
implementation of energy efficient technologies, the U.S. EPA
Energy Star Building Program or renewable energy technology
portfolios. Potential future extensions of the model to incorporate material flows into the standard model to produce an
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MARKAL has been applied with the joint efforts of U.S.
EPA and BNL, for instance, towards examining the effects of
implementing Energy Star Building Program technologies in
Hong Kong and Taiwan to measure reductions in energy use and
subsequent CO2 emissions.21 U.S. EPA is currently funding a
project to develop a Northeastern regional version MARKAL
model (“NEMARKAL”) for the six New England states. The
states of New York and New Jersey may participate in the
exercise once the concept is validated. The U.S. EPA Office of
Research and Development (“ORD”) is the principal funding
agency along with in-kind contributions from state participants.
Unlike the MADRI and RGGI, the NEMARKAL is a comprehensive stationary and mobile source technology evaluation tool
that addresses issues from GHG reductions in the electric generation and transportation sectors, reductions of Clean Air Act
criteria pollutants, and reducing energy intensity in commercial
and industrial buildings. This model is intended as the pilot and
flagship of a group of nine regional models for the continental United States. NEMARKAL primarily focuses on State Air
Quality Programs as they are developed by the Northeastern
States Coordinated Air Use Management (“NESCAUM”)—an
organization composed of State Government Air Quality Directors. Taking this framework into consideration, future regional
MARKAL models should be developed on the structure of
nation’s electric grid, considering Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) as boundaries for other regional models.

New York Case Study Outcomes
The integrated MARKAL/EnergyPlus/UHI framework for
modeling the energy supply/demand electric loads of buildings,
along with the effects of UHIs in major urban areas, provides a
systematic approach toward identifying and implementing opportunities and policies for the reduction of energy system loads
and related P2 metrics. This framework pulls together the recognized and widely-applied MARKAL reference energy system
model, the U.S Department of Energy’s EnergyPlus model for
buildings, and recent UHI mitigation modeling. Taken together,
these facilitate the study of electric peak loads as well as energy
system supply side capacity requirements and P2 metrics.
Annual Electricity Consumption for Lower Manhattan Sub-station

Benefits of Urban MARKAL Model
The benefits of using integrated urban MARKAL methodology include the following:

Energy, Water, and Solid Waste Systems
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Provide reliable energy, water, and wastewater systems
Reduction in energy use per capita (Btu/capita)
Increased use of renewable resources
Decreased reliance on imported fossil fuels
Increased use of efficient appliances and green technology
Increased use of bio-fuels and solid waste recycling
Increased production of electricity from water treatment
plants
• Decrease in energy for buildings, water supply, and treatments and transportation

Sustainability
• Reduction in water use per capita
• Increase in recycling of solid waste
• Efficient and reliable building technologies and
transportation
• Reduction of GHG emissions, criteria pollutants, and other
multi-media pollution

Urban Community
• Assure reliability of systems
• Provide a clean environment
• Keep energy costs as low as possible
Preliminary results obtained from this portfolio approach
indicate that Energy Star and UHI mitigation strategies,
employed in tandem, can potentially lead to savings in energy,
P2 metrics, and system cost:
• Lower aggregate demands and consequentially, reduced
supply-side requirements indicated by MARKAL.
• Reduced peak load requirement of the Lower Manhattan Sub-station, which moderately impacts the New York
City’s energy system peak as shown in Figures 4 and 5.
• Curtailed emissions of carbon dioxide and other criteria
pollutants within the city are expressed in Figure 6.

Peaking Load for Lower Manhattan Sub-station

Figure 4: MARKAL Simulations for Lower Manhattan Case-study
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Annual Electricity Savings for New York City System

Peaking Load Reduction for New York City System

Figure 5: Impacts of Lower Manhattan Reductions on New York City Energy System

Net CO2 Reductions for New York City

Net Reductions in Criteria Pollutants for New York City

Figure 6: System Wide P2 Benefits
These activities and current programs in the U.S. EPA
regions create infrastructure to study energy saving and emissions reduction strategies. The framework of the New York City
MARKAL project features cooperation between different state
and federal agencies, academic institutions, and the industry,
highlights “validation of concept.” Further “proof of concept”
for necessary development mechanisms is required to create
implementation projects as a next step. A new generation of programs and public and private sector partnerships, state energy
agencies (e.g., NYSERDA), regional transmission grid operators and green building community can be augmented to provide
effective implementation projects. Such a concept and portfolio
approach can be replicated on a national level to achieve desired
reductions in energy consumption to relieve grid congestions,
UHI effects, and emissions.

MARKAL Integration with Other
Urban Sub-systems
MARKAL models dynamic interactions among energy and
water availability, supply, distribution, and consumption technologies. This novel approach uses highly interconnected formulations to represent and integrate the inherent multidimensional
feedbacks with other systems important to the multi-disciplinary
Winter 2008

urban systems analysis. Examples of factors include the energy-water nexus, solid waste, transportation, land-use change,
climate change, and public health, as shown conceptually in
overview in Figure 7. The MARKAL methodology quantifies
these relationships while accounting for evolutionary and revolutionary technologies and parametric characteristics pertaining
to energy and water supply, distribution, and consumption.
This approach explicitly models fundamentally crosscutting
issues and their interactions, which then determine technology
performance and ultimately Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (“RDD&D”) expenditure decisions.
Additionally, it can model endogenous technological learning
and learning-by-doing formulations at the forefront of research
and technology improvements over the years. Based on programmatic or research objectives, the project develops benefits
metrics (measurable targets) for proposed technologies and scientific solutions, and the project then tests the technologies for
water-efficient energy supply and energy-efficient water supply
through scenario-based examination. These metrics help prioritize technologies for deployment on the basis of short and longterm technical, economic, environmental, and social benefits.
The approach uses various sensitivity analyses to explore key
technical and economic risks and barriers to the future deploy58
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Figure 7: Major Feedback Processes Among Energy, Water, and Associated Systems to be Incorporated
with the MARKAL Analysis

ment of the competing technologies. For example, the urban
MARKAL methodology is able to analyze the expected benefits
of solar energy and biologically-derived fuels. In addition, the
MARKAL model can work with existing modeling platforms
such as water body models for Chesapeake Bay, New York Harbor Estuary, and Long Island Sound to produce estimate-targets
of GHG reductions from both individual media and from an ecosystem as a whole.
Successfully modeling cross-media ecosystems entails solving a number of scientific and computational challenges such as
ensuring that consistent assumptions are used at the boundary of
the media, and managing the large number of models and data
sets that are typically required. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. EPA Atmospheric Sciences
Modeling Division jointly developed a Multimedia Integrated
Modeling System (“MIMS”) that provides solutions for some of
those challenges.22 MIMS is a non-substantive model architecture which allows media specific models to share and cross relate
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data and results, which will be used to integrate MARKAL with
other proven integrating models such as the U.S. EPA Community Multiscale Air Quality Model (“CMAQ”) because the
alignment of stakeholders on Long Island and New York City
has already been accomplished through PlaNYC and Long
Island 2035.
In spite of its detailed nature, the model formulation is
transparent; its behavior is clearly connected to the assumptions
and causal structure of the model, and it has a simple-to-workwith model interface. It is very helpful, therefore, in creating a
common understanding with stakeholder participation to address
complex challenges of energy, water, solid waste, climate
change, and land-use, as well as improving fundamental understanding of these interconnected sub-systems in a comprehensive approach. The model is able, but not limited to: (1) quantify
water needs for the future and the amount of “new” water produced or water efficiency achieved by enabling technologies; (2)
predict gaps in the regional water availability and energy sector
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Conclusion
demand and the energy saved or produced as a result of the
applied technologies; (3) identify energy and water efficiency
and conservation opportunities; (4) promote new science and
technology for advanced water treatment and reclamation; (5)
quantify environmental sustainability and energy security benefits of proposed technologies; and, (6) describe potential markets
and benefits of energy-related science and technology programs,
along with their energy and water-related impacts.

Endnotes:

Promoting the need to accelerate adaptation and mitigation
to the impacts of climate change in the New York Metro Region
is where the suite of models centered on MARKAL analysis provides a unique framework with ongoing environmental planning
programs. The results of these ongoing case studies can provide
the analytical basis and background for future carbon control
in a compressed timeframe. Combined with appropriate stakeholder participation, such case studies hold the promise of influencing the current environmental regulatory regime, including
multi-media aspects of carbon control, whether at the regional
or national level.
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Domestic Ocean and Coastal Resource Law
and Policy and Climate Change
by Thomas Street*

T

Introduction

he United States Commission on Ocean Policy, a Presidentially-appointed panel of sixteen advisers, with
genesis in the Ocean’s Act of 2000,1 has noted that
“[although] coastal watershed counties comprise less than 25
percent of the land area in the United States, they are home to
more than 52 percent of the total U.S. population.”2 With such a
large percentage of the American population living in or near the
coastal zone, it is unsurprising that the value of the coastal and
ocean economy is also high. In 2000, the contribution to United
States GDP from services
and manufacturing from
and in the marine and
coastal economy exceeded
U.S. $1.1 trillion.3 When
the term coastal is taken
to its broadest reading to
include all coastal watershed counties, the value to
the United States from the
coastal and ocean economy
rises to over U.S. $5.5 trillion (2000).4
The coastal and ocean
environment is under great stress from development and resource
exploitation. On the “wet-side” of the coastal baseline, 5 overutilization of fishery resources, degraded water quality from
anthropogenic impacts, and invasive species are the primary, but
not sole, stressors.6 On the “dry-side,” the coastal environment
has largely been impacted from coastal development associated
with population growth. With the increasing development of the
terrestrial and littoral coastal environment, natural hazards such
as hurricanes, tsunamis, and seashore erosion have become serious and growing problems.
Of all the factors impacting the coastal and oceanic environment, perhaps one of the most grave is climate change. It is wellaccepted that average global temperatures have risen over the
past century. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”) has “[reported] that the average near-surface temperature of the Earth increased by about 1ºF between 1861 and 1990,
but is expected to increase by another 2.5–10.4ºF by the end of
the [21st Century.]”7
Global climate change will likely have significant impact
upon the U.S. coastal zone and be felt in a number of ways.
Perhaps most visible, as a result of an anticipated sea level rise
of between four and forty-three inches, the coast line of the

United States may be significantly altered.8 As a direct result
of climate change-induced sea level rise, “saltwater contamination of fresh-water sources, coastal erosion, damage to natural
barriers such as coral and mangroves, and loss of agricultural
sites and infrastructure” is likely to result.9 In addition, with
climate change-induced disruption of chemical, biological, and
oceanographic processes in the marine environment as a result
of climate change, significant effects upon marine fish stocks
are probable. Although not strictly in the coastal zone, climate
change will also likely have great impact upon domestic water
resource (and associated freshwater
fishery) management.

Of all the factors
impacting the coastal
and oceanic environment,
perhaps one of the most
grave is climate change.
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This Article will focus upon the
major federal agencies that have jurisdiction in the United States coastal
zone, as well as reviewing their underlying legal mandates. Next, this Article
will examine two laws that are of general importance. It will then examine
those areas of the law that will likely
have particular relevance in terms of
and as a result of climate change. This
Article will conclude by briefly assessing how coastal and ocean
law and policy is especially relevant in the domestic response to
the consequences of climate change in the United States.

Federal Agencies with a
Resource Management Interest in the
Coastal Environment
Five federal agencies of the United States have a resource
management interest in the coastal zone of the United States specifically relevant to climate change: the Army Corps of Engineers
(“ACE”), the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), the Minerals
Management Service (“MMS”), the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”). Of these agencies, the ACE and
FWS largely regulate on the terrestrial side of the coastal baseline, with MMS regulating generally in the near-shore marine
environment, and NOAA and EPA in both.
* Thomas Street is an Attorney Advisor in the Office of the General Counsel of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The views expressed in
this Article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent those of the
Office of the General Counsel, NOAA, the Department of Commerce, or the United
States Government. The author can be contacted at thomas.street@yahoo.com.
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Minerals Management Service
The MMS has jurisdiction over the energy resources of
the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) of the United States. The
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), as amended by
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments,10 provides
the pertinent legal authority for offshore oil and gas leases to
companies for marine mineral extraction.11 Relatively recently,
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 also gave jurisdiction over OCS
alternative energy projects to MMS.12
Pursuant to OCSLA, the OCS is largely those areas of the
marine environment that extend beyond three nautical miles
(“NM”) from the coastal baseline. In the case of the Gulf Coasts
of Florida and Texas, state jurisdiction extends to three marine
leagues, approximately nine nautical miles. Under OCSLA, the
federal government is entitled to all revenue from lease sales
beyond six NM, with the states receiving twenty-seven percent
of such revenues in the three to six NM zone, with a similar protocol, based upon the different jurisdictional boundaries, used
for the gulf coasts of Florida and Texas. Pursuant to OCSLA,
leasing decisions are required to consider environmental considerations and impacts to fisheries and endangered species.

Fish and Wildlife Service
The FWS manages domestic, largely freshwater, fishery
resources, birds, associated habitat, and wetlands. The statutory
authority underlying the operation of the FWS is largely found
in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,13 protecting birds subject to
one of a number of international treaties, the Endangered Species Act,14 conserving threatened or endangered species and
associated critical habitat, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,15 which provides a consultation role for the FWS
in domestic “water-resource development projects.” The FWS
also co-manages marine mammals with the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, with each taking the lead on a
number of different species. Other important and relevant laws
protecting the coastal environment, involving the FWS, include
the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration
Act,16 which created “national coastal wetlands conservation
grants,” allowing for funds to be awarded to states for wetlands
conservation projects and also provided for a specific role in
wetlands restoration efforts in coastal Louisiana. The FWS also
plays a lead role in the Coastal Barrier Resources Act,17 which
created a system of undeveloped barrier islands along the East,
Gulf, and Great Lakes coastlines of the United States. This act
is especially interesting as it does not preclude development, but
forbids any sort of federal assistance, especially federally subsidized hurricane insurance.
Perhaps the most important law providing underlying statutory authority to FWS is the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act (“FWCA”).18 Under the FWCA, “whenever the waters of
any stream or other body of water are proposed or authorized
to be impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream
or other body of water otherwise controlled or modified for any
purpose whatever,” by a federal agency or by a private entity as
a result of a federal license, the FWS must be consulted “with
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a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by preventing
loss of and damage to such resources as well as providing for
the development and improvement thereof in connection with
such water resource-development.”19 Significantly, the FWCA
also requires that the FWS provide recommendations to federal
agencies for any proposed “water resource development projects” that they are involved in. These agencies are required to
give “full consideration” to FWS’s recommendations.

Environmental Protection Agency
As noted by a commentator, “[o]ne of the most basic
divisions in federal water quality regulation is the distinction
between point source and nonpoint source pollution. This division derives [by negative implication] from the [Clean Water
Act].”20 Although the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)21 does have
impact in the marine environment, its focus is on domestic terrestrial water quality, with its centrum in point source pollution
regulation and with the EPA in a lead role. NOAA, through
the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),22 has federal
responsibility over non-point source regulation, with programmatic authority essentially delegated to the States.
Pursuant to the CWA, a point source of pollution is defined
as “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection system, vessel
or other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated
agriculture or agricultural storm water run-off.”23 The characterization of whether or not a pollution source will be considered
point or non-point is generally done at where it would first be
introduced into United States waters.24
The overarching goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”25 Pursuant therefore to this goal, the “discharge of any
pollutant [into the navigable waters of the United States] by
any person [is] unlawful.”26 Under the CWA, the EPA is given
responsibility for permits in terms of coastal activities under two
programs.27 The first is for Section 404 Secretary of the Army
permits, necessary for the release of dredged materials into specific coastal sites in accordance with guidelines jointly created
by the ACE and EPA. The Administrator of the EPA is specifically given the authority
to prohibit the specification . . . of any defined area as
a disposal site, and is authorized to deny or restrict the
use of any defined area for specification . . . as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge . . .
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.28
The second program is for National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits, necessary for the discharge of point sources of pollution into navigable waters of the
United States.
62

Although initially vested in the Administrator of the EPA,
Section 402 of the CWA provided authority for EPA to delegate
to the States the ability to manage their own NPDES programs
and issue permits for discharge, under guidelines set by EPA.29
As one commentator has noted, the NPDES permit system
essentially provides for
an exception to [the] zero pollution approach [as provided for in the CWA]. Under the NPDES permit program, ‘the Administrator may, after opportunity for
public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants,’ [into navigable waters] upon condition that the discharger meets all
applicable effluent standards under the law.30
Upon delegation to the states, similar authority exists.
Under the CWA, navigable waters are defined as “the waters of
the United Sates, including the territorial seas,”31 the latter as marked
from the low water tidal line.
The breadth of the “waters
of the United States” under the
CWA has long been controversial.
Ultimately known as the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the ACE in 1986
declared it had jurisdiction over
intrastate waters and wetlands adjacent to navigable waters that were
used, or might be used, as habitat
by migrating birds. Over the years, numerous courts have examined this contentious issue. In 2006, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Rapanos v. Army Corps of Engineers,32 limited
the definition of “waters of the United States” under the CWA
to only flowing or standing waters of relative permanence. This
restriction has relevance to other laws that relate to the CWA.

the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.39 Recognizing that
“[t]he key to more effective protection and use of the land and
water resources of the coastal zone is [the encouragement of] the
states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters
in the coastal zone . . . [,]” 40 the Coastal Zone Management Act
created a voluntary federal-state partnership for coastal management. Aside from the relatively limited federal financial support
available to states who participate in the program, the crux of the
partnership is the concept of “federal consistency.”
Federal consistency is a powerful tool that state partners
possess to manage development in the coastal zone. There are,
in effect, two types of consistency under the CZMA. The first
relates to direct federal agency activity,41 with the second being
connected with the issuance of a required license or permit by a
federal agency.42 In terms of direct federal agency activity, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §1456(c)
(1)(a), federal consistency
requires that “[e]ach federal
agency activity within or
outside the coastal zone that
effects any land or water use
or natural resource of the
coastal zone . . . be carried
out in a manner . . . consistent to the maximum extent
practicable with . . . enforceable policies of [federally]
approved State management programs.” A second type of consistency applies to federally permitted or licensed activity that
“effects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal
zone” by virtue of 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(a).43 Under this second type of consistency, a developer must submit certification
to a relevant state coastal management agency that a project is
consistent with enforceable policies of a federally approved state
coastal management program. If a State coastal management
agency objects to a project requiring a federal license or permit
(arguing that the project is inconsistent with its state enforceable
policies), then no relevant federal agency may issue a permit,
unless the Secretary of Commerce overrides the objection on
one of two policy grounds: “. . . the activity is consistent with
the objectives of this [CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the
interest of national security.” 44
Importantly, the CZMA also provides states with the authority to regulate non-point sources of pollution, noting that:
each State [with a federally approved CZM management program] shall prepare and submit to the Secretary [of Commerce] and Administrator [of EPA] a
Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program. . . . The
purpose of the Program shall be to develop and implement management measures for nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal waters, working
[with State and local partners].45
Pursuant to the CZMA each state non-point source pollution program is required to identify and provide for land uses
which impact coastal waters, critical coastal areas, governance

The coastal and ocean
environment is under great
stress from development
and resource exploitation.

Army Corps of Engineers
Of all federal resource agencies, the ACE has perhaps one
of the largest roles in terms of coastal development and its mission is closely related to that of the EPA.33 Organized into eight
national divisions and forty-eight subordinate districts, the ACE
has jurisdiction over coastal navigation, coastal dredging, and
the discharge of refuse into the navigable waters of the United
States pursuant to the Rivers & Harbors Act of 189934 and its
successor, the Clean Water Act of 1972.35 Special emphasis
must be placed upon Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.36 This
section allows for Secretary of the Army permits providing for
the release of dredged materials into specific coastal sites, with
such sites chosen in light of guidelines jointly created by EPA
and the ACE. The ACE is also specifically given a lead role in
protecting and preserving Louisiana’s wetlands in the Coastal
Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act.37

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
In part, the mission of NOAA is to “conserve and manage
coastal and marine resources to meet [the United States’] economic, social, and environmental needs.”38 In terms of managing
coastal development, chief among the tools utilized by NOAA is
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measures to address problematic land uses and critical coastal
regions, opportunities for public input, measures for administrative coordination between state agencies, and the possible modification of coastal boundaries to address the above concerns.
In terms of managing marine fishery resources, NOAA’s
chief tool is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (“MSFCMA”), which created eight regional
fishery management councils (“RFMCs”), each responsible for a
region of United States waters (generally 3-200 NM). For most
domestic marine fishery resources, the councils prepare Fishery
Management Plans (“FMPs”) in accordance with ten national
policy standards.46 Pursuant to the MSFCMA, FMPs are also to
identify essential fish habitat in “waters of the United States,” as
defined by the CWA. Essential Fish Habitats (“EFH”) are “those
waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding,
feeding or growth to maturity.” 47 Federal law requires that “[e]
ach federal agency . . . consult with the Secretary [of Commerce]
with respect to any action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or
proposed to be authorized, funded or undertaken, by such agency
that may adversely affect any [“EFH”] identified . . . .” 48
Due to the amount of coastal development, other activities
may also have adverse effects upon EFH. Consequently, all
FMPs must identify activities other than fishing that
may adversely effect EFH. Broad categories of such
activities include, but are not limited to: dredging,
filling, excavation, mining, impoundment, discharge,
water diversions, thermal additions, actions that contribute to non-point source pollution and sedimentation, introduction of potentially hazardous species, and
the conversion of aquatic habitat that may eliminate,
diminish, or disrupt the functions of EFH.49
Furthermore FMPs must also identify habitat areas of particular concern (“HAPCs”), based upon a number of specific
criteria: (1) ecological significance, (2) sensitivity to anthropogenic impact, and (3) sensitivity to impacts from development.50
RFMCs are given permissive authority to comment on any
federal agency action with adverse effects upon EFH, but are
required to do so in regards to anadramous fish habitat under a
council’s authority. Last, “[f]ederal agencies must consult with
NMFS regarding any of their actions authorized, funded, or
undertaken, or proposed to be authorized, funded, or undertaken
that may adversely affect EFH.” 51 In response, NMFS will
provide recommendations for conservation. This issue is especially triggered by coastal energy projects, both under traditional
power sources (nuclear and fossil-fuel) and renewable sources
(hydrokinetic and wind).52

Other General Laws
There are two other laws of particular relevance to domestic
ocean and coastal law and policy and climate change. The first is
the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).53 The FPA creates a regulatory
protocol for the establishment of hydrokinetic power generating
stations on domestic navigable waters, defined, for purposes of
the Act, as those waters to which Congress’ jurisdiction extends
under the Commerce Power. Pursuant to this Act, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) may issue licenses
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for the construction and operation of hydrokinetic power generation facilities. In deciding whether or not to issue licenses,
FERC is statutorily required to consider several factors, among
them, the project’s potential power-generating capacity as well
as its possible impact upon fishery resources, specifically including fishery habitat. In direct reference to fishery resources, each
license is required to include considerations relating to fishery conservation. FPA Section 18 is especially important as it
requires that any license granted by FERC contain conditions
relating to “fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary
of the Interior [through FWS] or the Secretary of Commerce
[through NOAA], as appropriate.”54 The second law is the
National Aquatic Invasive Species Act (“NAISA”).55 NAISA
created a ballast water management program intended to combat the introduction and dispersal of invasive species into United
States waters through the creation of voluntary guidelines by the
Secretary of Transportation. The act also sponsors research into
combating invasive species.

Laws of Particular Relevance to
Climate Change
Although all of the above-examined laws are of significance
in terms of climate change, it is this author’s opinion that several
general legal areas are of the most potential relevance. These
will be examined below, with a short explanation of their possible eventual implications.
The first relates to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the
enhanced role that it provides for the Minerals Management Service. With the advent of climate change, it is likely that coalpowered and other high carbon-emitting power plants will be
supplemented and/or eventually replaced by alternative energies
such as wind, wave, tidal, ocean current, and solar. As it is well
known that wind resources located in the littoral and coastal
United States are strong and relatively consistent, that ocean
tides are well known and constant, and that broad areas of the
coastal zone are subject to strong and continuous wave energy, it
is likely that this is an area of strong growth.
The second relates to the Coastal Barrier Resources Act,
which although it does not forbid development, prohibits federal assistance on certain barrier islands on the East and Gulf
coasts. As climate change-induced sea level rise becomes evermore evident, it is conceivable that this law could become more
popular to limit federal expenditures for at-risk barrier islands,
and possibly even expanded to include the West Coast.
The third relates to the Clean Water Act, which regulates
point sources of pollution. If climate change has substantial
effect upon the physical layout of the coastal zone, as some forecast, it is likely that areas of current intense development may
be impacted by rising sea levels. It is thus likely that pollution
sources that currently do not have interactions with “waters of
the United States” may eventually do so by encroaching water
lines.
The fourth relates to the Coastal Zone Management Act and
is of particular importance. Unlike many of the above-examined
laws, the CZMA allows States to plan for and actively manage
coastal development, while also regulating non-point sources of
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pollution. Under the CZMA, states can adopt coastal management plans, addressing local geographic and physical variations,
and can plan themselves for climate change, while forcing federal consistency with federally-approved programs.
The fifth relates to the group of laws that address fisheries
and marine resources. Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the FWS and NOAA have a key role in managing
freshwater and marine fish, respectively. With climate change,
fishery resources are likely to be significantly impacted due to
changes in chemical, biological, and oceanographic processes,
with a possible large federal response so as to protect food
sources as well as biodiversity. In addition, climate change is
also likely to have impact upon flow rates of American coastal
and continental rivers. Such an impact will also likely have concomitant implications in terms of the Federal Power Act and the
conservation/utilization balance between fisheries and power
generation. Finally, climate change will also likely have impact

upon the range of marine (and freshwater) species, creating problems in terms of defining the meaning of an invasive species.

Conclusion
The coastal and ocean environment is home to extensive
development and substantial resource utilization. A number of
laws have been created to attempt to manage this development
and resource use, under the cognizance of a number of federal
agencies. With ever increasing development in the coastal zone
and ocean industry, it can be seen that coastal and ocean law and
policy is particularly relevant to climate change due to the incredible diversity of resources and uses that are likely to be impacted
by rising sea levels and a changing marine environment. With
such a large proportion of the American population residing in
or near the coastal zone and an ocean and coastal industry worth
trillions of dollars, it is clear that this issue is primed to become
one of the most pressing of the coming century.
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The Polluter Should Pay: Adapting to a Changing Climate
by Rachel T. Kirby*

W

ith the release of the last report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), it
is clear that climate change is already a reality, and
future warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels is probably unavoidable.1 As gradually warming temperatures lead to
stronger storms, longer droughts, and more frequent flooding,
communities all over the world must adapt to this new reality.
The blame for climate change, however, is not spread equally
throughout the world, and the impacts of a warmer climate will
not be spread equally either. The developed nations, which are
most responsible for the carbon
emissions warming the climate,
have a moral obligation to help less
developed nations adapt.2
The next few decades will
bring significant changes to
global weather patterns and deviations from historical norms. Both
drought-affected areas and flooding will increase as precipitation
patterns change, glaciers melt, and
sea levels rise.3 Crop productivity
will drop in seasonably dry and
tropical areas, increasing the risk of
hunger.4 Poor coastal communities will begin to flood annually
as the sea level rises, threatening small island states and delta
communities in Asia and Africa where adaptive capacity is especially low due to extreme poverty.5 Adapting to a changing climate is vital to the survival of communities all over the world.
While the developed world benefited from cheap energy
provided by burning fossil fuels, the developing world will
be the first to suffer. Climate models suggest that agriculture
in the United States will benefit from longer growing seasons
and warmer temperatures, but crops in Africa and elsewhere
are already near the upper end of their temperature tolerance.6
Millions of people least able to cope with environmental change
will suffer as the developed world escapes the initial effects of
climate change.7
In addition to the urgent obligation to drastically reduce carbon emissions, developed countries have a moral obligation to
help the rest of the world adapt to the climate change created by
development.8 The consequences of development are being felt
largely in those communities that benefited least from this development. Developed countries must both mitigate future harm by
reducing emissions and provide major assistance to reduce the
harm caused by previous emissions.9
The IPCC defines adaptation as an “adjustment in natural or
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli
or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial

opportunities.”10 Successful adaptation goes hand in hand with
sustainable development. More developed communities—measured by income, education, capacity of institutions, and access
to technology and information—are more capable of adapting
to changes in the climate.11 To successfully adapt to a changing climate, communities require knowledge of likely impacts
and efficacy of possible responses, capacity to successfully
plan and design responses, the financial resources to implement
adaptation measures and cope with impacts, institutions to organize responses, and technologies that meet the needs of specific
communities.12 To prevent
additional warming, developing countries must avoid
following in the footsteps of
developed countries. Instead,
development must skip many
technological generations
to jump straight to efficient
renewable technologies.
Adaptation efforts must
be balanced between measures that respond to emergencies and measures that
increase the adaptive capacity
of a community.13 Specific adaptations in response to immediate
threats, such as disaster assistance, emergency stockpiles, and
early warning systems, are vital in emergency situations. Larger
benefits, however, are possible from measures that increase
adaptive capacity, such as strengthening competent government
institutions, public health services, and research into alternative
crops.14
Successful adaptation will require a significant investment
by developed nations, but that investment need not require difficult choices. Successful measures that pay for adaptations
achieve the dual goals of mitigating climate change by reducing
emissions and increasing the adaptive capacity of the world. In
the United States, efforts to reduce carbon emissions will likely
yield an energy tax, whether by a direct tax or a cap-and-trade
system, and may include a reduction in subsidies provided to
non-renewable energy companies. While most of the new revenue provided by new taxes and reductions in subsidies should
go towards offsetting other taxes and research into renewable
technologies, a portion of that revenue must go to developing
nations to support efforts to adapt to a changing climate.

The next few decades
will bring significant
changes to global weather
patterns and deviations
from historical norms.
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Endnotes: The Polluter Should Pay continued on page 90
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Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?
by Michael J. Zimmer*

T

Introduction

he international debate over reducing worldwide carbon
emissions increasingly focuses on effectively reducing
carbon emissions by formulating novel policy tools after
the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. One recommendation posits
that if a tax is levied on carbon emissions it would promote environmentally-minded business decisions, encourage incremental
investment in new clean technology, attract the necessary level
of capital formation in impacted sectors, and achieve national
and global environmental goals. Yet, to effectively reduce carbon emissions, businesses and individuals will have to adopt
significant lifestyle and behavioral changes and endorse choices
with dramatic economic consequences. Rather than dwelling on
the immediate impacts on business and household budgets, all
users of energy must eventually confront and assume responsibility for reducing the economic and environmental consequences of carbon emissions. Once governed under the law of
“commons,” carbon will now become governed by the laws of
science, physics, and economics in global markets. To this end,
the most effective plan will ensure that all sources of carbon are
meaningfully addressed.
If economic markets were forced to integrate the cost of
environmental externalities caused by carbon emissions into
the costs of doing business, the ensuing price signals and economic incentives would force a dramatic shift toward developing cleaner energy sources and more sustainable energy habits.
Economic consequences will likely be imposed on the industries
that created carbon emissions if there is any hope of effectively
reversing the legacy of environmental damage. This Article
argues that implementing a tax on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
imposes economic accountability and would impact the use of
precious resources in a more direct, transparent, and sustainable
manner than any proposed cap-and-trade program. The critical
issue is managing the perceived political consequences of exercising such policy choices.
A carbon tax would directly influence both industry and
individual behavior with transparency, fairness, speed, and balance. Industry would have an economic incentive to reduce
their carbon emissions to avoid the tax, which would likely
be a cost passed on to consumers, and thus, the price signals
created would modify consumer behavior. Accurate price signals for carbon (with diminished volatility) will also direct the
marketplace so that clean renewable sources of power, energy
efficiency, demand-side management, and combined heat and
power technologies enjoy a level playing field with the CO2producing conventional fossil fuel generation resources. A capand-trade system will reward traders, commodities merchants,
67

and financial institutions. An astute use of the federal tax system
can build companies, development of equipment and technology, and ensure that physical investments are made in sustainable business models.
But the question remains whether the carbon tax is ready
for widespread application in light of the clear impediments
to, and uncertainty about, a cap-and-trade system. Currently,
carbon trading cannot establish with reasonable accuracy how
much carbon is being bought and sold over a period of time.
The product is not physical, it is not readily usable, and the purchaser faces limited utility after the purchase is consummated. It
is also subject to a level of reliance on fiduciary conduct that has
been compromised in past decades and is not fully embedded
in all global financial and legal systems. Industry self-reporting
will remain an essential component to any new CO2 emissionscontrol system, but the most effective policies will institute a
further measure of verification and transparency. No technology
can confirm and validate such continuous emissions monitoring
for new CO2 products in support of a cap-and-trade system.

Carbon Tax Basics
A “carbon tax” is a tax on the carbon content of fuels; effectively, it is a tax on the CO2 emissions produced from burning
fossil fuels.1 The current prices of gasoline, electricity, oil, coal,
and other fuels do not include the full economic costs of the
health, resource, and environmental externalities associated with
the broad usage of these energy sources in the United States and
around the world. The failure to force industry and consumers to
shoulder these externalities suppresses the economic incentive
to develop and implement carbon-reducing measures like energy
efficiency, renewable energy, advanced metering, storage, additional transmission, or clean technology. On the other hand,
taxing fuels based on their carbon content infuses these incentives at every point in the chain of production and consumption,
from an individual’s choice of the type and usage of vehicles,
appliances, and housing, to business choices of product design,
capital investment, facilities location, and government’s choices
when setting regulatory policy direction.2

* Mr. Zimmer is an attorney at Thompson Hine LLP in the energy practice and
also serves this academic year with the Ohio University Consortium of Energy,
Economics and the Environment. Mr. Zimmer expresses his appreciation for the
assistance, research, and editorial guidance provided by Jennifer M. Rohleder in
the preparation of this article. Ms. Rohleder is a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law and a law clerk at Thompson Hine LLP in Washington, D.C. The
views herein are based on the author’s research and do not necessarily represent the views of any clients the author represents nor organizations in which the
author participates.
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Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade
Regardless of whether creating a price for carbon emissions takes the form of a tax or tradable emissions allowances,
the cost of carbon emissions will
be passed through to the ultimate
consumers. This fundamental
market result occurs while ninetyeight percent of United Kingdom
(“U.K.”) businesses recognize it
is important to reduce the environmental impact of industry.3
Over fifty percent of U.K. companies today are struggling with
long-term strategic and business
modeling decisions in the face
of the current unstable policy
and tax environment.4 Interestingly, after global cap-and-trade
emissions trading experience,
almost sixty-six percent of U.K. companies welcome the use of
the tax system to provide incentives for them to become carbon neutral.5 Only the public policy processes fail to recognize
this current market-based distinction in managing what has been
characterized as one of the greatest market failures in the world
today—that failure to clearly account for the externalities of fossil fuel use.

In addition, administering the carbon tax could utilize current tax collection mechanisms and existing enforcement, compliance, reporting, and administrative resources. In contrast,
the cap-and-trade approach
embraced by the financial
industry envisions creating a
complex new system for compliance reporting, audits, and
verification with an uncertain
value proposition in return.
Without developing rigorous
new accounting and verification mechanisms, such a system is unworkable and will
be highly volatile and subject
to gaming, thereby undermining confidence and certainty in
planning the outcome. A carbon
tax is much more feasible than
a cap-and-trade system, except for the threat of its dire political
consequences.

A carbon tax would
directly influence
both industry and
individual behavior with
transparency, fairness,
speed, and balance.

Price Predictability
A carbon tax sets a market clearing price that encourages
predictable energy prices. Predictability is important because
when future energy and power prices can be reliably calculated
in advance, energy-critical decisions can be made with the full
awareness of carbon price signals. Once these price signals are
added to the costs that industry must factor into the cost of doing
business, they can affect plant and building design considerations, new clean technology development, electricity storage
and deployment for industry, and appliance selection and the
purchase of the family car for the individual.6
The United States has had tradable permits for sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) since the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. In that period, the tradable permits have varied in
price by over forty percent.7 Yet due to carbon’s higher relative
market penetration within the United States and global economy,
compared to that of SO2, similar price fluctuations would likely
affect all aspects of the U.S. economy, including consumer
spending, budgeting, capital expansion, and inflation.8

Simple Administration
The carbon content of every form of fossil fuel is precisely known, as is the amount of CO2 released when that fuel
is burned.9 This precision presents few technical problems for
documentation or measurement. The type of fuel and the amount
purchased or used is already tracked by most industrial and private consumers. Thus, instituting a carbon tax would require
few, if any, additional reporting or accounting burdens, while
enjoying clarity and transparency.
Winter 2008

Timing
A carbon tax can be implemented much more quickly than
a cap-and-trade program. This factor is critical to the effectiveness of any CO2 emissions reduction policy because time is of
the essence from a scientific performance basis.10 So far, capand-trade has proven to be unsuccessful in reducing carbon
emissions in the European Union and other global markets.11
Although a cap-and-trade system has been extremely successful in the United States for reducing SO2 emissions in the past
decade, the SO2 model is not dispositive for carbon. A carbon
cap-and-trade program will have to be designed one hundred
times larger in scale than its SO2 counterpart, which creates an
enormous problem of scale, complexity, administration, and
cost of compliance for cross-border purposes. In a comparable
example, the success of the U.S. acid rain program required
solid data collection and transparent verification combined with
the use of continuous emissions monitoring technology. Readily available technology does not currently exist for filtering or
capturing CO2. Carbon storage or sequestration will likely take
another decade to become cost effective and will create operational de-rating of ten to thirty percent, water supply demands,
fuels shifting, and higher operating costs to succeed.
Cap-and-trade systems are also complex and difficult to
design. Issues concerning the proper level of the cap, timing,
allowance allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures,
standards for use of offsets, penalties and regional conflicts must
all be addressed before the system can be implemented.12 These
issues require complex operational and political considerations
that surely would hinder any timely solution to regulating U.S.
CO2 emissions. Further, while this design and implementation
process is taking place, polluters are free to continue unchecked
while uncertainty reigns for another decade. A cap-and-trade
approach for CO2 will not be as effective as a carbon tax in the
68

short term because it will lag behind the needs of the marketplace, scientific inquiry, and global policy making. It would not
offer transparency, nor a clear stable price signal to support capital investment and new investment decision-making until 2020.

Less Fraud and Manipulation
The protracted negotiations necessary to develop a comprehensive and politically acceptable carbon cap-and-trade program
leave the process vulnerable to parties shaping the program to
maximize narrow economic benefits, maximizing their market
positions in industry sectors, or constraining competition rather
than designing an economically
efficient system that maximizes
public gain and a competitive
U.S. economy. In a cap-andtrade program, although market
prices will increase, just as with
a carbon tax, the reasons for the
increase are hidden in a maze
of new bureaucracy, regulatory
impositions, and cost partnerships that render it more opaque
and politically attractive.
A carbon tax can be implemented with far less opportunity for manipulation. Carbon taxes are transparent and easily
understandable by the public. Once the market targets for carbon
are set, they can be readily adjusted according to market success or failure. However, it is this transparency and flexibility
that makes a carbon tax politically undesirable because it is clear
where and how society will have to take responsibility, make
direct changes and improvements, and pay for the CO2 by-products of society.

tax,15 I argue it is more effective to skip the middleman with
its administrative costs and complexity, verification problems,
and lack of transparency in favor of a clear tax. To succeed, the
carbon tax would need to be coupled with other tax offsets in the
tax code to be revenue neutral, and be managed in trust to avoid
profligate political expenditures.

Economic Efficiency
Setting a clearing price for carbon that can be periodically evaluated for its effectiveness in achieving public policy
and market performance objectives is a simpler and more economically efficient approach
than a cap-and-trade program.
The cost of carbon can be set
through a tax mechanism, and
its progress in reducing energy
intensity can be evaluated every
five years. This built-in evaluation process permits adjustments to be made, which will
ensure achievement of emission reduction goals. Technical
inputs can be provided by DOE,
EPA, NOAA, and the National Academy of Science each cycle
for review with final economic evaluations of the tax conducted
by Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
In the United States, potential economic harm could be
diminished by offsetting the revenue resulting from a new carbon tax upon its enactment, with mirroring reductions in the
payroll tax, the corporate tax rate, and the alternative minimum
tax. Additional revenue can be reserved in trust for government
funding of clean energy technology and advanced energy R&D.
Economic feedback would be provided with balance to benefit the corporate, small business, and individual tax payers to
reduce the economic burden of the new carbon tax scheme by
starting with a tax that is “revenue neutral.” The key effectiveness of a carbon tax program that is currently being overlooked
is that such a tax may become revenue neutral. Revenue neutrality shifts the economic burden to industries requiring behavioral
and competitive modification consistent with global policy shifts
while preserving efficiency, energy intensity, and benefits of stability in the U.S. economy. No cap-and-trade proposal offers
similar revenue neutrality and the specter of economic stability.
Rather, cap-and-trade arguably creates some market winners,
many market or industry sector losers, opportunities for gaming,
and makes U.S. consumers the biggest losers of all.

A carbon tax can be
implemented much more
quickly than a
cap-and-trade program.

Cap-and-Trade is a Tax in Another Form
The key attribute of cap-and-trade that has made it so popular is that future emission targets for reductions are fixed and
known. This is mostly propaganda, however, because most capand-trade systems under development include a “safety-valve”
provision. This safety valve would counter the operations of
markets and provide for the auctioning of additional allowances
if the price exceeds a certain predetermined value.13 In addition,
the knowledge of the future trajectory of carbon emissions is
questionably valuable because there is no agreed-upon trajectory
for achieving climate stability and preventing disaster.14
Cap-and-trade programs have traditionally provided initial
allowances for free. Freely giving away financial assets prevents
the government from reducing the economic costs of carbon control by cutting taxes elsewhere, or by providing rebates to protected classes of consumers. Certain industries capitalize upon
the economic benefit and prioritize the costs in products regarding services, which flow generally to utilities and traditional
energy providers. Costs are passed through twice to consumers;
this was the case in European electricity markets following the
European Emissions Trading System. While the newer proposed
cap-and-trade programs include a government auction of permits to generate revenue and emulate the advantage of a carbon
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Issues in Designing the Carbon Tax
None of the current carbon tax discussions are ready for
implementation yet for several reasons:

1. Lack of Adequate Enforcement and
Strategy for Tax
Additional tax and energy specialists would need to
be shifted from the U.S. DOE and EPA to the U.S. Treasury
Department. Initially, additional staffing would be required for
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

the additional rulemaking, audits, enforcement, and advisory
work. Tax treaties and the World Trade Organization are in
place to administer international consequences. Within a decade,
administrative precedents could be established, and staffing
management would likely decline as the tax system is largely
self-implementing thereafter.

2. Ability to Ratchet
The whole reason for implementing a tax for carbon is to
harness economic power to quickly attack a serious environmental problem. The goal is to create a market for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid the extraordinary costs
of climate change-induced adaptation. To ensure that emissions
reductions are actually occurring, rather than simply permitting
people to pay more in order to emit much like they are paying
more to continue to drive, a ratcheting mechanism can be studied. The ratchet would periodically increase the tax rate depending on the emission reductions achieved, evaluated every five
years through the processes shared above. This will provide a
consistent price signal to encourage development of less carbonintensive technologies, accelerate clean technology deployment
and planning certainty, and stimulate a societal behavioral shift
toward sustainable business and commercial practices to maintain U.S. competitiveness.
This ratcheting plan was introduced to the House of Representatives in April 2007 when Representative Stark (D-CA)
introduced a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to impose a tax on fossil fuels based on their carbon content.16
This structure could be adapted to begin at $10 per ton of carbon content and increased by $10 per ton every five years until
the United States reaches an annual emissions level that does
not exceed a specified level of CO2 emissions. This structure
would reward early company actions and establish an economic
benchmark, while recording market reaction and response and
managing price volatility.

3. Not as Workable for Transportation
and Commercial Buildings
The cap-and-trade system or carbon tax may not impact the
transportation and commercial building sectors as effectively
as the electric power production sector. More focus is provided
on stationary sources through cap-and-trade while mobile and
building sources are ignored. The new fuel efficiency standards
for passenger and non-passenger vehicles, however, will create
a more direct impact on the transportation sector. In addition,
green buildings could benefit from a required market evaluation
of energy efficiency improvements in building appraisals upon
sale or resale. Moreover, a cost of capital, insurance reductions
and resale valuation “adders” from LEED certified new or existing buildings could be implemented with clearer market signals.
Federal tax credits, accelerated depreciation, state building codes,
and state tax incentives could round out this market for construction where substantial CO2 savings are possible through funding
with carbon tax revenues. The new recognition of forestry and
agricultural impacts might also favor a tax solution to cut back
administrative costs in these important carbon markets.
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4. Requires an Overhaul of Energy
and Environmental Taxes in the Tax Code
Consistent with the enactment of a new carbon tax, existing tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code would require
review for consistency and “deadwood” overhaul. Legacy decisions of the past are not the building blocks of our national
future. The outdated or inconsistent provisions in the tax code
must be removed as part of a carbon tax enactment. A tax or
fee could be levied on CO2 emissions, which would establish
the costs of such emissions with clarity. The market can then
establish the emission level and degree of market penetration in
a revenue neutral environment engaging in classic tax planning
and capital investment in carbon tax avoidance strategies. This
fosters a more productive market transaction than the artificial
cap-and-trade scheme with uncertain prices, little transparency,
additionality and verification concerns—with no corresponding
guarantees of similar levels of capital support for investment in
physical assets to reduce carbon.

5. Problems with Social Stewardship
The neediest citizens of our country need a set-aside of
funds from any new tax revenues. This set-aside should be split
between improving multi-family housing stock upon audit and
Low Income Housing Energy Assistance Program fuel assistance, and affordable housing incentives, structures and support
administered through state, county, and city governments and
foundations. A cap-and-trade system offers no contribution to
our obligations for social stewardship.

6. Water Impact Analysis
No carbon strategy should be considered credible without
analyzing the water impact of the technology choices and strategies for the future. Specifically, the analysis should include the
technology’s impact on water resources, water availability, and
sustainability for CO2 purposes administered through EPA and
the Army Corps of Engineers.

Conclusion
A fair assessment of these strategy alternatives and implementation consequences is critical because the national choices
we make in managing carbon will become the foundation of
the next environmental initiatives: water management, brownfield restoration, and new patterns of U.S. real estate and community development. The business model, market solution, and
strategies for CO2 will set the stage for the next global trading
product—water rights—because of its implications for health,
new power generation, food, and weather impacts on famine,
economic growth, and power production.
Our future course in managing carbon may be unclear, but
the stakes involved in the choice between a new trading system
or the tax system are quite high. After watching market based
responses artificially built around trading and financial risk
management from savings and loans, dot-coms, electric power
marketing, natural gas marketing, agricultural commodities, and
sub-prime mortgage lending, a fresh innovative approach built
around the federal tax system could become a powerful tool of
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market-based action across stationary, mobile, and building emission sources. This true market-based approach also ensures that
physical investment will match with financial risk management
strategies to diminish volatility and achieve the desired result.
Other financial derivatives wrapped around trading schemes do
not provide that comfort, and limit the return and benefits to narrow sectors of society and create distortions in markets.
The consequences of a developed and imposed carbon tax
should be consistently offset against other less desirable business
and individual taxes striving for revenue neutrality. The revenues should never be converted into sources of new funding for
grand social programs or legislative earmarks that benefit political elites, instead of benefiting true markets, U.S. companies,
industries, and the underlying public policy objectives of the
carbon tax operating in a global economy. Carbon can become a
driver for innovation and job creation and technology advancement in the 21st century as opposed to being a mere externality.
Success will depend upon the choices we make managing the
laws of science, economics, and politics with balance and true
protection of U.S. markets and industry. In addressing honestly
the greatest market failure of the 20th century, we can create an
economic renaissance built on sustainable and sound technology
and business practices.
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The Thirsty Rio Grande:
Sustainable Water Planning
Along the Rio Grande in the Age
of Global Warming
by Matthew Padilla*

T

he snow that falls in the Rockies’ Sierra Sangre de Cristo
range holds water during the winter months, slowly
releasing water over the spring and summer months into
the tributaries and aquifers that feed the Rio Grande basin.1 As
the climate continues to warm, the ability of the Rio Grande basin
to replenish itself may become increasingly threatened as snowpack decreases and evaporation rates increase.2 Past droughts
and environmental catastrophes are archeologically preserved in
the ruins of ancient southwestern cities such as Chaco Canyon3
and serve as dire warnings of what may occur in a dryer climate.
As the Southwest prepares for population growth and increased
water scarcity, Albuquerque and El Paso’s stories illustrate how
the destinies of all the communities in the Rio Grande valley are
intertwined.
In the 1980s, New Mexico and the city of El Paso litigated
and negotiated water rights in federal court and before the New
Mexico State Engineer.4 New Mexico’s “beneficial use” provision in its state Constitution and related water management statutes place strict restrictions on water exports.5 Eventually, New
Mexico was not compelled to provide its water to El Paso, thus
allowing farmers and cities in the state to keep part of an already
limited supply of water from booming El Paso.6 As a result, El
Paso was forced to pump more water out of its aquifer in the
Hueco Bolson. El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, which both draw
water from the Hueco Bolson water basin, have been estimated
to have as little as two years of freshwater remaining in their
aquifer and both face population growth.7
El Paso is experiencing increased growth because of military base realignments, which will add nearly 28,000 soldiers,
not to mention their families, to Fort Bliss through 2013.8 With
limited groundwater or water from the Rio Grande to sustain
growth, the city of El Paso turned to the federal government and
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) for federal assistance.9
The solution was the largest inland desalination plant in the
world, meant to treat the remaining brackish ground water and
ensure El Paso’s future growth.10 It is estimated that depleting
the Hueco will enable the city of El Paso to maintain an estimated fifty years of projected growth.11 The Hueco, however, is
not easily recharged and there appear to be no plans for the city
if the Hueco is tapped dry.
* Matthew Padilla is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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to global warming.21 Such preparation is vital if the communities of the Rio Grande are to continue using the available water
for the beneficial use of all in the warmer future. Regardless of
the outcome, as snowpack lessens and evaporation increases, the
thirsty Rio Grande will have less to share with the communities
she sustains.

Endnotes:
1 Western Governors’ Association, Water Needs and Strategies for a
Sustainable Future (June 2006), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/
publicat/Water06.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2008).

The lifeblood of multiple communities is the Rio Grande. Above is a portion of
the Rio Grande Valley State Park near downtown Albuquerque. Photo taken by
Matthew Padilla.

North of El Paso, Albuquerque, New Mexico’s largest
city, is urgently trying to balance growth and make use of the
San Juan-Chama diversion project instead of tapping its finite
aquifer. Through a series of mountain pipes and dams, the
project diverts New Mexico’s water from the Colorado River
basin southwards towards Albuquerque via the Rio Grande.12
The project was spearheaded by former Senator Dennis Chavez
(D-NM) and signed into law by President Kennedy in 1961.13
Senator Chavez spent nearly three decades of his Senate career
working to pass the diversion project as a safeguard against
drought.14
Albuquerque, after learning that its aquifer was smaller
than previously believed, has begun to rely on the additional
San Juan-Chama water as a primary potable water source.15 It is
believed that the San Juan-Chama diversion project will enable
Albuquerque to sustain predicted growth for the next sixty years
without draining its aquifer.16 In addition to the diversion project, the city of Albuquerque has curtailed its water use by over
thirty-percent in the past decade and begun efforts to promote
increased water awareness and eco-friendly development.17
Albuquerque is experiencing rapid growth rates, and will have
to contend with proposed developments which will place greater
strain on its water supplies.18
Population growth is not the only variable affecting the sustainability of water supplies along the Rio Grande. Exacerbating
the problems posed by population growth, climate change has
the potential to derail any planning in the Rio Grande basin that
is based on current water models.19 Declining water supplies
due to decreased snowpack and increased evaporation in the Rio
Grande system will lead to less water and increased litigation
over what is left. Ensuring there is enough water for all entities
could impact agricultural land availability and result in bidding
wars over water rights between stakeholders as has been the case
in other water-scarce regions.20
How the states monitor available water in light of global
warming is also important. The Chair of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources committee Senator Bingaman (D-NM) and
senior member Senator Domenici (R-NM) have both called for
an accounting of western water in light of increased stress due
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Legislative Update
A Changing Climate in the U.S. Congress
by Emily Alves*

W

hen the 110th Congress convened last January, the
new Democratic majority repeatedly pledged that
comprehensive and aggressive legislation to address
global climate change would be a top priority. Many freshmen
members of Congress were elected on platforms of improving
America’s energy security by investing in clean technologies
and reducing our dependence on oil. Heightened interest in the
connection between carbon pollution and U.S. energy consumption has provided further incentive
to follow through on such promises.
An important cornerstone in
developing a framework to address
climate change was the passage of
the Energy Independence and Security Act, on December 17, 2007.1
The most notable achievement
in the bill was the first increase in
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(“CAFE”) standards for automobiles in over three decades. Starting in 2020, all new cars will be required to have a fuel economy
of thirty-five miles per gallon. This mandate is expected to save
up to 3.7 billion metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions by
2030, which will go a long way towards reducing overall emissions.2 Another important component of the bill is a mandate to
increase the production of biofuels to thirty-six billion gallons
by 2015, which will help shift energy production from foreign
oil to domestic and lower greenhouse gas emitting sources.3 The
bill further requires a whole suite of energy efficiency standards
for appliances, most notably a new mandate for all light bulbs to
use seventy percent less electricity by 2020.4
Dropped from the bill at the last minute was a tax package
intended to roll back tax breaks for oil companies in favor of
incentives for renewable energies. Lawmakers were forced to
remove the package under the threat of a filibuster as well as a
Presidential veto. The House also conceded to removing a provision in their original bill that would have mandated a renewable
portfolio standard. That provision faced fierce opposition in the
Senate from lawmakers concerned that their particular regions
had insufficient renewable resources to meet the standard.
The Farm Bill, H.R. 2419, is another legislative initiative
with global warming implications.5 The agricultural sector is

responsible for seventy-one percent of nitrous oxide emissions
and thirty percent of methane emissions in the U.S.—two greenhouse gasses that are considered even more potent than carbon
dioxide.6 While various environmental safeguards can be found
throughout the Farm Bill, the most important in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the conservations title. The
funding provided in this title, which supports programs geared
at protecting wildlife, keeping water reserves clean, and promoting energy efficiency,
was in high demand after
the last Farm Bill in 2002.
There is a great deal of pressure to expand the funding
of this title so that farmers
may engage in conservation
practices that include no-till
agriculture and general crop
and manure management
that will vastly reduce greenhouse gases. At the close of the first
session of Congress in December, both chambers had passed
their own versions of the Farm Bill, and the plan is to start merging the two in early 2008.
In terms of climate specific legislation, more than 125 bills
were introduced within the first few months of the 110th Congress, compared with 106 climate specific bills introduced in the
last two Congresses combined.7 The legislation varies widely in
their methods and in levels of targeted reductions. The most common solution proposed is that of a national cap-and-trade system,
which would assign permits to companies allowing them to emit
a certain amount of carbon pollution. The debate around these
proposals concerns whether the government should oversee such
an operation, and whether the permits should be auctioned off
or freely given. Another far less common proposal is to institute a carbon tax. Under this system, polluters would be required
to pay a tax based on the tonnage of their carbon emissions.
Of all these bills, only one has actually seen a vote. The
America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, was intro-

Of all these bills,
only one has actually
seen a vote.
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duced last October by Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut
and Senator John Warner of Virginia.8 The bill aims to reduce
U.S. carbon emissions to a level somewhere between sixty-two
and sixty-six percent of today’s level by 2050.9 The bill would
set up a declining cap on U.S. carbon emissions that would cover
eighty-six percent of all current U.S. emissions.10 The bill strives
to achieve these methods through several means. It would set up
a cap and trade system to be regulated by the Environmental
Protection Agency, which would be required to implement an
emissions tracking and monitoring system. It would also create
a carbon market efficiency board to monitor any trading of emissions and make necessary adjustments for permit allowances.
The bill was successfully voted out of the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee on December 5, 2007 by a vote
of 11-8.11 According to several capitol hill staffers, floor action
is expected to be brought to the Senate floor around Memorial
Day.
It remains uncertain what further steps Congress will take
to address climate change as it reconvenes for the second session of the 110th Congress. With 2008 being an election year,
lawmakers’ attention may be diverted elsewhere. If, however,
lawmakers choose to continue making climate legislation a priority, they certainly have momentum to build upon.
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Litigation Update
Okeson v. Seattle
by Matt Irwin*

Introduction

Legal Background and Arguments

n January 18, 2007, the Washington State Supreme
Court declared that the City of Seattle owned electric utility company, Seattle City Light, could not use
electric utility rate payments to buy offsets of greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions from companies unassociated with Seattle
City Light. The suit was filed by four individual rate payers, and
on behalf of all other Seattle City Light ratepayers.1 While the
case has been legislatively overturned, it demonstrates the need
for state legislatures to consider the traditional judicial limitations of public utilities in crafting legislation to meet environmental goals.

On April 10, 2000, the City of Seattle passed Resolution
30144 to accompany the 30th Anniversary of Earth Day.2 Resolution 30144 stated that “[Seattle] City Light will meet growing
[electricity energy] demand with no net increase in greenhouse
gas emissions by . . . [m]itigating or offsetting greenhouse gas
emissions associated with any fossil fuels to meet load growth.”3
In the spring of 2001, the Seattle city council passed resolution
30359.4 Resolution 30359 stated that because it is more expensive to reduce GHG emissions locally in the Seattle area than in
other areas, Seattle City Light was directed to pay other entities

O

*Matt Irwin is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University Washington
College of Law.

Winter 2008

74

throughout the country to reduce their GHG emissions to offset Seattle City Light’s GHG emissions.5 An example of Seattle
City Light’s agreements with outside entities was Seattle City
Light’s agreement with DuPont in which Seattle City Light paid
DuPont $650,000 to buy 300,000 tons of GHG emission offsets
from a DuPont plant in Kentucky.6
Plaintiff ratepayers challenged the legality of Seattle City
Light’s GHG offset contracts, arguing that under Washington
law, utility expenditures must
have a sufficient nexus to the utility’s purpose.7 Therefore, under
the plaintiff’s argument, Seattle
City Light’s arrangements to
pay entities such as DuPont to
reduce their GHG emissions did
not have a sufficient connection
to supplying electricity to Seattle
ratepayers.8 Defendant City of
Seattle argued that it may choose
any means to reduce GHG emissions as long as it offsets the GHG emissions associated with
supplying power to Seattle ratepayers, including paying other
emitters to reduce their GHG emissions.9

reduce the world’s GHG emissions on an aggregate, not Seattle
City Light’s own GHG emissions in regards to the operation of
supplying electricity.16

Conclusion
Individual plaintiff Okeson released a statement that the
“lawsuit doesn’t mean he opposes fighting global warming . . .
But he wants utilities to deal with their own pollution and calculate the price into what they
sell rather than paying someone
else to deal with the problem.”17
While under the previous statutory regime the plaintiffs were
successful in preventing Seattle
City Light from paying other
companies to reduce their GHG
emissions, Washington has
passed legislation that specifically overrules Okeson v. City
of Seattle.18 The Washington
State Legislature has passed H.B. 1929, which allows municipal
utilities and public utility districts to mitigate their GHG emissions through activities such as, “purchase, trade, or banking of
greenhouse gasses offsets or credits.”19 Thus the state of Washington has overcome previous statutory and judicial limitations
to allow Seattle City Light to mitigate its impact on global
climate change.

Plaintiff ratepayers
challenged the legality of
Seattle City Light’s GHG
offset contracts.

Holdings
The trial court granted summary judgment for the City of
Seattle.10 The trial judge summarized the court’s position:
I think that City Light has the authority to reduce its
own emissions. It can do that by managing its own
facilities, its own producing facilities, or it can spend
money to have its emissions, its contribution reduced
by someone else. This all makes sense only because of
the unusual nature of the greenhouse gas canopy; the
fact that it is an envelope around the entire glove; that
it’s not localized.11
Thus, the trial court upheld Seattle City Light’s agreements
to pay unrelated emitters of GHGs because, considering the
nature of GHG reduction, there is no difference between reducing GHGs in the Seattle area or thousands of miles away.
The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order to
the Washington State Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”). The
state’s Supreme Court applied a longstanding Washington
state rule that a municipal corporation is limited to the powers
expressly granted to them, powers implied or incident to the
express powers, or powers essential to the purpose of the municipal corporation.12 The Supreme Court stated that as a municipal
corporation, Seattle City Light lacks the authority to take actions
that benefit the public as a whole.13 Instead, as a municipal corporation, Seattle City Light can only take actions that benefit
ratepayers.14 The Supreme Court determined that by paying
other organizations to reduce their GHG emissions, Seattle City
Light is not actually reducing its own emissions and is therefore
benefiting the public as a whole, not just the Seattle City Light
ratepayers.15 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Seattle
City Light’s GHG emissions offset contracts were not within
the utility’s proprietary powers because they were designed to
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Book Reviews
The Montreal Protocol
Celebrating 20 Years of Environmental Progress
Edited By Donald Kaniaru
Reviewed by Michael Distefano*

T

he majority of today’s environmental discourse tends to
deal with current and on-going battles, and rightly so.
Climate change, renewable energy, and species conservation are issues that are still playing out in civil society, and
thus draw heavily on the resources of environmental advocates.
For this reason it is refreshing, even inspiring, to reexamine past
environmental victories.
The Montreal Protocol stands
as one of the most effective environmental treaties ever, and there
are many lessons to be learned
from its success. The collection
of essays in The Montreal Protocol: Celebrating 20 Years of
Environmental Progress, edited
by Donald Kaniaru, traces the
history of the Montreal Protocol,
examines the mechanisms and
organization which enabled its success, and finally teases out the
lessons which can be learned and employed in today’s confrontation with climate change.
The primary aim of the Protocol was to halt the depletion
of stratospheric ozone by chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), which
are chemical compounds commonly used as propellants and
refrigerants. Beginning in the mid-70s, scientists were noticing
a disturbing trend in the breakdown of CFCs and their reaction
with ozone. Though the science of the time was struggling to
understand this process completely, by the mid-80s it was clear
to many that a response was needed. The Montreal Protocol was
that response. The Protocol was finalized in September 1987,
but the final document was the culmination of a ten-year process
of constructing frameworks, debating implementation strategies, and building relationships. It included the themes of burden
sharing and differentiated responsibility, which although they
are common today, were quite novel at the time.
The agreement was for a fifty percent reduction in the use
and consumption of five types of CFCs by 1999, using 1986 as

the base year. Signatories included the United States, Japan, the
European Union, and the Soviet Union, which along with a few
smaller consumers represented more than two-thirds of worldwide CFC consumption.
As many of the authors included in this book argue, there
are clear parallels between the challenges of ozone depletion
and climate change. While
the effects of CFCs and other
ozone-depleting substances
are common knowledge today,
the science at the time was still
uncertain in many respects. It
did not deal with an immediate threat, but rather one that
would fully manifest itself in
the future. It would affect not
just certain individuals, but
everyone on earth. The Montreal Protocol boldly instituted short-term economic costs to prevent this threat from materializing, and in so doing, undertook
preventive action on a global scale. In these ways, the Protocol
demanded of its signatories the same commitments that treaties
addressing climate change require today.
Another argument running through the book is that the Montreal Protocol itself has done much to combat climate change. In
fact, many of the authors believe that further changes to the Protocol, such as an accelerated HCFC phase-out, would produce
a valuable short-term reduction in greenhouse gases. Such a
strengthening of the Protocol could serve to shift the Protocol’s
focus from ozone-depleting substances to climate change more
generally. This strategy is recommended because such a move
may provide insurance against the slow progress of the Kyoto
Protocol.

There are clear parallels
between the challenges
of ozone depletion and
climate change.
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While opponents of an HCFC phase-out point to the relative
absence of energy efficient and cost-effective replacements, a
key lesson of the Montreal Protocol is that the knowledge that a
market is in decline will often provide the creative stimulus and
financial resources needed to develop alternatives. No alternatives to CFCs existed when the Montreal Protocol’s ban on CFCs
was first proposed, but when faced with a phase-out, chemical
producers, notably DuPont, quickly developed alternatives and
committed themselves to new production strategies. The book
goes on to suggest that this realization is the missing element at
the Kyoto Protocol. If energy producers were assured of immi-

nent changes, technological innovation would be the only means
of survival, and society could finally expect the advances for
which it has been waiting.
The authors of this book present a valuable and policyoriented approach to understanding environmental protocols.
They celebrate the success of the Montreal Protocol while at the
same time seeking to translate that success into further environmental victories. Their message is that as we turn to face the
problems of today, insight and lessons from the past are perhaps
our best hope.

Cool It:
The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming
by Bjørn Lomborg
Reviewed by Mary J. Bortscheller*

B

jørn Lomborg, a professor at the Copenhagen Business
School, is a self-described “skeptical environmentalist.”1
The Skeptical Environmentalist is also the title of his
2001 book, a controversial volume proposing that, far from
deteriorating, the state of the environment is actually improving. The book set off a wave of criticism in Lomborg’s native
Denmark, including allegations that his arguments were “scientifically dishonest.”2 These allegations were later proved false
by the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.3
The firestorm surrounding The Skeptical Environmentalist has
not deterred the writer from continuing his pursuit of provocative
arguments in the environmental debate in his latest book, Cool
It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming.
Lomborg sets an ambitious agenda from the start of Cool
It, which seeks to reframe the international debate about the
challenges and solutions presented by climate change. In a volume dedicated “to future generations,” Lomborg acknowledges
the existence of global warming and its significant impact on
humanity. Simultaneously, however, he asserts that the current
societal debate is getting it all wrong by designing costly and
inefficient solutions to a problem that is overblown.
In recent years, the causes and effects of global warming
have received increasing attention in the media. Most predictions
have been dire. Lomborg attempts to persuade his readers that
the media and many, if not most, environmental activists focus
on data that is wrong or taken out of context. His central example for this point is the emphasis on rising global temperatures
and the deaths that will be caused by extreme heat waves similar
to what Europe experienced in the summer of 2003. Lomborg
maintains that while a warmer Earth will provoke more deathly
77

heat waves, it will also prevent hundreds of thousands of deaths
caused by extremely cold temperatures.
He returns to this point several times to illustrate what he
emphasizes is the mistaken focus of the environmental debate.
The comparative reduction in overall deaths caused by weather
is a central factor in Lomborg’s overall cost-benefit analysis of
global warming solutions. Under his analysis, most of the proposed solutions to global warming that involve carbon-emission
reduction are, economically-speaking, a “bad deal,” producing
benefits that are not worth the effort.
Lomborg is particularly critical of the Kyoto Protocol and
similar international efforts calling for high taxes on carbon
emissions. He stresses that the Protocol is too costly for the benefits it would confer. According to Lomborg’s assessment, if
implemented to the fullness of its provisions, the Kyoto Protocol
would only yield a global temperature reduction of 0.3 degrees
Fahrenheit by 2100. In Lomborg’s view, the billions of dollars
spent implementing the Kyoto Protocol could be better spent
elsewhere, combating disease, malnutrition and other global
maladies. Lomborg also defends the United States’ reluctance
to ratify the Protocol, because the United States would get the
worst deal by spending the most money on implementation for
the least return or benefit.
Rather than follow a Kyoto Protocol-style model, Lomborg
advocates a global carbon tax model that balances the cost of
the tax with the tangible environmental benefits derived from
the carbon emission cuts. A model of this type would avoid a
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situation illustrated by the law of diminishing returns, where the
more carbon emissions are cut, the fewer the “social benefits” to
humans. Lomborg quotes economists who believe “going much
beyond the small optimal initiative is economically unjustified.”
Lomborg urges the international community to consider the
range of issues facing the world today, from epidemic diseases
like HIV/AIDS and malaria to malnutrition and trade barriers.
As a founding member of the Copenhagen Consensus, a conference of economists whose stated goal is to “provoke international debate about prioritization,” Lomborg tries to steer the
focus away from global warming to problems that have more
feasible solutions. While recognizing that climate change and
its attendant consequences are real, Lomborg and the members
of the Copenhagen Consensus rank it low on the list of international priorities. In a list of seventeen of the “world’s greatest
challenges,” climate change comes in dead last behind solutions to problems such as disease, malnutrition, migration, and
corruption.4
A prominent figure in Cool It is former Vice President Al
Gore, whom Lomborg repeatedly cites as having misled the
debate over global warming. Responding to the popular acclaim
for the 2006 documentary An Inconvenient Truth, Lomborg wonders how the film and Mr. Gore, by showing the chain reaction
of global warming, melting ice caps and rising sea levels, “can
say something so dramatically removed from the best science.”
Lomborg cites Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change data
to refute the documentary’s images of coastal cities inundated
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by rising sea levels. According to Lomborg, the IPCC’s data
indicates that as the Earth’s temperature increases, “Antarctica
will not noticeably start melting” but there will be more precipitation and “Antarctica will actually…[accumulate] ice, reducing
sea levels by two inches.”
Whether Bjørn Lomborg’s Cool It will succeed in changing
the tenor and framework of the climate change debate remains to
be seen. What is not in doubt, however, is that Lomborg’s ideas
are provocative and his goals ambitious. Cool It is a challenging
and interesting read for anyone concerned with global warming,
whatever your reading of the current crisis may be.
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World News
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*

Africa & Asia
U.S. scientists recently released a report showing that crops
in Southern Asia and Africa will likely be the worst affected
by climate change. Equally as important, the research showed
that the people in these regions utilize the likely affected crops
for a majority of their calorie intake, increasing the likelihood
of mass-malnutrition and starvation.1 The most affected crops
include millet, groundnuts, rapeseed, and wheat in Asia, and sorghum and maize in Africa.2 To increase research and investment
into developing foods that can withstand climate change, the
Gates Foundation has announced that it will grant $19.9 million
to the International Rice Research Institute (“IRRI”) to develop
rice species to fill the role.3 IRRI will develop a strain of rice
that is resistant to floods, droughts, and salty water, and distribute it to 400,000 farmers in needy areas.4

Americas
On January 30th, the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”)
quit supporting the FutureGen project in Mattoon, Illinois
because of predicted cost overruns and other concerns.5 FutureGen was to be a near zero emission coal plant and a prototype
for the next generation of clean-coal plants around the world.6 Its
goal was to convert coal into flammable hydrogen, which would
power electric turbines, and carbon dioxide would have been
sequestered underground.7 In response to the growing estimated
costs, $1.8 billion, the consortium of private companies working
on FutureGen with the government offered to split any overrun
costs, however, the DOE acknowledged that costs were not the
only issues.8 A report from MIT highlighted that a single power
plant could not provide all the trials that clean coal sequestration
requires.9
With the United States relying on coal fired power plants
for over half of its electricity, experts believe it is necessary for
the United States to discover uses of coal that do not result in
large releases of carbon dioxide.10 The DOE hopes to receive
comments on clean coal sequestration technology and then build
multiple plants like the previously proposed FutureGen, without the previous issues of cost overruns and burdensome federal
rules.11

Europe
Norway plans to cut its greenhouse gas emissions to nearly
nine percent below 1990-levels by 2012 and become carbon
79

neutral by 2030.12 This is twenty years sooner than Norway’s
announcement last year of going carbon neutral by 2050.13 Norway plans to drop their emissions to forty-five million tons from
their current production of fifty-eight million by 2012. However,
scientists in Norway point out that there are very few planned
cuts in emissions.14 In fact, Norway’s greenhouse gas emissions are expected to increase in the coming years because of a
growing dependence on gas and oil for energy.15 Norway currently gets much of its energy from its hydroelectric stations,
but plans to increase natural gas use to satisfy growing demand.
16 While Norway does plan to force industry to purchase quotas
on Norwegian markets, that will only decrease production by an
expected 9.7 million tons.
The remaining cuts are expected to come from the purchase
of carbon credits via the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”), and the planting of forests.17 The Norwegian plan
includes spending more than $550 million a year on reforestation efforts around the world. Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries can only get CDM credits for planting trees in developing
countries.18 Many groups have criticized the plan as vague and
impossible, but Norwegian officials say that the far sighted goals
are necessary and liken reaching the carbon neutral goal to the
environmental equivalent of landing on the moon.19

Middle East
The United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) is planning to build the
world’s first carbon neutral city, Masdar City, in the desert outside of the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi. Work has already begun
on the massive project which is slated to open in 2016 and is
expected to cost $22 billion.20 The government has put up $4
billion for the project with the rest financed by private enterprise looking to make money from the carbon credits.21 Masdar
City will use solar collection for power, be one hundred percent
car free, with full waste recycling, and use seventy percent less
energy and fifty to sixty percent less water than conventional cities.22 Masdar City hopes to use both rooftop solar panels as well
as large concentrated solar power (“CSP”) outside the city for
all their power needs.23 CSP is different from traditional photovoltaic solar cells because it uses mirrors to focus heat from the
sun to produce power and is ideal for hot desert climates like in
the UAE.24
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Polar Regions
New research is showing that the ability of trees to act as a
carbon sink for the world may be decreasing as climate change
increases. The higher temperatures created by climate change
are beginning to alter the carbon cycle of trees taking in carbon
through photosynthesis and then releasing it when they decompose or burn.25 Until recently, it was believed that climate change
would spur greater growth in plants, at least initially, because of
the increased growing season, thereby increasing their carbon
uptake. This increased growth is already evident and can be seen

from space. However, a research group monitoring forests in
thirty northern polar regions for the past twenty years has shown
that increased carbon uptake has not followed the increased
growth.26 Their research focused on the autumn months when
most forests release more carbon than they take in because of
decomposition. The research shows that autumn is coming earlier in the year, in some cases as much as a few weeks, meaning
that the forests are producing much more CO2 than previously
expected.27 Although the net effect of this finding is still not
known, forest adaptation or the forestation of areas currently
covered in tundra could make up for the extra CO2.28
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